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Preface
In today’s world, information is an important resource. Information and communication
technologies (ICT) have enabled a transformation of our society to the information age.
They interrupted and accelerated the normal pace of economic progress in an econom-
ically significant manner. They are thus considered general purpose technologies (e.g.
Brynjolfsson and McAffee, 2014). Prices to collect, store, and transmit information have
fallen significantly. The number of transistors on integrated circuits, determining the
processing power of electronic products, increased exponentially from a few thousand in
the 1960s to several billions in the 2010s (e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAffee, 2014). The
resulting increase in processing speed enabled the progress of the digital revolution.
Baldwin (2016) refers to ICT as the main driver of the second era of globalization by
radically reducing the cost of moving ideas across borders. ICT facilitate the interaction
and coordination between firms, customers, and suppliers (Brynjolfsson and Saunders,
2010). Since the introduction of broadband internet, e-mail and voice over internet pro-
tocol technologies offer cheap and convenient ways to communicate, replacing expensive
airmail or overseas calls. ICT facilitate offshoring of business support services such as
customer services, credit bureaus, and call centres. Cheap communication and easy ac-
cess to remote servers further allow employees to work from distant locations to their
employers (Bloom et al., 2015). Besides, firms set up e-businesses to reach new customers
instead of sending catalogues. These new opportunities promote economic growth and
efficiency.
Despite the many advantages of ICT, there is an increasing discussion about the un-
intended negative consequences of these new technologies. Many worry about increasing
unemployment as humans are replaced by machines (e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAffee,
2011; Brynjolfsson and McAffee, 2014). Most tasks that are substituted by machines are
1
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routine in nature and executed by low-skilled individuals. Convincing evidence by many
scholars shows that the ongoing technological change is skill-biased (e.g. Autor et al.,
2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017; on broadband internet:
Akerman et al., 2015). Until now, most evidence on the impact of ICT on employment
and skill composition is shown at the local labor market level. To draft effective policy,
however, it is important to understand the firm level responses. The first two chapters
of this dissertation provide a new perspective on how access to ICT shapes firms.
In addition, the rise of the digital age suggests that geographic frictions can be eas-
ily overcome nowadays. More than twenty years ago, Cairncross (1997) claimed that
geographical distance would soon not play a role anymore as ICT would let any fric-
tions disappear. However, face-to-face communication remains relevant for social and
economic clustering (e.g. Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998; Storper and Venables, 2004). Even
global technology companies such as Facebook and Yahoo require their employees to
work in their company offices (Reses, 2013; Zuckerberg, 2016). Despite all the possi-
bilities offered by ICT, they report substantial frictions to optimal communication and
coordination if employees are not working at the same location. Indeed, Battiston et al.
(2017) find that face-to-face communication remains a significant determinant of team
productivity. Hence, ICT do not seem to have let “distance die”. It is therefore im-
portant to understand how firms respond to the geographic frictions. Chapter 3 of this
dissertation focuses on geographic frictions and their effect on the managerial organiza-
tion of firms, even when ICT exist.
In chapters 1 and 2, we1 study firm responses to getting access to one of the arguably
most revolutionary information technologies: broadband internet. We provide causal
empirical evidence on the impact of faster broadband internet availability on firm growth,
employment, and firm skill composition. Identifying the impact of getting access to faster
broadband internet empirically poses a challenge as firms self-select into the adoption
of faster broadband internet. This makes it difficult to disentangle the causal effect of
broadband internet speed adoption from unobserved characteristics of firms that choose
to adopt faster broadband internet. To overcome this problem, we use an identification
1To facilitate readibility, the pronoun “we” is used throughout this thesis to refer to the author or
the authors of the respective chapter.
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strategy originally proposed by Falck et al. (2014). Our results show how existing firms
respond to the introduction of new technologies as we compare the same firm before and
after getting access to broadband internet. Thus, our results are not driven by start-ups
that use broadband internet as a key component in their original business model. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to causally identify within-firm responses to
broadband internet speed availability at the time of introduction.
Our identification strategy is based on an historical accident. During the early 2000s,
broadband internet was diffused over the copper wires of the established telephone net-
work in Germany. This imposed technological restrictions: the nature of the network
led to exogenous differences in the ability of establishments and firms to adopt faster
broadband internet. The main distribution frames (MDFs) in the network are connected
through copper wires to establishments and households. With increasing distance to the
MDF, the maximum speed provided decays up to a threshold distance. Whereas Falck
et al. (2014) relate the distance between the geographical middle point of a municipality
to the threshold to instrument the share of households with broadband internet access, we
extend their strategy by calculating and using the individual distance of each geocoded
establishment to the MDF. Our set-up allows identifying establishment responses to the
first generation of broadband internet access and later speed upgrades in Germany.
Chapters 1 and 2 study the responses of single-establishment and multi-establishment
firms separately. As shown in chapter 1, single-establishment firms include many young
firms with high growth potential. For example, they profit from decreasing costs of
market access as the possibility to set up an e-business offers a cheap way to enter new
markets. Understanding how these firms respond to ICT is important to draft policy that
stimulates future growth. In chapter 2, we study multi-establishments. They are a very
important subgroup of firms as they employ disproportionate shares of the workforce
(30% in Germany; 80% in the US, see Bernard and Jensen, 2007). Their reaction to ICT
thus has a big impact on aggregate labor demand.
We assemble unique datasets for our analysis. We use German social security records
that provide information on establishments and employees. We combine the administra-
tive data with firm-level information. For single-establishment firms, we use information
from an establishment survey. For multi-establishment firms, we add information pro-
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vided by Bureau van Dijk via a record linkage procedure. We can thus identify which
establishments belong to the same firm. To implement our identification strategy, we
geocode the establishments and add information on the telephone network to assess
which broadband internet speed is available to each establishment.
Chapter 1 studies how access to faster broadband internet affects single-establishment
firm growth. We find that firms with access to the first generation of broadband internet
reduce their employment while keeping their output constant. This finding suggests
increasing efficiency through broadband internet acesss. Moreover, firms with access to
the first generation of broadband internet reduce the share of low-skilled employment in
their workforce. Besides, we find that firms that receive later speed upgrades grow more
in revenues and employment than firms that do not get access to the upgrades. This
finding points towards an increasing market size effect of the access to faster broadband
internet. In addition, firms with access to the later speed upgrades increase the share of
medium-skilled while decreasing the share of high-skilled employment.
Our results suggest both positive efficiency and market size effects of the access to
faster broadband internet. The first generation of broadband internet seems to decrease
the required labor input per unit of output. The later speed upgrades seem to provide
the opportunity to increase revenues and hence to expand production. In addition, our
findings provide evidence for complementarity of medium-skilled labor to broadband
internet.
We contribute to the literature by providing causal evidence on the effect of the access
to faster broadband internet on firm growth. Our differences-in-differences approach al-
lows ruling out time-constant firm characteristics that may otherwise explain differences
between firms that do or do not get access to the new technologies. Exploiting the ex-
ogenous differences in broadband internet speed availability allows excluding any further
bias of our estimates through omitted variables. We also provide supportive evidence of
skill-complementarity of broadband internet as found by Akerman et al. (2015). Firms
adjust their skill composition by increasing the share of more highly skilled employment
as a response to faster broadband internet availability. Our findings provide a more com-
prehensive picture on the firm adjustments in response to getting broadband internet
access.
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Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Anna Gumpert, Eduardo Morales, Ezra Ober-
field, and Manfred Antoni. We focus on the analysis of the impact of broadband internet
speed availability on firm employment and skill composition to multi-establishment firms.
Understanding multi-establishment firms may further our understanding of the impact
of ICT on multinational firms: Baldwin (2016) predicts that the reduction of face-to-face
costs through advancing ICT will lead to another wave of unbundling of tasks between
developed and developing countries. However, to date, very little empirical evidence in
this respect exists.
It is important to consider the access to faster broadband internet at the establish-
ment level as opposed to the firm level, as adoption may vary between establishments.
Firms only adopt certain broadband internet speed in those establishments where it is
efficient. The impact of faster broadband internet on multi-establishment firms may vary
depending on where it is adopted. For example, if the headquarters of a firm adopts faster
broadband internet, this may facilitate managing subordinate establishments by reduc-
ing coordination costs and thus have repercussions on the subordinate establishment.
Our identification strategy, as applied in chapter 1, allows differentiating between the
impact of an establishment’s own access to faster broadband internet and the respective
headquarters’ access.
We find that subordinate establishments respond to their headquarters’ access to
faster broadband internet. Subordinate establishments that already employ high-skilled
labor respond more strongly to faster internet availability at their own location and at
their headquarters’. In addition, subordinate establishments shift their skill composition
towards more skilled labor when their headquarters gets access to faster broadband
internet. Thus, our results point towards interdependence of subordinate establishments
and headquarters as well as skill-complementarity of faster broadband internet.
Similar to chapter 1, chapter 2 contributes to the literature on the impact of broad-
band internet on firm behavior. We provide a more comprehensive picture on the skill-
complementarity of broadband internet by showing that firm responses to the access to
faster broadband internet depend on their initial skill composition. By showing that
subordinate establishments increase the share of more skilled labor, we further pro-
vide evidence on firm adjustments in the workforce. In addition, chapter 2 extends the
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literature on multi-establishment firms by providing empirical evidence on the interde-
pendence of the establishments within a multi-establishment firm. This finding suggests
that establishments of multi-establishment firms should not be treated as independent
units.
Consistent with the ongoing discussion on the importance of face-to-face communica-
tion, our findings in chapter 2 suggest that geographic frictions between establishments
are more important than previously thought. Establishments may be interdependent
because access to faster broadband internet in the headquarters may facilitate the co-
ordination of subordinate establishments and thus have repercussions on the optimal
organization of the firm. As our analysis in chapter 2 does not allow isolating the impact
of easier access to information from the reduction of internal frictions within the firm,
we study this second channel in a separate analysis.
In chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Anna Gumpert and Manfred Antoni,
we study how geographic frictions affect firms’ managerial organization. We develop a
model to show that geographic frictions between the headquarters and one subordinate
establishment affect the organization of all establishments of a multi-establishment firm.
We assume that the CEO of a firm is a resource of limited supply that is shared among
the establishments. Geographic frictions increase the costs of accessing the CEO. Hiring
middle managers at an establishment releases CEO time that is reallocated across all
establishments. This increases the production efficiency of the establishments and thus
affects their optimal organization.
We provide empirical evidence supporting our model implications. The model ex-
plains cross-sectional differences between single and multi-establishment firm organiza-
tion that we uncover using administrative data from Germany. We exploit the opening
of high speed train routes to show that not only establishments directly affected by faster
travel times, but also the other establishments of the firm adjust their organization. Our
findings imply that empirical analyses at the establishment level may underestimate the
impact of local conditions on multi-establishment firms.
This insight is particularly relevant for the literature on multi-establishment and
multinational firms. Recent papers uncover that distance to the headquarters and other
geographic frictions decrease investment, productivity and longevity of subordinate es-
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tablishments of multi-establishment firms (e.g. Giroud, 2013; Kalnins and Lafontaine,
2013). In this literature, standard models implicitly assume that firms copy their ex-
isting operations when opening foreign affiliates (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004; Antràs and
Yeaple, 2014, for a survey). To the best of our knowledge, Charnoz et al. (2015) is the
only study of the impact of geographic frictions on firm organization. We provide a novel
and nuanced interpretation of the regression results in light of our theoretical model.
Besides, our study contributes to the literature on firm organization and management
by showing that geographic frictions are a determinant of firm organization. Previous
literature focuses on firm size as the major determinant of firm organization (for an
overview, see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015).
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the impact of ICT on
firm behavior. Firms with access to broadband internet become more efficient and in-
crease the share of more skilled employment. It further points out how, notwithstanding
the powerful technologies, geographic frictions remain key determinants of firm organi-
zation.
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Chapter 1
Firm Responses to High-Speed
Internet
1.1 Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are general purpose technologies
that enable firms to reshape their business (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Saunders, 2010).
Broadband internet, in particular, is said to have revolutionized many business processes.
Firms may set up e-businesses and hence increase the size of the market they can serve.
Further, broadband internet facilitates file-sharing and offers new communication tools
like videoconferencing. Still, causal evidence on firm growth affected by broadband
internet is limited as identifying the causal impact is difficult.
This chapter studies how access to the broadband internet affects firm growth. Our
set-up allows identifying firm responses to the first generation of broadband internet
access and later speed upgrades in Germany. We analyze within-firm growth and work-
force adjustments caused by the access to the broadband internet and the later speed
upgrades using detailed social-security data.
We find that firms with access to the first generation of broadband internet reduce
their employment while keeping their output constant. They specifically reduce the share
of low-skilled employment in their workforce. Further, we find that firms that get access
This chapter uses the same identification strategy as chapter 2. To make each chapter self-contained,
we explain the identification strategy in both chapters. I would like to thank Manfred Antoni and Florian
Zimmermann at the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg for their great support.
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to later speed upgrades grow more in revenues and employment than firms that do not
get access to these upgrades. When getting access to higher internet speed, firms increase
the share of medium-skilled while decreasing the share of high-skilled employment.
Theoretically, one would expect two distinct effects of broadband internet adoption on
firm growth in revenues and employment. First, broadband internet is said to increase
efficiency in production processes by reducing communication and coordination costs
with customers and suppliers. As a result, required labor per unit of output decreases.
Empirically, we test this hypothesis of increasing efficiency by regressing revenues per
employee on broadband internet access.
Second, broadband internet potentially increases the size of the market a firm can
serve by reducing search costs and offering new sales opportunities. Browsing the web
provides a cheap way of searching for information on new markets. Also, firms can set
up e-businesses that create new sales channels. As a result of the increase in market
size, firms would grow in revenues and expand production. Thus, firms require more of
each production factor, including labor. Empirically, we test this hypothesis by using
revenues and value-added as the outcome variables to measure output. Further, we
use different employment measures as outcome variables. In practice, both effects may
occur simultaneously. In our analysis, we observe the net effect of potential expansions
in output and employment as well as a decreasing ratio of required labor per unit of
output.
Apart from its believed positive impact on growth, the expansion of broadband in-
ternet is said to contribute to a rising skill-biased technological change (Akerman et al.,
2015). Policymakers should not only consider the overall employment effects of new
technologies but also take the distribution effects into account. To contribute to this
discussion, we study the changes in the skill composition of firms getting access to the
broadband internet and later speed upgrades.
Identifying the impact of getting access to the broadband internet empirically poses
a challenge as firms self-select into broadband internet adoption. This makes it difficult
to disentangle the causal effect of broadband internet adoption from unobserved charac-
teristics of firms that choose to adopt broadband internet. To overcome this problem, we
use an identification strategy originally proposed by Falck et al. (2014) to compare firms
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with differential access to faster broadband internet before and after its introduction and
later speed upgrades. During the early 2000s, broadband internet was diffused over the
copper wires of the established telephone network in Germany. This imposed techno-
logical restrictions: the nature of the network exogenously led to differential access to
higher broadband internet speed levels (here: digital subscriber line, DSL). The main
distribution frames (MDFs) in the network are connected through copper wires to firms
and households, also called the “last mile” of the network. With increasing distance to
the MDF, the maximum speed provided decays up to a threshold distance. Whereas
Falck et al. (2014) relate the distance between the geographical middle point of a munic-
ipality to the threshold to instrument the share of households with broadband internet
access, we extend their strategy by calculating and using the individual distance of each
firm to the MDF.
We exploit the fact that distance to the MDF affected broadband internet speed
availability in Germany, a technical feature that firms could not anticipate. We compare
firms before and after the introduction of the first generation of broadband internet
by restricting our sample to firms within small bounds around the threshold distance.
Moreover, our identification strategy allows studying the impact of speed upgrading in
addition to the effect of access to the first generation of broadband internet. Within
the group of firms that got access to the first generation of broadband internet, only
a subgroup also got access to the later speed upgrades. Again, the distance to the
MDF determines how fast the internet a firm receives would be. Further, our strategy
allows analyzing within-firm responses to the available speed upgrades by comparing the
performance of a firm before and after the introduction of the upgrades. Hence, our
findings are not driven by start-ups that particularly use the broadband internet in their
business model. In our specification, we control for time- and firm-fixed effects to rule
out time-constant firm characteristics and common time shocks. We analyze the impact
on existing firms that get access to new technologies.
For our analysis, we assemble a novel dataset: using geographic information system
software1, we geocode single-establishment firms in a survey provided by the German
Employment Agency (see Heining et al., 2016). We merge the geocoded telephone net-
1We use QGIS version 2.18.3 (QGIS Development Team, 2017).
10
Firm Responses to High-Speed Internet
work (Bundesnetzagentur, 2017) to calculate the distance from each establishment to
its MDF. We further combine the establishment-level data with employee-level social-
security data which allows us to study changes in the workforce composition.
Looking at firms getting access to the first generation of broadband internet, we find
evidence that is consistent with increasing efficiency. Firms that get access to the first
generation grow less in employment than firms that do not get access. They do not
grow differently in revenues leading to increasing revenues per employee. Through the
lense of potential theoretical impacts, this suggests increasing efficiency, but no market
size effect. We also find that firms reduce the share of low-skilled employees in their
workforce pointing to skill complementarity of broadband internet. The first generation
of broadband internet facilitated the exchange of e-mails with large attachments (500kB
and more). Hence, firms that got access probably engaged more in digitization processes
that require less low-skilled labor than previous administrative work. Separating man-
ufacturing and non-manufacturing firms reveals that non-manufacturing firms benefit
most from getting access to the broadband internet.
A subgroup of firms that got access to the first generation of the broadband internet
also experienced later speed upgrades. We find positive growth effects in revenues and
employment indicating a market size effect. We find no significant evidence suggesting
increasing efficiency, even though the results suggest a positive effect. Firms increase
the share of medium-skilled employment. In contrast to the conventional understanding
of skill complementarity to new technologies, firms reduce the share of high-skilled em-
ployees. The later speed upgrades of the broadband internet provided the possibility to
set up online businesses. To serve a greater market, firms probably needed to expand
production. If this expansion required hiring over-proportionally more medium-skilled
labor, the share of high-skilled employees would fall without a reduction in the actual
number of high-skilled employees.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to causally identify within-firm responses
to broadband internet speed availability at the time of the introduction. We contribute
to the literature in three ways. First, we build on and extend the literature on growth
effects of broadband internet surveyed by Bertschek et al. (2015).2 At the firm-level, the
2At the country-level, the literature mostly finds positive growth effects of broadband adoption (e.g.
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literature finds mixed results. Most papers studying the impact of the first generation
of broadband internet find no significant effects on growth and differential effects on
employment.3
One exception is Akerman et al. (2015) who find positive output elasticities as well
as skill-biased employment and wage effects. They exploit the quasi-exogenous time
variation in broadband infrastructure expansion in Norwegian municipalities due to the
limited funding of a government initiative. In line with their results, we find increases in
skill-biased demand for labor of firms with access to the broadband internet. This chapter
adds to their findings in a number of ways. We are able to look at within-firm responses,
which allow me to control for any time-constant firm characteristics. Further, we exploit
exogenously given technological restrictions which allow me to compare similar firms
around the threshold distance within the same municipality. Our strategy additionally
allows comparing firms during the introduction of the first generation of broadband
internet as well as later speed upgrades. Hence, our results provide further evidence on
the economic implications of speed upgrades. Moreover, we show that broadband internet
affected firms in different sectors heterogeneously. Thus, this chapter contributes to the
understanding of the actual sources of growth stemming from investments in broadband
infrastructure.
In another relevant paper, Canzian et al. (2015) study the impact of the second
generation of broadband internet (called ADSL2+) on firm growth in rural areas in the
province of Trento (Italy). They exploit a government program upgrading rural areas
to higher internet speed using longitudinal firm-level data. They find large positive
effects on revenues and value-added and no effect on employment. This chapter adds
to their findings by including firms in both rural and urban areas and hence estimating
an average effect which is of policy interest. Further, they analyze a later time period
when the second major generation of broadband internet was already widespread in
Czernich et al., 2011). Further, broadband availability at the county- and zip code-level is found to
have a positive effect on employment in the USA (e.g. Kandilov and Renkow, 2010; Kolko, 2012), which
mostly benefits skilled workers (Atasoy, 2013).
3De Stefano et al. (2014) exploit a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and find no effect of the
broadband internet on firm growth. Stockinger (2017) employs the instrumental variable approach
developed by Falck et al. (2014) directly to study employment growth of German establishments. He
finds negative effects on employment growth of establishments in manufacturing and positive effects in
knowledge-intensive industries. Our rich dataset allows studying firm responses to broadband internet
in more detail.
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many areas. Hence, their large effects may be driven by a catch-up effect. Our analysis
focuses on the time of the first introduction of the broadband internet and later speed
upgrades, including the second major generation of broadband internet. Analyzing a
longer time period further allows us to observe effects that only show up with a time
lag. Overall, this chapter provides a more comprehensive picture of firm responses to
broadband internet.
Second, we complement the literature on growth effects of ICT in general.4 As
a whole, the literature finds that productivity effects of ICT alone are very low. To
fully exploit the potential of the new technologies, firms need to provide complementary
factors like organizational adjustments (see e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). We con-
tribute to this literature by showing that firms that get access to the broadband internet
and later speed upgrades increase the share of skilled labor.
Third, we extend the instrumental variable strategy by Falck et al. (2014) who study
voting behavior. They exploit the distance between the geographical middle point of a
municipality to its MDF as an instrument for the share of households in a municipality
with broadband access. We build on this idea in our differences-in-differences approach
by calculating the distance between each individual firm and the dedicated MDF. Hence,
we approximate the access to the broadband internet at the firm-level instead of the
municipality-level. Our strategy allows measuring the technological restriction more
precisely and calculating the intention-to-treat effect on similar firms within the same
municipality.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes our empirical strat-
egy. We explain the set-up, our empirical model, and the data we use. In section 1.3,
we describe our main findings, report results from a number of robustness checks, and
discuss our results. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Strategy
Identifying the impact of broadband internet adoption on firm growth poses a challenge
to the empirical researcher. Ideally, one would randomize technology adoption. In prac-
4For a detailed survey of the literature on the impact of ICT on productivity we refer to Draca et al.
(2006) and Cardona et al. (2013).
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tice, new technologies are usually available to everyone at the same time, and firms
choose whether to adopt these. Hence, measured firm responses to new technologies
would be biased due to omitted variables. Firms that select into technology adoption
may simultaneously be subject to different changes correlated with firm growth, e.g.,
innovation activity. As a result, the impact of the new technology on firm growth can-
not be identified. To overcome this problem, we exploit a technological restriction to
broadband internet adoption that is orthogonal to firm characteristics. This exogenous
factor led to differential access of firms to the new technology that would otherwise have
selected into adopting it. We restrict our sample to similar firms that are located be-
low and above the threshold distance to the MDF and hence may or may not receive
broadband internet.
1.2.1 Set-up
Broadband expansion. The first generation of broadband internet, asymmetric dig-
ital subscriber line (ADSL), was first presented in Germany in 1999. Providing a down-
stream speed of 768 kBit/s and an upstream speed of 128 kBit/s, it was considered a
major improvement compared to previous dial-up technologies.5 In 2000, about 600,000
customers subscribed to the new technology. With 768 kBit/s, one could e.g. send large
attachments (500kB) in an e-mail.
In later years, the technology was further improved leading to speed upgrades (see
figure A.3 in the appendix), mostly in downstream. From September 2002 on, the first
generation of broadband internet allowed up to 1,536 kBit/s in download speed. In April
2004, the maximum provided speed increased to 3 MBit/s in download speed and 384
kBit/s in upstream by upgrading the technology to ADSL2, i.e. the second upgrade.
With 3 MBit/s, small video conferences and online meeting presentations were possible.
From 2005 on, with the third upgrade, up to 6 MBit/s in downstream and 512 kBit/s in
upstream were possible. With 6 MBit/s, third-party hosted applications like e-mail and
data back-up could be used.
The fourth upgrade to ADSL2+ in 2006, called the second major generation of broad-
band internet, provided a major improvement to broadband internet provision as the
5For a detailed description of the technological background see Schnabel (2015).
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maximum speed increased to 25 MBit/s6 in downstream and 1,024 kBit/s in upstream.
Most telecommunications providers offered up to 16 MBit/s. With 16 MBit/s, multi-
point videoconferencing, remote server access, and voice over internet protocol applica-
tions came up (Columbia Telecommunications Corporation, 2010). Overall, these speed
upgrades significantly improved the use of any application, especially file-sharing.
From 2006 on, another new internet technology called Very High Speed Digital Sub-
scriber Line (VDSL) was introduced. This technology provided even higher internet
speeds of up to 100 MBit/s. However, VDSL required large infrastructure investments
as fiber wires needed to be installed. It therefore took several years to introduce VDSL
in major cities in Germany and is still ongoing in 2018.7
At the time of the introduction of ADSL2+, more than 14 million customers sub-
scribed to DSL provision.8 Still, not every customer got access to the full potential
of each technology (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). Even in 2011, more than 22% of DSL
customers received only 2 MBit/s or less. Most customers (46.3%) received between
2 and 10 MBit/s whereas only 23% received between 10 and 30 MBit/s even though
ADSL2+ was already well established. Only about 8% got access to the upgrade to
VDSL providing between 30 and 100 MBit/s.
Technological restrictions to broadband internet access. The early generations
of broadband internet used the existing public switched telephone network (PSTN).
It consisted of copper wires that could be used to transfer broadband internet. The
network was constructed in West Germany in the 1960s by the state monopoly on tele-
phone networks at that time. They aimed at providing telephone access to the universe
of households. As distance is irrelevant for the quality of telephone usage, they opti-
mized installation and maintenance costs by serving as many customers by each MDF
as possible.
For broadband internet, however, the distance between a firm and the MDF matters.
As shown in figure 2.1b, there is a large decay of the technologically maximal speed
6Most telecommunications providers did not always provide the maximum speed (Schnabel, 2015).
7We provide robustness checks excluding counties where VDSL was installed until 2008 in tables A.27
and A.28 in the appendix.
8The number of subscriptions to DSL technologies reached 24 million in 2016. An overview of the
increase in subscriptions over the considered time horizon in this chapter can be found in figure B.1.
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provided with increasing length of the copper wires. For the first generation of broadband
internet (ADSL), the maximum speed ranges from less than 4 to 8 MBit/s after the latest
upgrade. Above the threshold distance of 4.2 km, no broadband internet was provided.
Similarly, for ADSL2, the maximum speed for firms close to the MDF is highest and
decays with the distance to the MDF. For ADSL2+, the speed decays even more steeply.
Within the group of firms that got access to the first generation of broadband internet,
only firms located between 0 and 2 km from the MDF got full access to the speed
upgrade to usually 16 MBit/s. Using the network offered a cheap way to introduce the
new technology. New constructions would have implied high installation costs as wires
are installed subsurface in Germany.
Figure 1.1: Decay of broadband internet speed
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The figure shows the decay of the maximum broadband internet speed that was technically possible
with increasing distance to the MDF. The solid line shows the decay of the first generation. The line
above shows the decay of the less used technology called ADSL2. The dashed line shows the decay for
the second major generation of broadband internet (ADSL2+). At the time of the introduction, most
telecommunications companies only provided a maximum speed of 16 MBit/s. Source: Schnabel (2015)
and own illustration.
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1.2.2 Empirical specification
Our basic framework consists of a fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation equa-
tion:
yi,t = β0 + β1,t broadband internet accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit (1.1)
We analyze different time-varying firm outcomes yi,t that measure performance, size or
workforce composition of firm i in year t. The dummy variable broadband internet accessi
equals one if broadband internet provision to a firm is technically feasible and zero
otherwise. It does not vary over time.
To study the impact of the access to the first generation of broadband internet, we
interact the broadband internet accessi-dummy with a post-introduction period dummy
which allows us to compare firms with and without access to broadband internet before
and after the introduction of the first generation of broadband internet. The post-
introduction dummy is equal to one for all years from 2001.9 To study the impact of
getting access to later speed upgrades, we use dummies from year to year to trace out
the timing of the effect. αi are firm-fixed effects that control for all time-constant firm
characteristics.
αt are year-fixed effects that control for any economy-wide year characteristics. β1,t is
thus an estimate for the difference between firms with and without access to broadband
in each year t, holding all time-persistent firm characteristics constant and controlling
for all year-fixed effects. uit is the error term which is clustered at the firm-level. We
balance treatment and control groups within three-digit sector groups following Iacus
et al. (2009).
This equation would still suffer from omitted variable bias if we directly observed
broadband internet adoption and simply included a dummy equal to one if the firm
adopted broadband internet and zero otherwise. In this case, there could be unobserved
time-varying factors that differ between firms that get access to the broadband internet
9As we observe firms as of June 30, only a very small subgroup of firms was connected to a MDF
with broadband internet access on June 30, 2000. We run a robustness check in which we drop all firms
in areas where MDFs were upgraded before June 30, 2000. Further, we run a robustness check in which
we define the post-dummy for all years from 2000 on. We report the results for both robustness checks
in table A.3 in the appendix.
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and firms that do not get access. This problem can be solved by exploiting the techno-
logical peculiarities of the network as explained in sub-section 1.2.1. These technological
restrictions affect the availability of broadband internet to each individual firm, and al-
low me to compare firms that lie just below a cutoff for broadband availability to firms
that lie just above it. As we do not observe adoption of broadband internet, we calculate
an intention-to-treat effect.
1.2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
For our analysis, we assemble a unique longitudinal firm-level dataset. We combine linked
employer-employee data from Germany with geocoded information on the included firms
and the telephone network. Germany provides an ideal setting for this study, as German
social security data are rated very highly regarding availability and reliability (see Card
et al., 2013).
Data. Our firm-year-level data come from an establishment survey provided by the
German Employment Agency (Heining et al., 2016). This dataset reports detailed es-
tablishment information on 30 June on an annual basis from 1993 to 2014. Firms report
revenues, value-added, and employment, among other topics. To follow the firms before
and after the introduction of the new technologies, we look at the unbalanced panel
samples from 1996 to 2005 and from 2000 to 2011. The panel samples are constructed
by the German Employment Agency. A subset of the establishments surveyed every year
are followed over several years. We only use single-establishment firms to exclude po-
tential interdependencies between establishments with and without broadband internet
in multi-establishment firms. We keep observations with non-missing sales information
reducing our dataset by about 20%.
Further, we merge linked employer-employee data from social security records. The
individual-level data come from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies
(SIAB) (Antoni et al., 2016). They include detailed current information on the employees
of the firms in the survey. For every employee, we observe individual demographic
information like education, wages, occupations, and employment status. Besides, we
calculate the age and tenure of each employee. We impute missings in the education
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variable following Fitzenberger et al. (2005). We define individuals with a university
degree as highly skilled, individuals with vocational training or a university entrance
qualification as medium-skilled and those without any training or university entrance
qualification as low-skilled. We consider full-time employees between age 18 and 65.
To approximate individual broadband internet access, we geocode each establishment
based on the address included in the social security records. Using the geographical
information on the local telephone networks provided by Bundesnetzagentur (2017),
we allocate each establishment to a local network using geographic information system
software. Lacking data on the actual connection of firms to MDFs, we define the closest
MDF within the local network as the relevant one. To approximate the length of the
copper wires, we calculate the distance via roads between the firm and the MDF using
the map of road networks provided by OpenStreetMap (2017) (version as of March 2015).
The distance is calculated based on the cross-sectional information provided in 2015 and
does not vary over time. As the copper wires were installed subsurface, they are usually
located next to roads where opening the ground is easiest.
Sample definitions. MDFs are not randomly located but rely on existing infrastruc-
ture. We argue that firms did not anticipate that distance to the MDF would matter so
they did not locate strategically within small bounds. Large distances, however, might
reflect very different firms. Our strategy allows excluding firms that are far away from
the MDF that may grow differently after the introduction of the broadband internet
because of other reasons. Figure 1.2 shows that the distribution of the distance to the
MDF in the panel sample from 2000 to 2011 within 4.7 km or less is skewed to the left.
50% of firms are located within 1.4 km from the MDF, 90% lie within 3.2 km.
Our determination of broadband internet access allows us to approximate broadband
internet availability for each firm but still suffers from measurement error. As we do
not have exact information on the location of the copper wires, we cannot determine
the exact length of the copper wires between the firms and their dedicated MDFs. To
reduce potential measurement error, our control groups include a “donut”, i.e., we leave
out firms that are located within a very small bound at the threshold.
Figure 1.3 summarizes our main samples. To study the impact of access to the first
19
Firm Responses to High-Speed Internet
Figure 1.2: Distribution of distance to MDF
The figure shows the kernel density of the distance between firms and their dedicated MDF. Own
illustration.
generation of broadband internet, we compare firms below and above the threshold at
4.2 km.10 Our treatment group consists of firms with a distance to the MDF between 2
and 3.5 km. These firms almost received the maximum speed provided by ADSL. Our
control group includes firms with a distance to the MDF between 4.2 and 5.7 km. These
firms are arguably comparable as they are located very close to the treated firms and did
not anticipate the implications of locating further away. These firms did not get access
to the broadband internet at all. We leave out firms between 3.5 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. These firms still got access to the broadband internet but did not experience the
full potential speed (as shown in figure 2.1b).11
For the later speed upgrades, we exploit the fact that broadband internet speed avail-
ability differed between firms. Access to the upgrades again depended on the distance
to the MDF, but the decay of the provided speed was more pronounced for shorter dis-
10As pointed out by Falck et al. (2014), there are other factors that also determine the maximum
speed. Thus, we use this as a fuzzy threshold.
11In the appendix, we show the results of our second control group consisting of firms between 3.5
and 5 km. A subgroup of these firms received slow ADSL whereas firms located more than 4.2 km from
the MDF did not get access to the broadband internet
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tances. Within the group of firms that got access to the first generation of broadband
internet, only a subgroup also got full access to the speed upgrades. After the upgrade to
ADSL2+, for example, firms located between 0 and 2 km from the MDF usually received
16 MBit/s from 2006 on. Above 2 km, the maximum speed decays up to the 4.2 km
threshold of any broadband internet provision. We compare firms below and above the
threshold of 2 km. Our treatment group comprises firms with a distance between 0.5
and 2 km. Our control group consists of firms between 2.8 and 4.2 km. For these firms,
the speed upgrades hardly increased their internet speed. We leave out firms located
between 2 and 2.8 km from the MDF. These firms did not get access to the full potential
of the speed upgrades. An illustration of the sample definition to analyze the impact
of speed upgrades is shown in figure 1.3.12 Figure A.1 in the appendix illustrates the
distribution of MDFs and the respective treatment and control groups.
Figure 1.3: Sample definitions
Distance to MDF (in km) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
Treatment group Control group 
First 
generation 
Speed  
upgrades 
The figure shows the defined treatment and control groups for each sample by technology. The treatment
group for the introduction of the broadband internet consists of firms located between 2 and 3.5 km
from the MDF. The control group includes firms between 4.2 and 5.7 km. The treatment group for later
speed upgrades consists of firms between 0.5 and 2 km. The control group includes firms between 2.8
and 4.2 km. Own illustration.
Descriptive statistics. For our analysis, we use different outcome variables to esti-
mate the impact of the availability of broadband internet and later speed upgrades on
firm performance, employment, and skill composition. To measure firm performance, we
12In sub-section A.2.7 in the appendix, we further show the results of a second control group including
firms between 2 and 3.5 km. They consist of firms that are most closely located to the treatment group.
These firms are very similar to the treatment group as they did not anticipate the threshold. These
analyses, however, are more likely to suffer from measurement error as we do not have information on
the exact location of the copper wires.
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of treatment and control groups for speed upgrades
4.2 km 
2.8 km 
2 km 
Treatment group Control group 
The figure illustrates the determination of treatment and control group based on the distance to the main
distribution frame for speed upgrades. The black triangle resembles an exemplary main distribution
frame. The circles show the areas defining the treatment and control group. White areas show the left
out “donut” circles. The dark circle resembles the treatment group of firms located between 0.5 and
2 km from the MDF. The shaded circle shows the control group from 2.8 to 4.2 km around the MDF.
The circles would show exemplary borders if distances were calculated via straight lines. They do not
resemble the actual thresholds as the distances are calculated via roads. Own illustration.
mainly use information from the survey data. Firms report their revenues as well as the
share of purchased inputs. We further calculate annual value-added generated by the
firm based on this information. To approximate efficiency, we construct two measures.
Based on the survey data, we calculate revenues per employee. Based on the informa-
tion on the employees from social-security data, we calculate the revenues per full-time
employee. We further use full-time employment and total employment as outcome vari-
ables measuring employment size. Besides that, we use information from the survey on
monthly wage sums as well as social-security data to construct daily wage sums. The
main difference between the two employment measures is that the survey data includes
part-time employees. Using the social-security data, we further calculate the annual skill
composition using the shares of three different skill groups in the full-time employment.
Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the analysis of the impact of the in-
troduction of the broadband internet. We pool all years before the introduction in the
pre-treatment period. Firms in the treatment group perform better regarding revenues
and value-added. They are also larger in total employment and wage sum. The difference
is economically small. Controlling for firm-fixed effects in our specification rules out any
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time-persistent characteristics. Hence, different initial situations of firms and treatment
and control group only cause a problem if they affect growth rates which would lead to
biased estimates.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables pre-treatment, pooled sample
Treatment group Control group Difference
Mean SD N Mean SD N (4) - (1) P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance
Log(revenues, survey) 14.53 1.89 887 14.28 1.64 343 −0.25 0.03
Log(value added, survey) 13.73 1.83 675 13.48 1.51 271 −0.25 0.04
Share of purchased inputs 0.48 0.22 684 0.44 0.21 280 −0.04 0.02
Log(revenues per FTE) 12.78 1.73 818 12.49 1.34 313 −0.29 0.01
Log(revenues per empl.) 11.32 0.84 816 11.34 0.79 312 0.02 0.71
Employment
Log(full-time empl., SIAB) 1.68 1.49 887 1.71 1.37 343 0.03 0.74
Log(total empl., survey) 3.37 1.53 887 3.09 1.35 343 −0.28 0.00
Log(daily wage sum, SIAB) 5.88 1.61 887 5.88 1.51 343 0.00 1.00
Log(monthly wage sum, survey) 10.58 1.77 853 10.25 1.54 331 −0.33 0.01
Skill composition
Share low-skilled 0.05 0.16 887 0.06 0.17 343 0.01 0.26
Share medium-skilled 0.83 0.26 887 0.88 0.23 343 0.05 0.01
Share high-skilled 0.10 0.22 887 0.06 0.16 343 −0.05 0.00
Shares
Units of observation Treat N IDs Urban Manuf.
Firms 0 595 79 .33 .31
Firms 1 1,760 235 .47 .44
Employees 0 43,566 8,355 .34 .60
Employees 1 393,772 75,522 .55 .24
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the firms in panel sample 1996 to 2005 in the pre-treatment
period (1996 to 2000). Data sources are reported in the table. The shares of skill groups are calculated
based on the composition in SIAB. The p-value in column 8 indicates whether the means of the treatment
and control groups are significantly different from each other.
Table 1.2 shows the descriptive statistics in the first panel year for the analysis of
the speed upgrades. Comparing the treated firms located around 0.5 to 2 km from the
MDF to the control group shows that these groups of firms are very similar before the
speed upgrades. Table A.1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics for non-
manufacturing firms separately.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables in 2000, pooled sample
Treatment group Control group Difference
Mean SD N Mean SD N (4) - (1) P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance
Log(revenues, survey) 14.41 1.97 1,046 14.45 1.90 284 0.13 0.75
Log(value added, survey) 13.57 1.98 938 13.63 1.84 259 0.15 0.66
Share of purchased inputs 0.49 0.23 953 0.48 0.22 265 −0.01 0.63
Log(revenues per FTE) 12.69 1.78 1,012 12.55 1.73 276 0.04 0.24
Log(revenues per empl.) 11.40 0.86 974 11.38 0.76 264 −0.03 0.23
Employment size
Log(full-time empl., SIAB) 1.69 1.53 1,046 1.91 1.58 284 0.10 0.03
Log(total empl., survey) 3.20 1.66 1,046 3.28 1.55 284 0.10 0.47
Log(daily wage sum, SIAB) 5.92 1.69 1,046 6.14 1.72 284 0.12 0.05
Log(monthly wage sum, survey) 10.46 1.98 1,013 10.58 1.84 278 0.17 0.33
Skill composition
Share low-skilled 0.07 0.19 1,046 0.06 0.16 284 −0.01 0.44
Share medium-skilled 0.83 0.27 1,046 0.82 0.24 284 −0.00 0.93
Share high-skilled 0.09 0.21 1,046 0.11 0.21 284 0.02 0.27
Shares
Units of observation Treat N IDs Urban Manuf.
Firms 0 2,516 343 .42 .55
Firms 1 10,006 1,337 .54 .47
Employees 0 264,340 50,688 .48 .47
Employees 1 629,766 120,759 .64 .37
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the firms in panel sample 2000 to 2011 in the first year. Data
sources are reported in the table. The shares of skill groups are calculated based on the composition in
SIAB. The p-value in column 8 indicates whether the means of the treatment and control groups are
significantly different from each other.
1.2.4 Discussion of identification strategy
In our identification strategy, we exploit technological restrictions to broadband internet
speed adoption that firms could not anticipate or directly influence. We discuss several
potential concerns and argue that our estimator would, if anything, be biased towards
zero.
First, the remaining threat to our identification is that unobserved time-varying
shocks may impact firms in the treatment and control differently. Hence, we check
if our parallel trend assumption holds for all years before treatment. As shown in ta-
bles A.4 and A.5 in sub-section A.2.1 in the appendix, firms in the treatment and control
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group have similar trends before the introduction of the broadband internet in the panel
sample from 1996 to 2005. The coefficients of the interaction terms of the treatment
dummy and year dummies are not significantly different from zero for the years before
2001. For the speed upgrades, we show yearly coefficients in all tables. In the panel
sample from 2000 to 2011, firms in the treatment and control group have similar trends
before the speed upgrades starting in 2003. Hence, the parallel trend assumption seems
to hold.
Second, as we approximate the length of the copper wires between the MDF and the
firm, our estimates may suffer from measurement error. This problem should, however,
be reduced in our “donut” samples. We exclude firms that could be falsely allocated to
the treatment or control group by calculating a shorter or longer distance to the MDF
within the respective range. Firms that are still included and allocated to the wrong
group bias our estimates towards zero. Lacking data on the road network in the early
2000s or even 1960s, we use the OpenStreetMap version as of March 2015. Hence, we may
falsely include roads that did not exist when the copper wires were actually installed. In
this case, we would underestimate the length of the copper wire. Hence, we may falsely
classify an untreated firm as treated which would bias our estimates downwards.
Third, one might be concerned about non-compliance in order to scale the intention-
to-treat to an average treatment effect on the treated. On the one hand, some firms
might adopt broadband internet even if they belong to the control group. Indeed, firms
could lease individual lines but only at high costs. In 2004, firms had to pay more than 2
million USD PPP annually for a leased line to the telephone backbone to receive 2 MBit/s
(OECD, 2005). Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that even large multinational firms
refused to pay for individual broadband infrastructure. The Italian multinational small
appliance manufacturer De Longhi moved its German subsidiary to a different city due
to slow internet connection (Koehler, 2012). As a consequence, we consider the group
of always-adopting firms supposedly small. If it existed, it would bias our estimates
downwards.
On the other hand, some firms may not adopt broadband internet even though it is
technologically possible. This group is more likely to exist in our analyses of the first
generation of the broadband internet when firms had to set up an explicit contract with
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the telecommunications provider. For the later speed upgrades, however, firms had little
incentives not to take advantage of higher speeds of the existing technology. Further,
Bertschek et al. (2013) show that 98% of the firms in their sample use the internet in
2002. Hence, general technology adoption is very high. Firms that had the possibility to
take up broadband internet had little incentives to stay with inferior dial-up technologies.
1.3 Results
In our analysis, we find evidence that is consistent with both our hypotheses on market
size and efficiency effects of the broadband internet. First, we find that firms that get
access to the first generation of broadband internet demand less labor per unit of out-
put, especially employing less low-skilled labor. This result is consistent with increasing
efficiency. Our results show that this effect is driven by non-manufacturing firms. Hence,
we report our results for this sub-sample as our main findings. Our results for manufac-
turing firms are reported in the appendix (tables A.9 to A.11). Second, we show that
non-manufacturing firms that get access to later speed upgrades grow more strongly in
revenues and employment suggesting a positive market size effect. They particularly
increase the share of medium-skilled employment. We show our main results in sub-
section 1.3.1. Further, we challenge our results in several robustness checks reported in
sub-section 1.3.2. We discuss their economic significance in sub-section 1.3.3.
1.3.1 Main findings
Figure 1.5 reports the results of the first generation of broadband internet for non-
manufacturing firms. The coefficients show the results of the interaction term of the
broadband internet accessi- and a Dpost,t-dummy. The Dpost,t-dummy is one for all years
after 2000 and zero otherwise. Table A.6 in the appendix shows the results for the
impact of the broadband internet availability in the pooled sample as well as for non-
manufacturing and manufacturing firms separately. Comparing the results reveals that
the effects are mostly driven by firms in non-manufacturing sectors. The signs of the
coefficients for manufacturing firms, however, are in line with our findings even though
they are not always significant.
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We find that firms with access to the broadband internet have 9% higher revenues
per employee than firms without access (significant on the 5%-level). The average firm
generates revenues of about 80,800 Euro per employee before treatment. A firm that
gets access to the broadband internet would generate revenues of more than 88,000 Euro
per employee on average after the introduction ceteris paribus. We find no effect on
revenues and value-added.
Further, we find that firms that get access to the broadband internet employ 7.5% less
full-time labor after the introduction of the broadband internet (significant on 1%-level).
A firm with about 13 employees before treatment would hence employ one employee
less after the introduction than a similar firm without access to the broadband internet.
Similarly, we find that their wage sum is smaller after getting access compared to the
control group. In addition to the overall effects on employment, broadband internet
access also affects the composition of the workforce with respect to their skills. Analyzing
the shares of employees by skill group reveals that low-skilled employees are negatively
affected by the availability of broadband internet. Firms that get access to the broadband
internet employ a 2 percentage points smaller share of low-skilled labor.
For the analysis of the effects of the speed upgrades, we report our main findings
for non-manufacturing firms in figures 1.6 and 1.8 as well as tables A.7 and A.8 in the
appendix. We use model (1) directly including yearly coefficients to trace out the effect
over time. Figure 1.6 shows the results of the effects of the speed upgrading on firm
performance of non-manufacturing firms. We find that firms that get access to the speed
upgrades grow more in revenues and value-added compared to the control group. As
an example, treated firms sell 15% more in 2006 than non-treated firms. The yearly
effect remains stable within a range between 13% in 2003 and 19% in 2007. Besides, we
find no effect on revenues per employee. Table A.9 shows that the effects are similar for
manufacturing firms.
Figure 1.8 shows the results of the effects of the speed upgrades on employment of
non-manufacturing firms. We find that firms that get access to the speed upgrades grow
more in employment. In 2006, they were 12% larger in total employment than firms
that did not get access. They also report higher wage sums. In 2004, firms that get
access to the speed upgrades paid a 20% larger wage sum. The effect drops down to
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12% in 2006 and then rises to 20% in 2008 and 2009 again. The coefficients for total
employment are larger and significantly different from zero whereas the coefficients for
full-time employment are not significant. One potential explanation would be that firms
hire more part-time employees to expand production. As reported in table A.10, we find
similar effects for manufacturing firms.
The access to later speed upgrades leads to an over-proportional increase in the
use of medium-skilled labor. The share of medium-skilled employees increases, whereas
the share of high-skilled employees decreases after the speed upgrades. Our results
support the idea that medium-skilled labor serves as a complement to ICT as found
in the literature (see, e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). In contrast to the classical
interpretation of skill-biased technological change, we find that the share of high-skilled
employees also decreases. For manufacturing firms, we find opposite results as shown in
table A.11. Firms that get access to the speed upgrades decrease the share of medium-
skilled and increase the share of high-skilled employees.
To summarize, we find that firms benefit from the introduction of both technolo-
gies. The first generation of broadband internet allows firms to become more efficient
employing less labor per unit of output. The later speed upgrades increase output and
employment. Both the access to the first generation of the broadband internet as well as
to later speed upgrades lead to an over-proportional increase in the demand for medium-
skilled labor in comparison to low- and high-skilled labor in non-manufacturing firms.
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Figure 1.5: Regression results of the introduction of the broadband internet
1) Log(Revenues)
2) Log(Value added)
3) Log(Revenues per FTE)
4) Log(Revenues per empl.)
5) Log(Employment)
6) Log(Full-time empl.)
7) Log(Wage sum, SIAB)
8) Log(Wage sum, survey)
9) Share of low-skilled
10) Share of medium-skilled
11) Share of high-skilled
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This figure shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment period and 2001 to 2005 as the treatment period. The estimation equation is:
yi,t = β0 + β1 broadband internet accessiDpost,t +αi +αt + uit, where Dpost,t is an indicator variable for
the treatment period from 2001 on. broadband internet accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if
the firm is located between 2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7
km from the MDF. The table reports the results of β1. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the
treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009).
Significance level chosen at p < 0.10. The sample only contains non-manufacturing firms. Regression
results reported in table A.6 in the appendix.
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Figure 1.6: Regression results of speed upgrades on performance
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The figure shows the regression results of model (1) using the panel sample from 2000 to 2011. The
upper left graph shows the results of log(revenues) as the outcome variable. The upper right graph
shows the results of log(value-added) as the outcome variable. The bottom left graph shows the results
of log(revenues per full-time employee) as the outcome variable. Full-time employees are counted in the
administrative data. The bottom right graph shows the results of log(revenues per employee) as the
outcome variable. The total number of employees is reported in the survey data. The treatment group
consists of firms between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF. The control group consists of firms between 2.8
and 4.2 km from the MDF. The samples only contain non-manufacturing firms. Grey lines mark the
confidence intervals at the 10% significance level. Own illustration.
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Figure 1.7: Regression results of speed upgrades on firm size
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The figure shows the regression results of model (1) using the panel sample from 2000 to 2011. The
upper left graph shows the results of log(full-time employees) as the outcome variable. The upper right
graph shows the results of log(total employment) as the outcome variable using the data from the survey.
The bottom left graph shows the results of log(daily wage sum) as the outcome variable. The bottom
right graph shows the results of log(monthly wage sum) as the outcome variable using the data from the
survey. The treatment group consists of firms between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF. The control group
consists of firms between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the MDF. The samples only contain non-manufacturing
firms. Grey lines mark the confidence intervals at the 10% significance level. Own illustration.
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Figure 1.8: Regression results of speed upgrades on the skill composition
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The figure shows the regression results of model (1) using the panel sample from 2000 to 2011. The
upper graph shows the results of the share of low-skilled employees (i.e. without vocational training or
university entrance qualification) as the outcome variable. The bottom left graph shows the results of
the share of medium-skilled employees (i.e. with vocational training or university entrance qualification)
as the outcome variable. The bottom right graph shows the results of the share of high-skilled employees
(i.e. with a university degree) as the outcome variable. The treatment group consists of firms between
0.5 and 2 km from the MDF. The control group consists of firms between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The samples only contain non-manufacturing firms. Grey lines mark the confidence intervals at
the 10% significance level. Own illustration.
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1.3.2 Robustness checks
As discussed in sub-section 1.2.4, one might be concerned about some confounding factors
biasing our results. To take these concerns into account, we run several robustness
checks. Table A.12 summarizes the results of most of the following robustness checks
for the introduction of the broadband internet. We report the results of the robustness
checks on speed upgrading in separate tables. The results support our main findings.
First, we run the regressions using the distance to the MDF as a continuous treatment
variable instead of the dummies. We report the results in tables A.13 to A.15 in the
appendix. Our results confirm our previous findings. Further, we repeat the regressions
on the samples without considering the “donut”. Hence, we compare firms that are
located within even smaller bounds from the MDF, as one may be concerned about the
distance to the MDF being correlated with other time-varying firm characteristics. For
the analysis of broadband internet, we use the same sample of firms as the treatment
group as in the main results but firms between 3.5 and 5 km as the control group. The
results are presented in table A.16 in the appendix. We find similar negative employment
effects as in the “donut” sample. However, we do not find comparable positive effects
on revenues per employee.
Table A.17 and table A.18 report the results of the “non-donut” samples for the
analysis of later speed upgrades. We use firms between 2 and 3.5 km as the second
control group. We find limited evidence on employment effects as shown in table A.17
but increasing revenues per employee as reported in table A.18. To understand these
results, however, one needs to take into account that these estimations are more likely
to suffer from measurement error.
Second, firms may strategically locate close to the MDF, or the MDF may be installed
close to specific firms. As explained above, the network in West Germany was installed
in the 1960s. Hence, MDFs could be located close to firms that existed at that time. As
a robustness check, we run separate regressions on firms founded before and after the
1990s when first internet technologies were introduced. Table A.19 shows the results of
the speed upgrades for the firm size of firms founded in 1992 or later. Firms that get
access to the speed upgrades significantly increase the wage sum. Table A.20 shows that
results of increasing revenues of treated firms are robust. Table A.21 shows the results
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on the firm size of firms founded in 1992 or before. Indeed, firms in the treatment group
already grow faster before treatment. However, results on firm performance in table A.22
show that the effect on revenues does not kick in earlier than expected. For the first
generation of broadband internet, we find similar results as in the main specification.
However, the results of changes in employment are not significant. This result may also
be caused by the decrease in sample size.
Further, we run separate regressions excluding East Germany where the MDFs were
installed only in the 1990s. Table A.23 shows the results of firm size and table A.24 shows
the results of the performance measures. We find our results to be weaker for firm size
but similar for performance. For the introduction of the broadband internet, the sample
size decreases to around 200 observations. Hence, the results need to be interpreted with
caution: treated firms become smaller in revenues and value-added than non-treated
firms.
Third, we check for potential measurement error because of lagged technology up-
grading. If the MDF did not provide broadband internet, e.g. because it was not
upgraded to provide the new technology yet, firms around the MDF would falsely be
classified as receiving broadband internet. Hence, we use information on the share of
households with broadband internet from 2005 to 2008 provided by the Federal Min-
istry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology,
2009). As a robustness check, we exclude municipalities with very low shares of house-
holds with broadband internet access in 2005. Again, we find our results to be robust
to this restriction as shown in table A.25 for the results on firm size and in table A.26
for the performance measures. For the introduction of the broadband internet, we find
similar results. The coefficients are not always significantly different from zero which
may also be due to the small sample size. Further, our estimates may be biased by the
introduction of VDSL. We therefore exclude all counties in which VDSL was introduced
until 2008. Tables A.27 and A.28 in the appendix show the results supporting our main
findings.
Besides, we run additional regressions with different outcome variables to check for
potential mechanisms how firms adjust to getting access to the broadband internet and
later speed upgrades. In Appendix A.2.9, we report the results for the regressions using
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exit (table A.29) and dummy equal to one if a firm invests in ICT (table A.30 for the
panel from 1996 to 2005 and table A.31 for the panel from 2000 to 2011) as outcome
variables. We find no effect on these variables.
1.3.3 Discussion of results
Our results are generally in line with the findings of the two most related papers. Similar
to the analysis by Canzian et al. (2015) for a region in Italy, we analyze the impact of
the availability of faster broadband internet on firm growth in revenues and value-added.
Whereas Akerman et al. (2015) show skill-biased labor market implications and output
elasticities caused by broadband internet, we complement their paper by studying the
firm-level adjustments to the skill composition of the workforce. Also, we offer several
detailed insights providing a more comprehensive picture of the impact of broadband
internet on firm growth and employment.
In line with Canzian et al. (2015), we find large positive effects of the access to the
speed upgrades like ADSL2+ on revenues and value-added. For our sample of non-
manufacturing firms, we find that firms with faster internet generate about 15% more
revenues than firms in the control group. Canzian et al. (2015) find that revenues
increase by 40%. This large result may be driven by the fact that they study the impact
of ADSL2+ at a time when many firms in other regions already had access to the new
technology. Hence, firms in their sample may be experiencing a catch-up effect as the
new technology was already established in the market. Our coefficients for value-added
are comparable to the results in Canzian et al. (2015). However, they do not find an
effect on employment whereas we find large positive effects on employment. Firms that
get access to the speed upgrades employ more than 10% more labor than the control
group.
Similar to Akerman et al. (2015), we find evidence for skill complementarity of broad-
band internet. We find that firms reduce the share of low-skilled employment when they
get access to faster internet. Akerman et al. (2015), however, do not find positive labor
market effects for medium-skilled labor whereas we find that firms over-proportionally
demand more medium-skilled labor. One needs to note, however, that our definitions for
medium-skilled labor differ. They define individuals with a high-school but no college
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degree as medium-skilled. As defined in sub-section 1.2.3, we define individuals with
vocational training but without a university degree as medium-skilled. In contrast to
the classical interpretation of skill complementarity, we also find that firms reduce the
share of high-skilled labor when they get access to the speed upgrades. Our results are
consistent with an interpretation of individuals with vocational training being the actual
complement to broadband internet. Akerman et al. (2015) find positive and significant
labor market effects and output elasticities for individuals with at least a college degree.
In Germany, however, many occupations that require a college degree in other countries
are taught in vocational training. Further, we estimate the effect of broadband inter-
net on existing firms that get access to the broadband internet or later speed upgrades.
Their result may be driven by new firms that enter markets where broadband internet
is installed and employ a large share of high-skilled labor. Both analyses contribute to
the understanding of the overall effect of broadband internet on firm growth.
Our results on the timing of the impact of the speed upgrades reveal that the effect
kicks in earlier than the large upgrade to ADSL2+. This finding suggests that treated
firms already benefited from earlier smaller speed upgrades. Firms that are closer to
the MDF also received faster internet speed before the upgrade to ADSL2+. One might
be concerned about the validity of the comparison of treatment and control group if
these groups are already different before treatment. As shown in table 1.2 discussed
above, however, firms in the treatment and control group were very similar before the
introduction of the broadband internet in 2000. Hence, these differences in the years
2003 to 2005 are probably driven by the treatment regarding speed upgrades.
This finding further raises the question on which speed upgrades matter to stimulate
firm growth. Policymakers should take into account whether firms react similarly to up-
grades to 6 or 16 MBit/s. Considering the results in the sample comparing firms located
between 0.5 and 2 km to firms located between 2 and 3.5 km (see sub-section A.2.7 in the
appendix) one might conclude that already smaller speed upgrades had a large impact
on firm growth. In this sample, firms in the control group also receive between 6 and 16
MBit/s compared treated firms receiving 16 MBit/s. Hence, the difference in internet
speed between treatment and control group is very small. If such a small difference in
speed is not decisive, this may explain why the results of this sample provide very limited
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evidence on firm growth caused by the speed upgrades.
1.4 Conclusion
New technologies like ICT are believed to drive future economic growth. As policymak-
ers expect external effects from investments in ICT, technology infrastructure is partly
publicly financed in many countries. The German government, for example, decided to
spend 100 billion Euro on expanding broadband infrastructure from 2017 to 2025 (as
stated by the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (Federal Ministry
of Transport and Digital Infrastructure), 2017). Firms are expected to reshape their
business adapting to an era of digitalization. So far, causal evidence of the impact of
broadband internet on firm growth is limited.
This chapter studies the impact of the first generations broadband internet and later
speed upgrades on firm growth and employment. In particular, we analyze the effect of
getting access to the first generation of broadband internet and latter speed upgrades.
We exploit a natural experiment of technological restrictions which implied that not all
firms had access to the broadband internet. We study within-firm growth in output,
employment, and adjustments to the skill composition of the workforce. Our results
suggest that firms benefit from increasing internet speed. Upgrading the internet speed
leads to firm growth in revenues and value-added and increases employment. Our re-
sults confirm the findings that broadband internet is a skill-biased technology found by
previous literature. However, we find very limited evidence of substitution of low-skilled
employees but rather an increase in medium-skilled employment of growing firms.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Broadband Internet
Availability on Multi-Establishment
Firms
2.1 Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are general purpose technologies that
enable firms to reshape their business (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Saunders, 2010). Broad-
band internet, in particular, is believed to have revolutionized many business processes.
It provides firms the opportunity to set up e-businesses and hence to increase the size
of the market they serve. Further, broadband internet facilitates file-sharing and offers
new communication tools like videoconferencing. The impact of broadband internet on
multi-establishment firms is particularly interesting for policy makers due to their large
employment share.1 Hence, it is important to understand the impact of broadband inter-
net on employment and skill composition of these firms. However, we know little about
the impact of broadband internet on multi-establishment firms.
Identifying the impact of ICT, like broadband internet, on firms poses a challenge
This chapter is based on joint work with Anna Gumpert, Eduardo Morales, Ezra Oberfield, and
Manfred Antoni. It uses the same identification strategy as chapter 1. To make each chapter self-
contained, we explain the identification strategy in both chapters.
1In our data, they represent only a small share of all firms (about 9%) but employ more than one
third of all employees subject to social security.
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as firms self-select into technology adoption. This makes it difficult to disentangle the
causal effect of the adoption of a new technology from factors that are observable to
the firm but not to the researcher. Identification is even more challenging in multi-
establishment firms, because adoption may vary at the establishment-level. Firms only
adopt higher broadband internet speed in those establishments where it is efficient. The
impact of faster broadband internet on multi-establishment firms may vary depending
on where it is adopted. For example, if the headquarters (HQ) of a firm adopts faster
broadband internet, this may facilitate managing subordinate establishments by reducing
coordination costs and thus have repercussions on the subordinate establishment.
In this chapter, we study the impact of the availability of broadband internet at
different speed-levels on the employment and the skill composition of German multi-
establishment firms. We exploit technological peculiarities of the broadband infrastruc-
ture that cause differences in the availability of broadband internet speed levels at the
establishment-level. Our strategy allows differentiating between the impact of an estab-
lishment’s own access to faster broadband internet and the respective HQ’s access. We
find that subordinate establishments grow faster with their HQ’s access to faster broad-
band internet. Further, we find that subordinate establishments that already employ
high-skilled labor respond more strongly to faster internet availability at their own loca-
tion and at their HQ’s. Besides, they shift their skill composition towards more skilled
labor when their HQ gets access to faster internet. Our results suggest that establish-
ments in multi-establishment firms are interdependent. We further provide supportive
evidence for skill-complementarity of faster broadband internet.
We exploit an identification strategy proposed by Falck et al. (2014). During the
early 2000s, broadband internet was diffused over the copper wires of the established
telephone network in Germany. This imposed technological restrictions: the nature of
the network exogenously restricted broadband availability for some establishments. The
main distribution frames (MDFs) in the network are connected through copper wires
to establishments and households. With increasing distance to the MDF, the maximum
speed provided decays up to a threshold distance, a technical feature that firms could not
anticipate. Distance to the MDF affects both the availability of the first generation of
the broadband internet and the available broadband internet speed in later years when
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the technology was improved. Whereas Falck et al. (2014) relate the distance between
the geographical middle point of a municipality to the threshold, we refine their strategy
by calculating and using the distance of each establishment to the MDF.
We exploit the fact that distance to the MDF mattered to get access to higher broad-
band internet speed in Germany. We compare establishments with differing distance to
their respective MDFs and follow them over time. Our strategy allows ruling out time-
constant characteristics of the establishments or firms by controlling for the respective
fixed-effects. We further control for county-year characteristics to take potential changes
in the labor market into account.
We assemble a unique dataset for our analysis. We use German social security records
that provide information on establishments and employees. We combine the administra-
tive data with firm-level information by Bureau van Dijk via a record linkage procedure.
Our data thus allow us to see which establishments belong to the same firm. We geocode
the establishments and add information on the telephone network to assess which broad-
band internet speed is available to the establishment.
In a first step, we study changes in employment at the establishment and firm level.
In particular, we analyze how the availability of faster broadband internet to one estab-
lishment impacts its own employment as well as the employment at other establishments
of the same firm. We study the impact of the available broadband internet speed on the
subordinate establishment, HQ, and firm.
First, we study the impact of the internet speed available to the subordinate estab-
lishments and its HQ on the employment in the subordinate establishment. We find that
establishments with access to faster broadband internet grow more slowly. However, es-
tablishments in firms in which the HQ has access to faster internet grow faster. Second,
we study the impact of the broadband internet speed of the HQ as well as the average
internet speed available to the subordinate establishments of the firm on the employment
in the HQ. We do not find significant effects. Third, we use the same regression equation
as for the HQ to study the impact on the whole firm. Again, we find no sizeable effects.
Overall, our results suggest an interdependence of the subordinate establishments and
the HQ within a firm as subordinate establishments respond to their HQ’s access to faster
broadband internet. However, this interdependence seems to mainly affect employment
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at the subordinate establishment.
In a second step, we study the impact of the availability of broadband internet speed
on the skill composition at the establishment and firm level. Subordinate establishments
with access to faster internet increase the share of low-skilled labor but decrease the share
of high-skilled labor. However, the skill composition of subordinate establishments also
depends on the access to faster broadband internet of the HQs of their firms. Subordinate
establishments of firms in which the HQ gets access to faster broadband internet decrease
the share of low-skilled labor.
Similar to subordinate establishments, HQs also increase the share of low-skilled labor
and decrease the share of high-skilled labor when they get access to faster broadband
internet. However, the average available broadband internet speed of the respective
subordinate establishments does not affect the skill composition of the HQ. Further,
the share of low-skilled employment of the whole firm increases in firms whose HQ gets
access to faster broadband internet. The share of high-skilled employment in these firms
decreases. The average available speed of the broadband internet of the subordinate
establishments does not have affect the skill composition of the firm.
Again, our results suggest an interdependence of the establishments affecting the skill
composition of the subordinate establishment. Subordinate establishments respond to
their HQ’s access to faster broadband internet. However, we do not find any evidence
that the interdependence of subordinate establishments and HQs affects the skill com-
position at the HQ. Further, our results for the response of subordinate establishments
to their own access to faster broadband internet, in contrast to the response to their
HQ’s access, is at odds with previous findings in the literature (Akerman et al., 2015).
To interpret these results, one should, however, keep in mind that the establishments
of multi-establishment firms may not be equal when faster broadband internet becomes
available. They may rather fulfill different functions within the firm. To account for
this possibility, we split our sample of subordinate establishments along the initial skill
composition, i.e., by positive or zero employment of high-skilled labor in 1999.
We find that the effects on employment are driven by establishments that employed
high-skilled labor before the introduction of the broadband internet. Subordinate es-
tablishments with high-skilled employment grow more slowly when they get access to
41
The Impact of Broadband Internet Availability
on Multi-Establishment Firms
faster broadband internet. Further, they grow faster when the HQ gets access to faster
broadband internet. We find no significant effects on subordinate establishments that
did not employ high-skilled labor before the introduction of broadband internet. This
finding suggests that establishments that provide the complementary input respond more
strongly to the technology than those establishments that did not employ high-skilled
labor. It is thus consistent with the idea of skill-complementarity of the broadband
internet.
Further, subordinate establishments increase the shares of more skilled labor when
the HQ gets access to faster broadband internet. Subordinate establishments that em-
ploy high-skilled labor and whose HQ gets access to faster broadband internet reduce the
share of medium-skilled and increase the share of high-skilled labor. Subordinate estab-
lishments that do not employ high-skilled labor decrease the share of low-skilled labor
and increase the share of medium-skilled labor with the HQ’s access to faster broadband
internet.
Overall, we find that subordinate establishments do not only respond to their own
access to broadband internet but also to their HQ’s access. This finding suggests an
interdependence of the establishments. Further, we find that the effects differ depending
on the initial skill composition of the subordinate establishments. Subordinate estab-
lishments that already employ high-skilled labor respond more strongly. Besides, they
shift their skill composition towards more skilled labor when their HQ gets access to
faster internet. We thus provide supportive evidence for skill-complementarity of faster
broadband internet.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the impact of the access
to higher broadband internet speed on the employment and skill-composition of multi-
establishment firms. We contribute to three strands of literature. First, we build on
and extend the literature on the impact of ICT, in particular broadband internet, on
firm behavior.2 The existing literature finds that technology may change optimal firm
boundaries (Baker and Hubbard, 2003; Baker and Hubbard, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2010).
Fort (2017) provides empirical evidence suggesting that communication technology lowers
2For a detailed survey of the literature on the impact of ICT on productivity we refer to Draca et al.
(2006) and Cardona et al. (2013). The literature on broadband internet is surveyed by Bertschek et al.
(2015).
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coordination costs as firms adopting the technologies are more likely to fragment their
production.
Akerman et al. (2015) find positive output elasticities as well as skill-biased employ-
ment and wage effects of the broadband internet. They exploit the quasi-exogenous time
variation in broadband infrastructure expansion in Norwegian municipalities due to lim-
ited funding of a government initiative. This chapter adds to their findings in a number
of ways. First, we study the impact of the availability of different broadband internet
speed on multi-establishment firms. Second, we look at within-establishment responses,
which allow us to control for any time-constant establishment characteristics. Further,
we contribute to this literature by showing that our results on employment are driven
by establishments that already employed high-skilled labor. Moreover, they increase
the share of skilled labor when getting access to faster broadband internet, suggesting
specialization of the establishments.
Second, we extend the literature on multi-establishment firms. Gumpert et al. (2018)
study how geographic frictions affect firms’ managerial organization. They show that
geographic frictions between the HQ and one subordinate establishment affect the or-
ganization of all establishments of a multi-establishment firm. Similarly, Charnoz et al.
(2015) show empirically that high-speed train routes decrease the share of managers
at subordinate establishments that are affected by lower travel times to the HQ. We
contribute to this literature by showing how ICT affects multi-establishment firm em-
ployment and skill composition. Further, we study how the access to faster internet of
one establishment affects the other establishments of the firm.
Third, we extend the instrumental variable strategy by Falck et al. (2014) who study
voting behavior. They exploit the distance between the geographical middle point of a
municipality to its MDF as an instrument for the share of households in a municipality
with broadband access. We build on this idea by calculating the distance between each
individual establishment and the dedicated MDF. Hence, we approximate the access to
faster broadband internet at the establishment-level instead of the municipality-level.
Our strategy allows measuring the technological restriction more precisely and calculat-
ing the intention-to-treat effect on similar establishments within the same municipality.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes our empirical strat-
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egy. Section 2.3 describes the data we use. In section 2.4, we present our findings.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical strategy
We are interested in the impact of the availability of faster broadband internet at the es-
tablishment level on the employment and skill composition of multi-establishment firms.
In our regression equation, we distinguish between the broadband internet speed avail-
able to the HQ and the subordinate establishments of the firm. If we observed broadband
internet speed adoption, a naive regression would consist of the following equation:
yjt =β1 × HQ adopts broadband internet speedi,t
+β2 × subordinate establishment adopts broadband internet speedj,t
+αj + αct + εi(j)t
In this regression, we would regress e.g. employment yjt of subordinate establishment j
in year t on both a dummy equal to one if the HQ of firm i adopts a certain broadband
internet speed and a dummy equal to one if the subordinate establishment itself adopts
a certain broadband internet speed. This specification would suffer from omitted vari-
able bias. Early-adopting firms are likely to be different in terms of other potentially
time-varying characteristics as firms self-select into adopting more advanced internet
technologies. For example, early-adopting firms may also be more innovative and choose
to adopt the internet in order to bring their new products to a bigger market. Thus,
we would overestimate the impact of internet speed on any outcome which is positively
correlated with innovative activities.
Furthermore, a firm could decide to adopt different speeds in each establishment
depending on the intended use of the broadband internet. As a result, different effects
of higher internet speeds by establishment type may be driven by endogenous choices
of the firm to only adopt higher speeds where they are efficient. If we could conduct
an ideal experiment, we would randomize internet speed to firms and even to different
establishments within firms. In practice, randomization is not feasible.
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(b) Decay of the broadband internet speed
Figure 2.1: Illustration of identification strategy
The left figure shows the timeline of the introduction and upgrading of the broadband internet technology
following Schnabel (2015). In 2000, customers received ADSL with a maximum download speed of 768
kBit/s. In later years, the speed was upgraded up to 6 Mbit/s. In 2006, however, ADSL2+ provided
a much larger speed upgrade with up to 16 Mbit/s. Further, VDSL was introduced but required large
infrastructure investments which took several years.
The right figure shows the decay of the maximum broadband internet speed that was technically possible
with increasing distance to the MDF. The solid line shows the decay for the first generation (ADSL).
The line above shows the decay for less used technology called ADSL2. The dashed line shows the decay
for the second major generation of the broadband internet (ADSL2+). Source: Schnabel (2015) and
own illustrations.
To overcome this problem, we exploit the fact that technological peculiarities of the
traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN) led to differential availability of
broadband internet speed levels (Falck et al., 2014). When the broadband internet was
introduced in the 2000s, it was transferred through the copper wires of the existing
telephone network. The length of the copper wire, and hence the distance, from an
establishment to the respective MDF is decisive for the internet speed an establishment
could receive.
In our analysis, we exploit the variation in internet speed over time. As shown in
Figure A.3, broadband internet speed increased in the 2000s (see Schnabel, 2015, for
more details). The first generation of broadband internet, asymmetric digital subsriber
line (ADSL), was introduced at a fair in 1999. In 2000, 600,000 customers subscribed
to the new technology as shown in figure B.1 in the appendix. Download speed and
broadband internet adoption increased in later years. In 2002, it was upgraded to 1,536
kBit/s. In 2004, ADSL2 was introduced reaching up to 3 Mbit/s and upgraded to 6
Mbit/s in 2005. From 2006 on, ADSL2+ was introduced providing up to 16 Mbit/s by
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most telecommunications providers.
Figure 2.1b shows the decay in download internet speed with increasing distance to
the MDF. Establishments located up to 4.2 km from the MDF could receive the first
generation of broadband internet. The state monopolist at the time of the introduction
of the broadband internet did not sell broadband internet to establishments with longer
copper wires as they could not provide their minimum standards of speed. The provided
internet speed of the first generation of broadband internet and the later speed upgrades
decay with the distance to the MDF. The line above shows the decay of broadband
internet speed of ADSL2 which starts at a higher speed but decays even more steeply.
ADSL2+ is considered the second major generation of the broadband internet. The
decay in internet speed is most pronounced for this generation. Establishments located
very close to the MDF could theoretically receive up to 25 Mbit/s but most telecommu-
nications providers only sold up to 16 Mbit/s. Establishments located 2 km from the
MDF would receive up to 16 Mbit/s, whereas establishments located 3 km from MDF
would hardly notice a speed upgrade compared to previous generations.
The PSTN was installed in the 1960s by the state monopolist at that time. The
infrastructure consists of a large backbone system which is connected to around 8,000
MDFs in Germany. The length of the copper wires between an establishment and its
MDF does not affect the quality of telephone communications. It is therefore unlikely
that establishments located strategically close to the MDF before the introduction of the
broadband internet.
To establish our identification strategy, we combine the exogenous geographical vari-
ation in access to faster broadband internet with the timing of the speed upgrades.
The distance to the MDF determines the treatment intensity of high-speed internet.
Our main regression equation takes both dimensions into account and estimates the
intention-to-treat effect:
yjt =β1,t × log(HQ distance to MDF)i × Periodt (2.1)
+β2,t × log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j × Periodt
+αj + αct + εi(j)t,
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We interact the distance of the subordinate establishment j or the headquarters of firm
i respectively with dummies for three different time periods. We use 1999 as our ref-
erence year in which no firm had access to faster broadband internet. Our first time
period is defined for the years from 2000 to 2003. Establishments could receive up to
1,536 kBit/s in download speed. Our second time period ranges from 2004 to 2005 in
which the maximum provided speed increased to up to 6 Mbit/s. Our third time period
from 2006 to 2010 covers the years in which internet speed was increased due to the
second major generation of ADSL2+. We control for subordinate establishment-fixed
effects αj to rule out time-constant subordinate establishment characteristics. Further,
we compare subordinate establishments within the same county in the same year with
differing broadband internet speed availability by controlling for county-year fixed effects
αct. εi(j)t is the error term clustered at the county-year-level.
We further run regressions at the HQ-level and the firm-level. In both cases, we use
the interaction terms of the distance of the HQ to the MDF with time period dummies
as described above. To take the average available internet speed of the subordinate
establishments into account, we calculate the average distance of the subordinate estab-
lishments to their MDFs, weighted by employment.3 We interact the weighted average
distance with time period dummies.
Distance to the MDF is negatively correlated with internet speed up to a certain
threshold. We restrict our sample to establishments located up to six km from the
MDF. Above this threshold, distance to the MDF does not affect the internet speed as
the broadband internet cannot be transmitted. Additionally, this restriction allows us
to exclude firms that may be located far away from economic centers for other reasons
and may hence evolve differently over time.
3Chapter 1 uses dummies comparing single-establishment firms located below and above a threshold
for certain internet speeds. To reduce measurement error, we leave out “donut” holes in chapter 1.
We choose distance to the MDF as our explanatory variable as we need to aggregate the internet
speed available to the subordinate establishments. Using the approach by chapter 1 would not allow
aggregating the information especially considering the “donut” holes.
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We assemble a unique longitudinal firm-establishment-employee-level dataset. We com-
bine three data sources: the German social security data, the ORBIS database by Bureau
van Dijk, and geocoded information on the telephone network. For our analysis, we use
an unbalanced panel from 1999 to 2010. We restrict our sample to multi-establishment
firms.
Firm-establishment-employee data. The German social security records contain
information on establishments and all of their employees subject to social security con-
tributions.4 We have information on the county, age, and three-digit sector of each
establishment. We keep establishments that were founded before the introduction of the
broadband internet. For each employee, we observe the age, gender, education, occu-
pation, employment history, and wages. We impute missings in the education variable
following Fitzenberger et al. (2005)5. We restrict our sample to full-time employees. We
combine the social security data with balance sheet information in the ORBIS database
provided by Bureau van Dijk. We employ a record linkage procedure to allocate estab-
lishments to firms described in Appendix C.1.1. Each firm, establishment, and employee
is allocated a unique identifier that allows following each unit of observation over time.
Information on the broadband internet speed availability. To approximate in-
dividual broadband availability, we calculate the distance between each establishment
to its dedicated MDF. We geocode each establishment based on the address included in
the social security records. We allocate each establishment to its local network using
the information on geocoordinates of the telephone network from Bundesnetzagentur
(2017). We use the closest main distribution frame in this local network if there are
several MDFs in the network. If there is no MDF in the local network, we use the closest
one outside the borders. We calculate the distance from each establishment to the MDF
via roads. This distance is more accurate than taking the airline distance as the cables
4We use the same dataset as in chapter 3. To make each chapter self-contained, we describe the data
for each chapter separately.
5After the imputation, we still have missings in 2.5% of the observations. We impute these remaining
observations by transferring the dominant educational background in each occupation.
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are installed belowground. Opening the ground next to roads was the cheapest way
to install the cables. We use the geocoded information on the road network provided
by OpenStreetMap (2017). The distance is calculated based on the cross-sectional in-
formation provided in 2015 and does not vary over time. We drop around 15% of the
establishments in our sample for which we cannot calculate the distance to the MDF
due to missing or incomplete reporting of the address.
Outcome variables. We are interested in the employment effects of the broadband in-
ternet availability to study growth and labor allocation within the firm. We use full-time
employment at the establishment and firm level as our outcome variables. Further, we
study the skill composition to understand which skill groups are most affected. We de-
fine three skill groups based on the information on skills reported in social security data.
Low-skilled employees do not have any vocational training. Medium-skilled employees
have vocational training or a university-entrance qualification. High-skilled employees
have at least a college degree.
Descriptive statistics. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for our data set. Our
sample comprises around 5,300 multi-establishment firms. We observe each firm for 10.6
years on average. Firms have around six establishments and 300 employees on average.
The distribution of both employment and number of establishments is highly skewed.
The median firm has two establishments and 56 employees. Headquarters (HQs) have
120 employees and represent 58% of firm employment on average. Our sample includes
around 29,000 subordinate establishments. As firms add and drop establishments, the
average number of years per subordinate establishment is lower than per firm. We
observe each subordinate establishment for 9.2 years on average.
Low-skilled employees represent the smallest shares of employment at the firm, HQ,
and subordinate establishment level. On average, around 8% of employees are low-skilled.
The median subordinate establishment does not even employ any low-skilled labor. The
median HQ and the median firm employ 2.3% of low-skilled labor.
Most firms, HQs, and subordinate establishments employ medium-skilled labor and
it is usually the largest group at the establishment and firm level. The average share of
medium-skilled employment ranges from 78.6% at the HQ level to 84.2% at the subor-
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Figure 2.2: Density of distance to MDF by establishment type
The figure shows the kernel density of the distance to the MDF in meters. The left graph shows the kernel
density for subordinate establishments. The right graph shows the kernel density for headquarters.
dinate establishment level. The median shares are even higher, ranging up to 100% at
the subordinate establishment level.
High-skilled labor makes a larger share of employment than low-skilled labor on
average. Especially at the HQ level, the share of high-skilled labor is higher on average
and at the median. At the subordinate establishment level, however, the average share
of high-skilled is only around two percentage points higher than the share of low-skilled
labor. Only around one-third of subordinate establishments employ any high-skilled
labor.
The distribution of the distance from the HQs and subordinate establishments to
the MDF is skewed to the left. On average, subordinate establishments are located
around 1,700 m from the MDF. The median subordinate establishment is located around
1,300 m from the MDF. The average distance to the MDF of HQs is around 2,000 m,
whereas the median HQ is located around 1,700 m from the MDF. Figure 2.2 shows
the kernel densities of distance to the MDF by establishment type. The distributions
of the two different establishment types are very similar. A larger share of subordinate
establishments is located closer to the MDF.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Units of observation N Unique IDs
Firms 56,885 5, 370
Headquarters 55,047 5, 379
Sub-establishments 223,261 29, 083
Employees 16,992,391 2, 959, 314
Descriptive statistics N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 p95
Firms
Employment 55,151 305 2,852 22 56 158 902
Number of establishments 55,151 5.6 40.1 2 2 4 55
Shares (in %)
Low-skilled 55,151 7.5 11.7 0 2.3 10.4 32.1
Medium-skilled 55,151 79.1 19.7 71.0 84.2 93.3 100
High-skilled 55,151 11.1 17.5 0 3.9 14.0 52.6
Headquarters
Employment 55,047 121.2 473.7 10 30 91 463
Shares (in %)
In firm empl. 55,047 58.5 26.4 38.6 61.5 80.6 96
Low-skilled 55,047 8.0 13.0 0 2.3 10.7 35.2
Medium-skilled 55,047 78.6 21.2 68.2 83.9 95.5 100
High-skilled 55,047 13.4 19.9 0 5 18.2 58.8
Distance to MDF (in m) 5,213 1,911 1,168 1,060 1,676 2,497 4,347
Subordinate establishments
Employment 223,261 38.6 368 2 6 17 116
Shares (in %)
In firm empl. 223,261 12.9 20.1 .4 3.5 16.7 60
Low-skilled 223,261 6.7 15.6 0 0 5.3 37.5
Medium-skilled 223,261 84.2 24.7 77.1 100 100 100
High-skilled 223,261 9.1 21.2 0 0 5.6 60.6
Distance to MDF (in m) 29,083 1,612 1,195 756 1,352 2,183 4,109
This table shows the summary statistics by firm, HQ, and subordinate establishment. The samples for
HQs and subordinate establishments are restricted to establishments within six km to the MDF. The
sample of firms is not restricted. The information on skills reported is social security data. Low-skilled
employees do not have any vocational training. Medium-skilled employees have vocational training or
a university-entrance qualification. High-skilled employees have at least a college degree. Shares are
reported in percent.
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2.4 Results
This section presents results from estimating equation 2.1 for subordinate establishments
and the adjusted equations for HQs and firms. In the appendix, we show the results from
several robustness checks as well as yearly effects instead of aggregated time periods.
Employment. Table 2.2 presents the results on employment. The first column shows
the results from estimating equation 2.1 for subordinate establishments. It shows that
subordinate establishments that are closer to the MDF, i.e. with faster internet available,
grow more slowly. During the time period from 2006 to 2010, a one percent increase
in distance to the MDF is associated with 0.02 percent less employment (significant on
the 1%-level). Hence, a subordinate establishment at the first quartile of the distance
distribution would be 4.3 percent smaller in the time period from 2006 to 2010 than
a subordinate establishment at the third quartile. Further, subordinate establishments
of firms with access to faster internet speed in the HQ grow faster. A subordinate
establishment with an HQ located at the first quartile of the distance distribution is 5.6
percent larger during the time period from 2006 to 2010 than if the HQ was located at
the third quartile. The effect kicks in during the time period from 2004 to 2005 but the
magnitudes of the coefficients increase in the later period.
The second column shows the employment results for the HQ. The HQ’s employment
does not respond significantly to the access to higher internet speed. The magnitude of
the coefficient for the time period 2006 to 2010 is less than one-fifth of the coefficient for
the subordinate establishment. We find no effect of the average available internet speed
of the subordinate establishments. The third column shows the results for the whole
firm. We find no effect of the HQ’s access to faster broadband internet or the average
internet speed available to the subordinate establishments.
The employment results suggest that access to higher internet speed matters for
multi-establishment firm employment. Subordinate establishments grow more slowly
with increasing own internet speed available and faster with the HQ’s internet speed
available. This is suggestive evidence for an interdependence of the subordinate estab-
lishment and the HQ. However, this interdependence does seem to affect the employment
at the HQ.
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Table 2.2: Regression results on employment
Sub-estab. HQ Firm
(1) (2) (3)
Sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 0.002
(0.005)
Sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 0.011+
(0.007)
Sub-estab. distance×D2006−10 0.022∗∗
(0.008)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.007 0.005+ 0.004+
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.025∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.039∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006+
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 −0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Avg. sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
Avg. sub-estab. Distance×D2006−10 −0.003 0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
R-squared 0.902 0.959 0.972
Obs. 217,387 55,047 55,151
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. For the estimations at
the HQ- and firm-level, the average distance of the subordinate establishments of the firm to their
respective MDFs is used (weighted by employment). The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t.
Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level
in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Skill composition. Table 2.3 reports the results on the skill composition. We report
three different outcome variables representing the skillshares. Columns one to three
report the results at the subordinate establishment level. Subordinate establishments
with faster internet available increase the share of low-skilled employment and decrease
the share of high-skilled employment. A subordinate establishment at the first quartile
of the distribution of the distance to the MDF employs a 0.75 percentage points higher
share of low-skilled labor and 0.51 percentage points lower share of high-skilled labor
during the time period from 2006 to 2010 than a subordinate establishment at the third
quartile. Compared to the average shares of low- and high-skilled employment, this result
is sizeable. It represents 11% (6%) of the average shares of low-skilled (high-skilled)
employment. The effect on the share of medium-skilled employment is hardly significant
but suggests a decrease. The skillshares of subordinate establishments also respond to
the available internet speed in the HQ. Subordinate establishments in firms with faster
internet speed available at the HQ decrease the share of low-skilled employment. We
find no effect on medium-skilled and high-skilled employment.
Columns four to six report the results for HQs. HQs with access to faster internet
increase the share of low-skilled employment and decrease the share of high-skilled em-
ployment. We find no significant effect on the share of medium-skilled employment. An
HQ at the first quartile of the distance distribution employs a 0.25 percentage points
higher share of low-skilled labor and 0.28 percentage points lower share of high-skilled
labor than an HQ at the third quartile from 2006 to 2010. The effect already seems
to start in smaller magnitudes during the time period from 2000 to 2003 and then fully
kicks in from 2004 to 2005. Our results suggest that the skillshares at the HQ of a firm do
not change with the average available internet speed at the subordinate establishments.
Columns seven to nine report the results for the whole firm. Firms with an HQ that
gets access to faster internet increase the share of low-skilled employment and decrease
the share of medium- and high-skilled employment. A firm whose HQ is located at the
first quartile of the distance distribution employs a 0.27 percentage points higher share of
low-skilled labor from 2006 to 2010 than a firm whose HQ is located at the third quartile.
The skill composition of the firm hardly changes with the average internet speed available
to its subordinate establishments. The results suggest that firms decrease the share of
54
The Impact of Broadband Internet Availability
on Multi-Establishment Firms
low-skilled employment and increase the share of medium-skilled employment but the
coefficients are not significant.
The results on the skill composition suggest that firms change the skill composi-
tion at their HQ and subordinate establishments when getting access to faster internet.
The increases of the shares of low-skilled employment at the subordinate establishments
and HQs with their own available internet speed, however, contradict previous work
finding skill complementarity of the broadband internet. However, responses of subordi-
nate establishments and HQs to their respective counterpart’s internet speed available
counteract the response to the own internet speed. This finding again suggests an inter-
dependence of the subordinate establishments and HQs of a multi-establishment firm.
This interdependence affects the skill composition at the subordinate establishment.
Differential effects by initial skill composition. Depending on the internal al-
location of the skilled workforce, multi-establishment firms may differently adjust their
workforce as a response to faster broadband internet availability. In fact, only about 25%
of subordinate establishments employ all three skill groups but almost all subordinate
establishments employ medium-skilled labor. Hence, it may be important to take the
initial skill composition of establishments into account. We split our sample of subor-
dinate establishments by positive or zero employment of high-skilled labor in 1999. We
analyze and report the changes in the skill groups that were initially most relevant for
the respective subordinate establishments.6
Table 2.4 reports the results for the two separate samples. The left panel shows the
results for subordinate establishments that employed high-skilled labor in 1999. Column
one shows the results on employment. The results are similar to the results reported
in table 2.2 but larger in magnitude. The effect starts during the time period from
2000 to 2003 and becomes stronger over time. Subordinate establishments with access
to faster internet grow more slowly. A subordinate establishment located at the first
quartile of the distance distribution is about 12% percent smaller during the time period
from 2006 to 2010 than a subordinate establishment at the third quartile. However,
6We report the remaining results in table B.1 in Appendix B.2.1. We do not interpret the results
as they are not meaningful for our analysis. For example, only 15% of subordinate establishments that
did not employ high-skilled labor in 1999 ever employ high-skilled labor till 2010.
55
The Impact of Broadband Internet Availability
on Multi-Establishment Firms
T
ab
le
2.
3:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
on
th
e
sk
il
l
co
m
p
os
it
io
n
S
u
b
.
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
t
H
Q
F
ir
m
L
ow
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
L
ow
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
L
ow
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
S
ub
-e
.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
0
−
0
3
−
0.
12
6
0.
11
3
0.
01
2
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
63
)
S
ub
-e
.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
4
−
0
5
−
0.
30
6∗
∗
0.
19
1+
0.
11
5
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.0
98
)
S
ub
-e
.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
6
−
1
0
−
0.
38
0∗
∗∗
0.
12
0
0.
26
0∗
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.1
06
)
H
Q
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
0
−
0
3
0.
09
8
−
0.
12
1
0.
02
3
−
0.
09
0∗
∗
0.
06
4
0.
02
6
−
0.
05
6∗
0.
05
7
0.
04
8+
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
29
)
H
Q
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
4
−
0
5
0.
23
2∗
−
0.
18
0+
−
0.
05
2
−
0.
16
8∗
∗∗
0.
01
4
0.
15
3∗
∗ −
0.
16
6∗
∗∗
0.
12
3∗
0.
09
8∗
∗
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
35
)
H
Q
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
6
−
1
0
0.
27
1∗
−
0.
11
8
−
0.
15
4
−
0.
17
6∗
∗∗
−
0.
02
1
0.
19
7∗
∗∗ −
0.
18
7∗
∗∗
0.
11
1
0.
14
3∗
∗
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
45
)
A
vg
.
su
b-
e.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
0
−
0
3
0.
05
2
−
0.
05
6
0.
00
4
0.
01
6
−
0.
01
4
−
0.
03
2
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
32
)
A
vg
.
su
b-
e.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
4
−
0
5
0.
06
2
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
05
6
0.
07
5+
−
0.
07
7
−
0.
02
9
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
39
)
A
vg
.
su
b-
e.
di
st
an
ce
×
D
2
0
0
6
−
1
0
0.
01
3
0.
00
2
−
0.
01
4
0.
04
2
−
0.
07
1
0.
01
0
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
48
)
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
75
9
0.
82
8
0.
88
4
0.
86
6
0.
88
8
0.
91
9
0.
90
2
0.
90
3
0.
94
9
O
b
s.
22
3,
26
1
22
3,
26
1
22
3,
26
1
55
,0
47
55
,0
47
55
,0
47
55
,1
51
55
,1
51
55
,1
51
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
th
e
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
d
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
u
si
n
g
1
9
9
9
a
s
re
fe
re
n
ce
ye
a
r.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
su
b
or
d
in
at
e
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
t
is
:
y j
t
=
β
1
,t
×
lo
g(
H
Q
d
is
ta
n
ce
to
M
D
F
) i
×
P
er
io
d
t
+
β
2
,t
×
lo
g(
su
b
or
d
in
at
e
es
ta
b
lis
h
m
en
t
d
is
ta
n
ce
to
M
D
F
) j
×
P
er
io
d
t
+
α
j
+
α
c
t
+
ε i
(j
)t
,
w
h
er
e
P
er
io
d
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
th
e
ti
m
e
p
er
io
d
s
fr
o
m
2
0
0
0
to
2
0
0
3
,
2
0
0
4
to
2
0
0
5
,
a
n
d
2
0
0
6
to
2
0
1
0
.
lo
g(
H
Q
d
is
ta
n
ce
to
M
D
F
) i
a
n
d
lo
g(
su
b
or
d
in
at
e
es
ta
b
lis
h
m
en
t
d
is
ta
n
ce
to
M
D
F
) j
d
es
cr
ib
e
th
e
d
is
ta
n
ce
o
f
th
e
H
Q
o
r
th
e
su
b
o
rd
in
a
te
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
t
to
th
ei
r
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
M
D
F
s.
F
o
r
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
s
at
th
e
H
Q
-
an
d
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
,
th
e
av
er
ag
e
d
is
ta
n
ce
o
f
th
e
su
b
o
rd
in
a
te
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
to
th
ei
r
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
M
D
F
s
is
u
se
d
(w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t)
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
β
1
,t
an
d
β
2
,t
.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
fo
r
ea
ch
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
ty
-y
ea
r-
le
ve
l
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
+
p
<
0.
10
,
∗
p
<
0.
05
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
1
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
0
1
.
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
o
n
sk
il
ls
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
so
ci
a
l
se
cu
ri
ty
d
a
ta
.
L
ow
-s
k
il
le
d
em
p
lo
ye
es
d
o
n
ot
h
av
e
an
y
vo
ca
ti
on
al
tr
ai
n
in
g.
M
ed
iu
m
-s
k
il
le
d
em
p
lo
ye
es
h
av
e
vo
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
tr
a
in
in
g
o
r
a
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
-e
n
tr
a
n
ce
q
u
a
li
fi
ca
ti
o
n
.
H
ig
h
-s
k
il
le
d
em
p
lo
ye
es
h
av
e
at
le
as
t
a
co
ll
eg
e
d
eg
re
e.
56
The Impact of Broadband Internet Availability
on Multi-Establishment Firms
subordinate establishments in firms in which the HQ gets access to faster internet grow
faster. A subordinate establishment whose HQ is located at the first quartile of the
distance distribution is 14% larger than a subordinate establishment whose HQ is located
at the third quartile.
Column two and three report the results on the shares of medium- and high-skilled
employment. The internet speed available to the subordinate establishment itself does
not have a significant effect on the skillshares. However, the skillshares in the subor-
dinate establishment respond to the available internet speed at the HQ. Subordinate
establishments whose HQ gets access to faster internet decrease the share of medium-
skilled employment and increase the share of high-skilled employment. A subordinate
establishment whose HQ is located at the first quartile of the distance distribution em-
ploys 0.9 percentage points less medium-skilled and more high-skilled labor from 2004
on. The average subordinate establishment in this subgroup employs about 23% high-
skilled employment. Hence, this change represents about 4% of the mean. The effect
kicks in during the time period from 2004 to 2005.
The right panel shows the results for subordinate establishments that did not employ
any high-skilled labor in 1999. We find no significant effect of the internet speed avail-
able to the subordinate establishment or the HQ on employment. Regarding the skill
composition, we find that subordinate establishments that get access to higher internet
speed increase the share of low-skilled employment. A subordinate establishment at the
first quartile of the distance distribution employs about one percentage point more low-
skilled labor from 2004 on than a subordinate establishment at the third quartile. We
find no significant effect on the share of medium-skilled labor. Subordinate establish-
ments in this subsample also respond to the available internet speed at the HQ. Faster
internet available at the HQ reduces the share of low-skilled and increases the share of
medium-skilled employment. A subordinate establishment of a firm whose HQ is located
at the first quartile of the distance distribution employs about 0.5 percentage points less
low-skilled and more medium-skilled labor from 2004 on. The effect kicks in during the
time period from 2004 to 2005.
Our results suggest differential responses of subordinate establishments to access
to faster internet by their initial skill composition. Our findings on employment in
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table 2.2 are driven by subordinate establishments that employed high-skill labor in
1999. This finding is in line with previous work pointing towards skill complementarity
of the broadband internet as subordinate establishments that provide complementary
labor respond more strongly to internet speed access.
The changes in the skill composition also differ by the two samples. Subordinate
establishments that did not employ high-skilled labor in 1999 increase the share of low-
skilled labor when getting access to faster internet. However, subordinate establishments
also respond significantly to the available internet speed at the HQ. Depending on the
initial skill composition, they decrease the share of less-skilled employment and increase
the share of the more skilled employment when the HQ gets access to faster internet.
This finding is in line with both skill complementarity and the interdependence of the
establishments in multi-establishment firms.
Considering the timing of the effects, our results suggest that the effects are not
driven by the latest maximum speed upgrades. The effect tends to kick in during the
time period from 2004 to 2005 already. Hence, it seems to be driven by earlier speed
upgrades before the large upgrade to the second major generation.
Robustness checks. To rule out any time-varying differences of subordinate estab-
lishments that correlate with the distance to the MDF, we run several robustness checks.
In sub-section B.2.3 in the appendix we report the robustness checks on employment (ta-
ble B.5), the share of low-skilled (table B.6), medium-skilled (table B.7), and high-skilled
(table B.8) employment at the subordinate establishment level.
First, one may be worried that firms strategically locate close to the MDF, or the
MDF may be installed close to specific firms that grow and adjust their skill composition
differently. As explained above, the network in Western Germany was installed in the
1960s. Hence, MDFs could be located close to firms that existed at that time. As a
robustness check, we run separate regressions on firms founded before the 1990s when
first internet technologies were introduced. Second, we run separate regressions excluding
Eastern Germany where the MDFs were installed only in the 1990s.
Third, we check for potential measurement error because of lagged technology up-
grading. If the MDF did not provide broadband internet, e.g., because it was not up-
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graded to provide the new technology yet, establishments around the MDF would falsely
be assumed to receive broadband internet. Hence, we use information on the share of
households with broadband internet from 2005 to 2008 provided by the Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2009).
As a robustness check, we exclude municipalities in which no household had broadband
internet access in 2005. Fourth, our estimates may be biased by the introduction of Very
High Speed Digital Subscriber Line (VDSL). Therefore, we exclude all counties in which
VDSL was introduced until 2008.
The results show that our findings are robust to all four changes to the specification
as reported in the four columns of each table for the respective outcome variables. The
sizes of most of the coefficients hardly change, even though the magnitude tends to be
higher when excluding counties in which VDSL was introduced until 2008.
To point out the role of available internet speed in comparison to the mere access
to the broadband internet, we run regressions excluding subordinate establishments and
HQs located further than 4.2 km from the MDF. We report the results for the pooled
sample in table B.9. We find that the results are very similar. If anything, the effects
on employment are even stronger than for the main sample. Moreover, we split the
sample by positive and zero high-skilled employment in 1999 as in table 2.4. We report
the results in table B.10. We find very similar results. Further, the available internet
speed at the HQ has a significantly positive effect on employment growth for subordinate
establishments without high-skilled labor in 1999 in this subsample.
Previous literature finds differential effects for non-manufacturing and manufacturing
firms. To contribute to this discussion, we split our sample by the sector reported for the
respective HQ. We report the results for non-manufacturing firms in table B.11. We find
similar effects as for the pooled sample. In addition, we split the sample by the initial skill
composition as in table 2.4. The results are reported in table B.14. We find very similar
results as in the main specification. Besides, the available internet speed at the HQ
has a significantly positive effect on employment growth for subordinate establishments
without high-skilled labor in 1999 in this subsample.
For manufacturing firms, we report the results in table B.13 for the pooled sample
in the appendix. We find no effect of the broadband internet speed availability on
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employment and the skill composition in the pooled sample. Table B.12 reports the
results for the sample split by initial skill composition. The results reveal counteracting
effects on employment. The available internet speed at the HQ has a positive effect on
employment growth for subordinate establishments with high-skilled labor in 1999 but
a negative effect for those without high-skilled labor in 1999. Overall, our main findings
seem to be driven by non-manufacturing firms.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides new insights on the impact of the broadband internet availability
on the employment and skill composition of multi-establishment firms. We show that
access to faster broadband internet has a significant impact on the employment at subor-
dinate establishments and the skill composition of subordinate establishments and HQs.
Moreover, subordinate establishments do not only respond to their own broadband inter-
net availability but also to the availability at their HQ’s location. Our findings suggest
both interdependence of subordinate establishments and HQs as well as skill complemen-
tarity of the broadband internet. Multi-establishment firms are key players in today’s
value chains and employment allocation. Hence, the impact of new technologies on these
firms remain an interesting area for future research.
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Chapter 3
Firm Organization with Multiple
Establishments
3.1 Introduction
Large firms often organize their employees in multiple establishments at different loca-
tions. Geographic frictions between the subordinate establishments and the headquar-
ters, such as higher distance or longer travel times between their locations, adversely
affect the performance of the subordinate establishments (e.g., Giroud, 2013; Kalnins
and Lafontaine, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that adjusting the managerial or-
ganization may help firms mitigate the negative impact of geographic frictions. For
example, employing middle managers at regional offices instead of at the headquarters
was a key ingredient for the success of Singer Sewing Machine in the US (Chandler, 2002,
p. 403-5). Philips employed dedicated country managers and regional executives as part
of a larger strategy to revitalize their operations after 1996 (Nueno and Ghemawat, 2002).
And when the Canadian manufacturing firm Blinds To Go set up a manufacturing plant
in New Jersey, moving an experienced manager on site proved vital to improve the new
plant’s production efficiency (Menor and Mark, 2001).
Still, we know little if anything about the influence of geographic frictions on the
optimal managerial organization of firms. Recent papers formalize the idea that adding
a layer of middle managers allows firms to increase efficiency as they grow, and assemble
This chapter is based on joint work with Anna Gumpert and Manfred Antoni.
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empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg,
2012; Caliendo et al., 2015a, b; Friedrich, 2016). However, existing studies focus on single
establishment firms and disregard the possibility of multi-establishment production.
In this chapter, we show that geographic frictions between the headquarters and one
subordinate establishment affect the optimal managerial organization of all establish-
ments of a multi-establishment firm. Firm organization affects firm performance. Thus,
our result implies that prior studies may underestimate the impact of geographic fric-
tions on firm performance, because they focus on subordinate establishments. More
generally, the main implication of this chapter is that analyses of the impact of local
conditions at the establishment level provide only a partial picture of their total effect
on multi-establishment firms.
We motivate our study by a set of stylized facts on multi-establishment firm orga-
nization. To derive the facts, we assemble a new linked firm-establishment-employee
data set from administrative sources in Germany. Our data set is ideally suited to study
multi-establishment firm organization because it combines detailed data about the em-
ployees of a firm and information about its geography. We summarize our findings in
three facts.
First, multi-establishment firms prefer locations that are geographically close to their
headquarters for their subordinate establishments. The location probability increases
with the market potential of a location and decreases with the wages and the land prices
relative to the headquarter location.
Second, multi-establishment firms are more hierarchical than single establishment
firms. On average, multi-establishment firms have 2.0 management layers, whereas single
establishment firms have 1.4 management layers. The difference is robust to controlling
for firm characteristics. In particular, the difference persists conditional on firm size. The
difference is related to geography: the number of managerial layers of multi-establishment
firms increases with the distance of the subordinate establishments to the headquarters
and with the area that the establishments cover.
Third, multi-establishment firms reorganize gradually. That is, they do not change
the number of layers firm-wide, but add or drop layers establishment by establishment.
These facts suggest that geographic frictions affect both the location and the orga-
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nization decisions of multi-establishment firms, and that the establishments are relevant
units for the managerial organization of firms. We propose a model to explain why firms
choose to organize their employees in multiple establishments, and why this decision
affects the managerial organization. We consider a setting with two locations. Each firm
consists of a CEO, production workers, and, optionally, one or more layers of middle
managers. The CEO is located at the headquarters. The production workers and pos-
sible middle managers may be located at either or both locations. The CEO provides
managerial services that are complementary to the labor input of the production workers
in output production. The key assumption of the model is that the CEO is a resource of
limited supply for the firm. He has only one unit of time. The location of the production
workers determines the amount of time that the CEO needs to spend to provide man-
agerial services. To release CEO time, the firm can hire middle managers that provide a
subset of the managerial services. However, hiring middle managers entails quasi-fixed
costs.
As point of reference, we first derive the optimal managerial organization if the CEO
and the production workers are located in a single establishment. The CEO always fully
uses his time to provide managerial services because they are complementary to the
production workers’ labor input. The larger the total output of the firm is, the more
production workers it hires. The more production workers are to be managed, the more
costly it is for the firm that only one unit of CEO time is available. The firm adds a
layer of middle managers if the benefit of releasing CEO time outweighs the quasi-fixed
costs of the middle managers (consistent with Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012).
We next consider the multi-establishment case and allow the firm to hire employees
at both locations. If the firm chooses to employ production workers at both locations, it
optimally allocates the output such that the marginal production costs are equal across
establishments, and the time of the CEO such that the marginal benefit of CEO time
is equal across establishments. This insight is a key result of the model. The result
implies that the managerial organization is interdependent across establishments. The
establishment organization determines the marginal production costs and the marginal
benefit of CEO time. As firm level optimization requires that these outcomes are equal
across establishments, the organization decisions at the establishment level are inter-
64
Firm Organization with Multiple Establishments
linked. The interdependence affects the impact of firm size and geographic frictions on
the organization.
Concerning firm size, the larger the total output is, the more production workers are
hired, as in the single establishment case. The larger the total output is, the more costly
the limit of CEO time therefore is for the firm. The firm can hire middle managers either
at one or both establishments. Hiring middle managers at only one establishment entails
lower quasi-fixed cost than hiring them at both establishments. The middle managers
decrease the marginal benefit of CEO time at the establishment. They release CEO time
that is reallocated to the other establishment to equalize the marginal benefit of CEO
time across establishments. Middle managers at one establishment are thus beneficial for
both establishments. Multi-establishment firms therefore add a layer of middle managers
at one establishment at a lower firm size than single establishment firms. At the other
establishment, they add a layer at a larger firm size than single establishment firms.
This result arises because the middle managers are substitutes across establishments:
The middle managers hired at the first establishment already release CEO time, thereby
decreasing the need for middle managers at the second establishment.
Concerning geographic frictions between the subordinate establishment and the head-
quarters, they affect the organization and location decisions of firms. The frictions in-
crease the amount of CEO time needed to provide managerial services and thus the costs
of the CEO time limit. In response, the firm adjusts the organization. Importantly, it
adjusts the organization of both establishments to maintain that the marginal benefit of
CEO time and the marginal production costs are equal across establishments. The more
costly the limit of CEO time is for the firm, the more beneficial it is for the firm to hire
middle managers. Higher geographic frictions thus increase the number of management
layers of a multi-establishment firm. The middle managers and other organizational
adjustments mitigate, but do not reverse the positive impact of geographic frictions on
firms’ production costs. The firm therefore only produces at both locations if lower wages
or advantages such as avoiding transport costs between locations outweigh the higher
costs of providing management services for the CEO.
The model reproduces the facts documented in the data. Multi-establishment firms
have more management layers than single establishment firms and reorganize gradually,
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establishment by establishment. Geographic frictions increase the number of layers and
decrease the appeal of multi-establishment production.
The key implication of the model is that geographic frictions between the headquar-
ters and one establishment have repercussions on the organization of all establishments of
the firm. In the final step of our study, we exploit the opening of high-speed train routes
in Germany during our sample period to provide evidence for this prediction. The train
routes affect the travel time between subordinate establishments and the headquarters
and thus provide plausibly exogenous variation of the costs of managing subordinate
establishments from the headquarters. The new train connections provide the fastest
mode of travel between locations: they are faster than cars or planes (if one accounts for
waiting times at the airport). We study their impact using a differences-in-differences
econometric strategy. We run regressions of outcomes at the firm level, the level of the
treated subordinate establishment and of untreated subordinate establishments. With
view to the model predictions, we exclude the “untreated” establishments of “treated”
multi-establishment firms from the control group for the “treated” establishments. We
find that firms benefiting from faster travel times grow faster than other firms. They
reallocate employment to the establishment that is faster to reach. Importantly, we find
that the new train routes affect both the organization of the “treated” and the “un-
treated” subordinate establishments of the multi-establishment firm. This is consistent
with the interdependence of establishment organization implied by the model.
The key insight of the model is that geographic frictions not only affect a specific sub-
ordinate establishment, but all establishments of a multi-establishment firm. This insight
is particularly relevant for the literature on multi-establishment and multinational firms.
In the literature on multi-establishment firms, the determinants of firm performance re-
ceive increasing attention. Recent papers uncover that distance to the headquarters and
other geographic frictions decrease investment, productivity and longevity of subordinate
establishments of multi-establishment firms (e.g., Giroud, 2013; Kalnins and Lafontaine,
2013).1 We show that the impact of geographic frictions exceeds their effect on the spe-
cific subordinate establishments. In the literature on multinational firms, headquarter
1Battiston et al. (2017) show that frictions to face-to-face communication decrease productivity in
teams.
66
Firm Organization with Multiple Establishments
inputs are typically considered public goods within the firm (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004;
Antràs and Yeaple, 2014, for a survey). We show that the public good assumption may
apply to patents or trademarks, but not to managerial inputs. Geographic frictions and
other local conditions thus affect not only the local foreign affiliate, but the network of
a multinational firm.
Beyond the literature on multi-establishment and multinational firms, our study con-
tributes to the literature on firm organization and management by showing that geo-
graphic frictions are a determinant of firm organization. To develop our model, we build
on the literature of firms as knowledge hierarchies (for an overview, see Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). A series of papers formalizes the idea that firms add manage-
ment layers as they grow to maintain their productivity, and provides empirical evidence
for it (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Caliendo et al., 2015a, b; Friedrich,
2016). Similar theoretical predictions result from a monitoring hierarchy framework
(e.g., Chen, 2017; Chen and Suen, 2017).2 The literature focuses on size as main deter-
minant of organization. Geographic frictions have been largely neglected, even though
multi-establishment firms are among the largest firms in developed economies and ac-
count for a substantial share of aggregate employment.3 While we implement the model
in the knowledge hierarchy framework, we stress that our main results do not depend on
this specific framework and would hold in a monitoring framework.
To the best of our knowledge, Charnoz et al. (2015) is the only study of the impact
of geographic frictions on firm organization. This empirical paper shows that high speed
train routes decrease the share of managers at subordinate establishments and increase
establishment performance. This chapter combines theoretical and empirical analyses.
This allows us to provide a novel and nuanced interpretation of the regression results on
the impact of high speed train routes. Further, based on the insights from the model,
we take the impact of lower travel times on “untreated” subordinate establishments into
account.
2In the broader literature on the hierarchical organization of firms, Rajan and Wulf (2006) and
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) study the organization of management positions in 300 large publicly
traded U.S. firms.
3Gumpert (2018) contains a knowledge hierarchy model where firms produce at more than one
location, but with a fixed number of layers. Crèmer et al. (2007) study firm language in a setting with
multiple divisions.
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This chapter also offers a novel perspective on the recent management literature.
Bloom et al. (2017) document that half of the total variation in management practices
between different U.S. establishments is due to variation between establishments within
the same firm. They argue that larger firms may find it harder to align management
practices across establishments (p. 10). Our model implies that heterogeneous man-
agement practices in multi-establishment firms may reflect asymmetries in the optimal
organization of employees across establishments. Implementing managerial practices re-
quires managerial time. Asymmetries in the number of managerial layers and the amount
of CEO time allocated to an establishment may manifest in heterogeneous managerial
practices.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3.3
presents the facts on multi-establishment firm organization. Section 3.4 develops a model
of firm organization consistent with the facts. Section 3.5 presents the evidence from the
opening of high speed train routes. The last section concludes.
3.2 Data
Our study requires information both on the geographic location of the establishment(s)
and the managerial organization of firms.
3.2.1 Data construction and descriptive statistics
We construct a detailed linked firm-establishment-employee data set for Germany that
is uniquely suited to study multi-establishment firms.4 The data contain information
on the legal form and sales of firms, and the location at the county level, three digit
sector, and age of each establishment. We observe all employees of the establishments
subject to social security contributions on 30 June every year. For each employee, the
data include the occupation, age, gender, level of education, employment history and
wages. The data cover the period 1998-2014. Each employee, establishment and firm
has a unique identifier that allows following the units of observation over time.
4We use the same dataset as in chapter 2. To make each chapter self-contained, we describe the data
for each chapter separately.
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We assemble the data set from two sources. The universe of Social Security records
provides the data on employees and establishments. The Research Data Centre (FDZ) of
the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) makes the data available for research. The employee history contains the data
on the employees. The Establishment History Panel and the extension file entry and
exit contain the information on the establishments.5 The ORBIS database of Bureau
van Dijk (BvD) contains balance sheet information of firms. We combine the Social
Security records and the ORBIS database using record linkage techniques. The algorithm
exploits the regulation that the establishment names in the Social Security data have
to contain the firm name. We identify the headquarters (HQ) establishment of a firm
as the establishment with the same zip code or locality as the firm.6 Appendix C.1.1
contains details on the components of our data set and the record linkage procedure.
The data set is an unbalanced panel. We use the 2012 cross section for cross-sectional
analyses, because it contains the maximum number of establishments. The panel anal-
yses use the period 1998-2010. We exclude the year 2011 because of changes in the
occupational classification in that year (for details, see Appendix C.1.2). Consistent
with the literature, we restrict our sample to full-time employees (e.g., Card et al., 2013;
Dustmann et al., 2009). We focus on firms with at least 10 employees in all years. 99%
of the firms dropped due to this requirement are small single establishment firms.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the 2012 cross-section. As the upper
panel shows, our sample comprises 109 thousand firms that consist of 144 thousand
establishments and employ 6.4 million individuals. The data cover almost one third of
total full time employment subject to social security contributions in Germany in 2012
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016).7 We do not observe sales for all firms, but only the
larger firms due to limitations of the BvD data. Though only 9 percent of all firms
in our sample are multi-establishment firms, 31 percent of establishments belong to and
34 percent of employees work for them. The sample covers all sectors. The share of multi-
5The establishment identifier in the Establishment History Panel may change when the establishment
changes ownership from one firm to another. The extension file entry and exit allows following the
establishments nonetheless.
6The Social Security records contain the address of each establishment and the ORBIS database
contains the address of the firm. We are allowed to use the address to identify headquarters, but are
allowed to use only the county of the establishments in our analyses for confidentiality.
7The total number of full time employees is only available for December 2012.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics, SE vs. ME firms, 2012 cross section
Units of observation N % share ME firms
Firms 109,348 9.0
with non-missing sales 54,035 9.4
Establishments 144,428 31.0
Employees 6,355,914 34.0
Descriptive statistics N ME Mean SD p25 p50 p75 p95
# employees per firm 99,524 0 42 92 13 21 39 133
9,824 1 222 1979 22 50 127 650
Sales per firm (M e) 48,976 0 29 750 2 4 9 73
5,059 1 350 4,238 4 17 79 573
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics, ME firms, 2012 cross section
Descriptive statistics N Mean SD p50 p75 p95
# establishments per ME firm 9,824 4.6 19.6 2 3 10
# sectors per ME firm 9,824 1.6 0.9 1 2 3
# employees per establishment 44,904 48 430 8 24 156
Maximum distance to HQ in km 9,824 218 189 39 167 546
Minimum area covered in km2 3,584 30, 075 41, 712 6, 933 49, 717 124, 564
establishment firms is similar across sectors. It ranges from 4.5 percent in construction
to 7.5 percent in manufacturing, the largest broad sectoral category, and a maximum of
12 percent in retail and services.
As the descriptive statistics in the lower panel show, multi-establishment (ME) firms
are substantially larger than single establishment (SE) firms in terms of their employees
and sales. The median multi-establishment firm employs more than twice as many
employees as the median single establishment firm; at the 95th percentile, the factor
is fivefold. Sales of multi-establishment firms are fourfold those of single establishment
firms at the median.
Table 3.2 documents the heterogeneity among the group of multi-establishment firms.
While more than half of multi-establishment firms have two establishments, the largest
five percent have ten or more establishments. Most multi-establishment firms are active
in only one three-digit sector. Even at the higher end of the distribution, the number of
sectors is significantly lower than the number of establishments. The size of the estab-
lishments varies with a larger standard deviation than the one for single establishment
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firms, which results because the size cut-off is not binding at the establishment level for
multi-establishment firms. To capture firm geography, we use the distance in kilometers
between a subordinate establishment and the headquarters and the minimum area in
square kilometers covered by all establishments. The latter only applies to firms with at
least two subordinate stablishments. Half of all multi-establishment firms do not have
establishments that are farther than 39 km from their headquarters. At the top of the
distribution, the distance exceeds 540 km, which is about two thirds of the maximum
possible distance within Germany. The distribution of the area is similarly skewed.
3.2.2 Measures for the managerial organization
We use the occupation of the employees to construct three measures of the managerial
organization of firms. First, we count the number of managerial layers of firms. We assign
employees to four layers depending on their occupation (as Caliendo et al., 2015b):
Level Designation Occupations
3 CEO CEOs, managing directors
2 Middle managers Senior experts, middle managers
1 Supervisors Supervisors, engineers, technicians, professionals
0 Production workers Clerks, operators, production workers
We transfer the mapping in Caliendo et al. (2015b) based on the French classifi-
cation of occupations to the German classification using official correspondence tables
(Friedrich, 2016, uses an analogous procedure for Danish data). We treat the layer at
the lowest level in each establishment as non-managerial. We count the number of layers
above the lowest layer per firm. The lowest layer contains employees at level 0 in 98 per-
cent of firms. Multi-establishment firms may separate management and production,
which is why we cross-check our findings treating the lowest level in the firm as non-
managerial. Appendix C.1.3 provides details on our procedure and a list of occupations
by level.
The two other measures are shares of managerial occupations in the wage sum, where
we determine which employees have managerial occupations in two ways. On the one
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hand, we build on the assignment of employees to managerial layers and treat all em-
ployees above the lowest level as managerial. The establishments report the occupations
of the employees in the social security data. In multi-establishment firms, establishments
may assign different occupations to similar employees. Cross-checking the results on the
number of layers with the management share helps ensure that our results are robust
to this possibility. On the other hand, we use the assignment of Blossfeld (1983, 1987,
see Appendix C.1.3 for the list of managerial occupations). The assignment builds on
research from sociology and is part of establishment history panel. Managers are employ-
ees in occupations that have control or decision-making power over the use of production
factors as well as high-level officials in organizations (Blossfeld, 1983, p. 208).
One may be concerned to which extent the occupation classification captures the
managerial position of employees in a meaningful way. Using survey data, we show
that the tasks and job characteristics of occupations are systematically different be-
tween layers in ways that plausibly reflect different roles of employees within firms (see
Appendix C.1.4).
3.3 Facts on firm location and organization
This section describes the location and organization patterns of multi-establishment
firms. We first describe how geographic frictions between a location and the headquarters
affect the decision of multi-establishment firms where to locate an establishment as well
as establishment size. Taking the location decisions as given, we then describe the
managerial organization of multi-establishment firms in the cross-section and over time
and compare it to the organization of single establishment firms.
3.3.1 Distance to headquarters decreases location probability
Table 3.3 describes the location patterns of multi-establishment firms. Columns 1 to 4
present the results of probit regressions that relate yij, a dummy variable that is equal
to one if firm i maintains a subordinate establishment in county j and firm and county
characteristics:
Pr(yij = 1) = Φ(β0 + β1xi + β2xj). (3.1)
72
Firm Organization with Multiple Establishments
Consistent with a negative impact of geographic frictions between the headquarters and
a subordinate establishment on establishment performance, firms are the less likely to lo-
cate an establishment in a county, the more distant the county is from the headquarters.
A larger market potential relates positively to the location probability, indicating market-
seeking motives. Lower wages and land prices in the county relative to the headquarters
are also positively related to the location probability, which points to cost-cutting mo-
tives. Finally, larger multi-establishment firms are more likely to set up subordinate
establishments.
Columns 5 and 6 present the results of OLS regressions that relate the number of em-
ployees of a subordinate establishment to county characteristics. The regressions control
for firm fixed effects to account for the possibility that larger firms have more establish-
ments. The sample therefore only includes multi-establishment firms with at least two
subordinate establishments. Subordinate establishment size is negatively related to the
distance between a county and the headquarters, again consistent with a negative impact
of geographic frictions between the headquarters and the subordinate establishment on
establishment performance. Larger market potential relates positively and higher wages
relate negatively to establishment size. Unlike higher wages, higher land prices are posi-
tively related to establishment size. A possible explanation for the different sign patterns
is that land is a fixed cost for production. Thus, it is worthwhile to maintain only larger
establishments at higher land price locations.
Fact 1 summarizes our findings:
Fact 1. Distance of a county from the headquarters of a multi-establishment firm is
negatively related to the probability that the firm locates a subordinate establishment in a
county as well as the size of the subordinate establishment conditional on location.
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Table 3.3: Location probability and establishment size, ME firms, 2012 cross section
Dependent variable Location probability, Probit Log est. emp., OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance to HQ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.018)
Log market potential 0.543∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041)
Relative wages −0.567∗∗∗ −0.552∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.112 −0.212∗∗
(0.168) (0.163) (0.114) (0.145) (0.080) (0.079)
Relative land prices −0.046∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log # employees 0.252∗∗∗
(0.014)
Log sales 0.149∗∗∗
(0.011)
# of observations 3,934,612 3,415,095 3,225,429 1,757,916 21,496 19,203
# of firms 9,812 9,255 8,741 4,758 3,066 2,773
HQ sector dummies N N Y Y N N
HQ county dummies N N Y Y N N
Legal form dummies N N Y Y N N
Firm fixed effects N N N N Y Y
Table presents coefficient estimates. Standard errors clustered at HQ-county-level in parentheses. ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The sample includes multi-establishment firms with at least 10 employees. De-
pendent variable: (1)-(4): dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i has a subordinate establishment
in county j (HQ counties are excluded), (5)-(6): log number of employees at subordinate establishment.
Independent variables: Log distance to HQ: log distance between county j and county of HQ of firm i in
km; Log market potential: distance weighted average of the GDP of county j and surrounding counties;
Relative wages/land prices: wages/land prices in county j relative to wages in county of headquarters of
firm i; Log number of employees: log number of employees of firm i; Log sales: log sales of firm i. Wages
are calculated as average wages in a county excluding the respective firm. Number of observations varies
because of covariate availability. Distance, market potential and relative land prices are computed based
on data on the coordinates of municipalities as well as GDP and land prices of counties provided by the
German Statistical Office. Relative wages are from the German Social Security data.
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3.3.2 Distance to headquarters increases managerial share
We proceed in two steps to describe the relation of geographic frictions and firm organi-
zation. First, we compare the managerial organization of single and multi-establishment
firms. This helps understand whether the number of establishments affects the manage-
rial organization. Second, we restrict the sample to multi-establishment firms and relate
geographic frictions and the managerial organization.
Figure 3.1 plots the number of management layers by firm type. On average, firms
have 1.46 management layers with a standard deviation of around 1 in the 2012 cross-
section. Multi-establishment firms are more hierarchical than single establishment firms:
the average number of management layers in multi-establishment firms is 1.88 and higher
than the average number of 1.42 in single establishment firms. The distribution is dis-
similar between single and multi-establishment firms. The distribution has an inverse
U-shape for single establishment firms. A third have one or two management layers
respectively. 22 percent have no management layer, and less than one fifth have three
management layers. In contrast, two thirds of multi-establishment firms have two or
three management layers. Only around ten percent do not have a management layer
and 23 percent have one management layer.8 Likewise, the managerial share of multi-
establishment firms is larger than the one of single establishment firms. When we define
the share by layer, employees in managerial occupations in multi-establishment firms
command 34% of the wage sum—six percentage points more than in single establish-
ment firms. According to Blossfeld (1987)’s definition, the share of managerial employees
in total wages in multi-establishment is 1.5 times the share in single establishment firms
(9% vs. 6%).
While the differences in Figure 3.1 may be driven by a firm’s number of establish-
ments, they may likewise result from the differences in size between single and multi-
establishment firms documented in Table 3.1. Table 3.4 presents the results of regres-
sions that condition on size as determinant of the number of management layers and
8Some firms do not have management layers for two reasons. First, social security data only contain
information on employees that pay social security contributions. Owner-managers are thus only included
if they pay themselves a wage. Our results are robust to separate estimation by legal form (see Appendix
Table C.8). Second, the data contain only one occupation per employee. Managers of small firms may
be attributed a production occupation if they execute such an occupation for much of their time.
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Figure 3.1: Number of management layers by firm type, 2012 cross-section.
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The figure plots the distribution of the number of management layers separately for SE and ME firms
in the 2012 cross-section. The sample includes firms with at least ten employees and non-missing legal
form. 82% of firms have consecutive layers. Appendix Table C.3 displays the share of firms with
consecutive layers by firm type and number of layers.
take differences in the sector, legal form and location of firms into account. Specifically,
columns 1 to 4 estimate
# management layersi = exp (β0 + β1DME firm,i + β2 sizei + αl + αn + αs) , (3.2)
where i refers to the firm, l to its legal form, n to the county of the headquarters, s to the
headquarter sector, DME firm,i is a dummy equal to one for ME firms and zero otherwise,
and α denotes fixed effects. As the mean and variance of the number of management
layers are approximately equal, the Poisson model is a reasonable approximation of the
data. Columns 5 and 6 use the share of managerial occupations in the wage sum as
dependent variable and relate it to the control variables using OLS regressions. We do
not condition on size because the total wage sum, the denominator of the managerial
share, is strongly correlated with the size measures.
Through columns 1 to 4, multi-establishment firms have a significantly higher number
of layers than single establishment firms. The coefficients in column 1 imply that multi-
establishment firms have 9 percent more management layers than single establishment
firms. The effect is equivalent to increasing the number of non-managerial employees
by 50 percent. As column 2 shows, the multi-establishment firm dummy does not reflect
a non-linear size effect. The effect is smaller, but still positive and significant when we
control for sales in columns 3 and 4. The decreases in effect sizes is likely partly due
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Table 3.4: Regression results, managerial organization, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share, OLS
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DME firm 0.085
∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.231) (0.122)
Log # non-mg. 0.148∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.004
employees (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Log # non-mg. 0.030∗∗∗
employees2 (0.002)
Log sales 0.182∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 105,949 105,949 53,566 53,566 105,947 105,947
2012 cross-section, only firms with at least 10 employees. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p
< 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management layers, 5 managerial share in wage sum, layer
definition, 6 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld. Independent variables: DME firm: 1 if firm is ME
firm, 0 otherwise; Log # non-mg. employees: log number of employees at lowest layer of establishments;
Log sales: log sales of the firm. Constant included.
to the non-random availability of the sales data. The ORBIS contains sales information
only for the larger firms in the sample. Columns 5 and 6 show similar results for the
managerial share. If defined based on the managerial layers, the managerial share in
multi-establishment firms is two percentage points higher than the share in single estab-
lishment firms. At the mean, this difference is equivalent to an increase by seven percent.
According to Blossfeld (1987)’s definition, the difference is 1.2 percentage points. At the
mean, this difference is equivalent to a 20 percent increase.
To explore whether the higher number of management layers of multi-establishment
firms is related to geographic frictions, we restrict the sample to multi-establishment
firms and re-estimate equation (3.2) taking into account geography:
# management layersi = exp (β0 + β1geographyi + β2sizei + αl + αn + αs) , (3.3)
where i now refers to the multi-establishment firm. We estimate analogous OLS regres-
sions using the managerial share as dependent variable. We employ two measures of firm
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Table 3.5: Regression results, managerial organization of ME firms, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share, OLS
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.019∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.474∗ 0.233∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.004) (0.202) (0.096)
Log area 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.195 0.181∗∗
spanned by firm (0.003) (0.003) (0.143) (0.070)
Log # non-mg. 0.139∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
employees (0.004) (0.006)
Log sales 0.125∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 9,275 5,033 3,320 1,984 9,275 3,320 9,275 3,320
2012 cross-section, only multi-establishment firms with at least 10 employees. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 include
only ME firms with at least two subordinate establishments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p
< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management layers, 5-6 managerial
share in wage sum, layer definition, 7-8 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld. Independent variables:
Maximum log distance to headquarters: log of maximum distance between subordinate establishment
and headquarters in km; Log area spanned by firm: log of minimum area covered by establishments in
square kilometers; others see Table 3.4.
geography, the maximum log distance in kilometers between a subordinate establishment
and the headquarters, and the minimum area in square kilometers covered by all estab-
lishments. Distance is defined for all multi-establishment firms, whereas the area is only
defined for firms with at least two subordinate establishments. We take the maximum
distance of the subordinate establishments to the headquarters if the firm has more than
one subordinate establishment; using the mean distance yields similar results. Firm size
controls both for the positive effect of size on the number of layers and for the possibility
of larger firms investing at farther destinations.
Table 3.5 presents the regression results for the 2012 cross-section. The regression
results show that both distance and area have a positive impact on the number of man-
agement layers in a firm. According to column 1, doubling the maximum distance of an
establishment to the headquarters is associated with a 2 percent increase of the number
of layers. The magnitude of the effect is about a sixth of the elasticity of the number of
layers with respect to the number of non-managerial employees. The effect is robust to
using sales as size measure in column 3. The impact of the log area in columns 2 and 4
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is similar. Likewise, the managerial share is positively related both to the maximum dis-
tance of the establishments and the area they span. Coefficients are significant, except
for column 6 (P-value 17%).
Fact 2 summarizes our findings:
Fact 2. Multi-establishment firms have more management layers than single establish-
ment firms of the same size, legal form, sector and headquarter county. The number
of management layers of multi-establishment firms relates positively to the distance be-
tween the headquarters and the subordinate establishments and the area spanned by the
establishments, conditional on firm characteristics. The same holds for the managerial
share.
Robustness. Appendix section C.2 shows that our results are robust to a series of
checks. First, multi-establishment firms may separate management and production ge-
ographically. We therefore replicate our analysis treating the lowest-level layer in each
firm as non-managerial layer. Appendix Table C.4 shows that the differences between
single and multi-establishment firms are even stronger with this definition of manage-
ment layers. According to the estimates in column 1, being a multi-establishment firm
quantitatively relates to the number of management layers as doubling the number of
non-managerial employees. The coefficients in columns 2-4 are also larger than the cor-
responding effects in Table 3.4. The coefficient for the managerial share is twice its
counterpart in column 5 of Table 3.4. Appendix Table C.5 shows that the relation of
geographic frictions and the number of management layers and the managerial share
defined at the firm level is similar as in the baseline regressions.
Second, Appendix Tables C.6 and C.7 replicate the cross-section regression results
for the 1998-2010 panel. Third, we explore potential sources of omitted variables bias.
The legal form affects whether owner managers are subject to social security contribu-
tions. Appendix Tables C.8 splits the sample by legal form to allow for heterogeneity
in the coefficients across legal form categories. The estimated coefficient of the multi-
establishment firm dummy is robust across legal form groups. In Table C.9, we exclude
multi-establishment firms with establishments in different sectors, or subordinate estab-
lishments in the headquarter county, as well as large multi-establishment firms with more
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employees than the 95th percentile of single establishment firms. The estimated coeffi-
cients are very similar to the baseline coefficients. Finally, the specification in Table 3.5
imposes a linear relation of distance or area and firm organization. Table C.10 uses
quartile dummies. The table shows that the coefficients in Table 3.5 are driven by the
top quartile.
3.3.3 Multi-establishment firms reorganize gradually
Facts 1 and 2 show that the location and organization of multi-establishment firms are
related to geographic frictions in the cross-section. So far, the analysis refers to the
managerial structure at the firm level. For multi-establishment firms, heterogeneity
of the organization of the establishments may, however, be important. In fact, the
managerial organization of subordinate establishments is rarely a copy of the one in
the headquarters: in around 50 percent of all multi-establishment firms, the number of
managerial layers at the headquarters exceeds the number of layers at all subordinate
establishments. Even if the number of layers is similar, the level of management often
differs.
To understand whether the heterogeneity among the organization of the establish-
ments is a constant feature of multi-establishment organization, we study changes in the
managerial organization over time. Table 3.6 displays the percentage shares of firms that
transition from a number of managerial layers in year t to a possibly different number
of managerial layers in year t + 1 separately for single and multi-establishment firms.
The propensity of firms to reorganize is similar across the two groups. The managerial
organization is sluggish: at least four fifth of firms in both groups keep their number of
managerial layers across periods. In case that firms change the number of layers, they
typically add or drop one layer. In only one instance, one percent of firms add or drop
more than one layer.
Table 3.7 digs deeper into the organization of multi-establishment firms and considers
their dynamics at the establishment level. To summarize the managerial organization of
multi-establishment firms with a possibly different number of establishments, the table
counts the number of managerial layers at the headquarters and the maximum number
of managerial layers at the subordinate establishment.
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Table 3.6: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, by firm type
# layers SE firms ME firms
in t/t+1 0 1 2 3 # firms 0 1 2 3 SE # firms
0 92 7 169,766 85 9 6 11,714
1 6 87 7 213,855 5 83 7 5 22,480
2 10 83 6 142,753 8 81 7 5 21,019
3 1 10 89 82,092 6 91 4 23,015
The table displays, separately for SE and ME firms, the percentage share of firms that reorganize from
a number of managerial layers in year t (given in the rows) to a possibly different number of managerial
layers in year t + 1 (given in the columns). Cells that contain fewer than 1% of observations are left
empty to ease readability. Sample: 1998-2010 panel of firms with at least 10 employees in all years.
Fewer than 1% of firms exit. Diagonal in bold.
Table 3.7: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization within ME firms
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/<1 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ sub.e. 0 85 5 6 11,714
HQ 1/ sub.e. 0 6 75 4 6 8 10,284
HQ 1/ sub.e. 1 1 6 75 7 2 7,865
HQ 2/ sub.e. 0,1 4 4 77 2 6 6 13,619
HQ 2/ sub.e. 2 1 10 70 9 1 1 3,727
HQ 3/ sub.e. 0,1,2 5 2 85 3 5 15,249
HQ 3/ sub.e. 3 8 88 1 5,323
The table displays the percentage share of firms that change from a managerial structure in year t (given
in the rows) to a managerial structure in year t + 1 (given in the columns). The figure in front of the
slash denotes the number of managerial layers of the headquarters. The figure behind the slash denotes
the maximum number of managerial layers at the subordinate establishments. Cells that contain fewer
than 1% of observations are left empty to ease readability. Sample: 1998-2010 panel of firms with at
least 10 employees in all years. Firms with a higher number of layers at the subordinate establishment
than at the HQ dropped for readability. Fewer than 1% of firms exit. Diagonal in bold.
Two findings are notable. First, the managerial organization at the establishment
level is less stable than the managerial organization at the firm level: there is less mass
on the diagonal of Table 3.7 than on the diagonal of the right panel of Table 3.6. Second,
multi-establishment firms reorganize gradually and add or drop layers at one establish-
ment at a time. For example, among multi-establishment firms with two layers both
at the headquarters and the subordinate establishments, 9 percent add a layer at the
headquarters and 10 percent drop a layer at the subordinate establishments, but only
1 percent of firms choose a lower or higher number of layers across all establishments.
The latter adjustment does not show up as reorganization at the firm level.
We interpret these findings as evidence that the establishments are important entities
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for the organization of multi-establishment firms. Organizational adjustments do not
only take place at firm level, but at establishment level. Fact 3 summarizes our finding.
Fact 3. Multi-establishment firms reorganize gradually and add or drop layers at one
establishment at a time.
3.4 A model of firm organization with multiple es-
tablishments
To explain why the number of establishments of a firm affects the managerial organiza-
tion, we develop a model of the organization of employees in multiple establishments.
We allow firms to endogenously choose both the number of establishments and the man-
agerial organization. The key assumption in our model is that CEO competency is a
resource of limited supply for a firm, because the CEO has only one unit of time. We
solve the optimization problem in three steps. In section 3.4.2, we derive the optimal
managerial organization of a single establishment firm. In section 3.4.3, we derive the
optimal organization of a multi-establishment firm. We first consider a setting with wage
differences as only motive for having two establishments and then study a setting with
both wage differences and market access considerations.
3.4.1 Set-up
We consider an economy with two locations, j = {0, 1}. The Nj agents per location
each supply one unit of time to the labor market. The agents are immobile, so local
wages wj can differ. We choose indexes such that w0 ≥ w1. The agents derive utility
from consuming differentiated products i:
U(x(αi)) =
(∫
A
α
1
σ
i x(αi)
σ−1
σ MdG(α)
) σ
σ−1
. (3.4)
x(αi) is an agent’s consumption of product i, αi > 0 is the agent’s taste for product i,
A is the set of all available products, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and M is the
mass of firms. The taste draws αi follow the distribution G(α). Each firm makes exactly
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one product, so we use the index i for both firms and products.
To simplify the exposition, sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 analyze the problem of finding
the optimal organization of a firm with taste draw α in location 0. Section 3.4.4 studies
the competition among many firms i in the goods market.
Production. Production is a problem solving process based on labor and knowledge
(as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Garicano, 2000). Every unit of labor employed
in production generates a unit mass of problems. Problems are production possibilities:
the labor input turns into output if the problems are solved using knowledge. Mathe-
matically, knowledge is an interval ranging from zero to an upper bound. We denote
the length of a knowledge interval by z. A problem can be solved if it is realized within
the knowledge interval. The problems follow a distribution with the exponential density
f(z) = λe−λz, where z ∈ [0,∞) refers to the domain of possible problems and λ denotes
the predictability of the production process. Combining n units of labor and knowledge
z̄ yields
q = n
(
1− e−λz̄
)
units of output, where 1− e−λz̄ is the value of the cumulative distribution function.
The firm hires agents on the labor market to put labor and knowledge in production.
The firm’s employees put in labor by spending their time generating problems. To use
knowledge in production, the employees have to learn it first. They spend wjcz to learn
a knowledge interval of length z, where c denotes the learning cost that is equal across
locations. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), the
firm remunerates the employees for their time and their learning expenses, so employees
receive remuneration wj(1 + cz).
The employees of the firm can communicate problems with each other, so they can
leverage differences in their knowledge. Communication is costly: an employee in loca-
tion j spends θkj units of time listening to problems communicated by an employee in
location k. Communication across space is more costly than communication within a lo-
cation: 1 > θ10 ≥ θ00 > 0. The communication costs are symmetric: θ10 = θ01, θ11 = θ00.
If an employee does not know how to solve a problem, he cannot tell who knows, but
has to find a competent fellow employee.
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Organization. The firm organizes its employees in hierarchical layers (as in Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Garicano, 2000). We call the employees at the lowest layer
` = 0 production workers. They put in labor and some knowledge in production. They
generate problems and solve those problems that are realized in their knowledge interval.
We call the employees at the higher layers ` ≥ 1 managers. They put only knowledge
in the production process and spend their time listening to unsolved problems from the
employees at the next lower layer. The highest managerial layer consists of the CEO.
We assume that each firm has exactly one CEO. The knowledge levels of the employees
are overlapping, so employees at layer ` know the knowledge of employees at layer `− 1
and more.9 Consequently, CEO knowledge z̄ delimits the maximum possible output per
unit of labor input, because the CEO is the most knowledgeable employee of the firm.
As the density of problems is decreasing in z, the knowledge of the production workers
covers the solution to the most common problems, whereas higher layers also know the
solutions to problems that occur more rarely. This minimizes the probability that costly
communication is necessary.10
The communication costs θjk, the learning costs c, the predictability of the production
process λ and the taste α are exogenous parameters. Assumption 1 in the Appendix
restricts the possible parameter values. The model is partial equilibrium, so the wages wj
are also taken as given. We take total output q̃ as given in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, but
endogenize it in section 3.4.4.
3.4.2 The optimal organization of single establishment firms
We first determine the optimal organization of a single establishment firm. The optimal
organization minimizes the production costs. It consists of the number of managerial
layers L, the number n`0,L and knowledge level z
`
0,L of employees per layer ` = 0, ..., L−1,
and the knowledge of the CEO z̄0,L. The indexes 0, L refer to the location of the firm j = 0
9We assume that knowledge levels are overlapping to simplify the optimization problem of the multi-
establishment firm. With non-overlapping knowledge levels, in a multi-establishment firm, both overlaps
and gaps between CEO and establishment knowledge may occur. This complicates the analysis without
adding insights.
10Garicano (2000) shows that an optimal knowledge hierarchy features specialization and organization
by frequency, i.e. only the lowest layer inputs labor and the knowledge of higher layers covers the rarer
problems.
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and the number of managerial layers L, because these variables affect the values of the
other choices.
The optimal number of layers is given by
C (q̃) = min
L≥1
C̃0,L (q̃) . (3.5)
The optimal number and knowledge levels of employees at all layers solve:
C0,L (q̃) = min
{n`0,L,z
`
0,L}
L−1
`=0 ,z̄0,L≥0
L−1∑
`=0
n`0,Lw0
(
1 + cz`0,L
)
+ w0 (1 + cz̄0,L) (3.6)
s.t. n00,L
(
1− e−λz̄0,L
)
≥ q̃ (3.7)
1 ≥ n00,Lθ00e
−λzL−10,L (3.8)
n`0,L ≥ n00,Lθ00e
−λz`−10,L ∀` = 1, ..., L− 1 (3.9)
z̄0,L ≥ zL−10,L , z
`
0,L ≥ z`−10,L ∀` = 1, ..., L− 1 (3.10)
The production costs consist of the personnel costs for the employees and the CEO.
Constraint (3.7) implies that the number of production workers and CEO knowledge
have to suffice to produce total output q̃. According to constraints (3.8) and (3.9), the
amount of time of the CEO and the managers limit the number of problems that can
be communicated to them. The number of problems communicated to a higher layer is
computed as the number of problems, n00,L, multiplied with the communication costs,
θ00, and the probability that the problem is not yet solved, e
−λz`−10,L . Finally, knowledge
levels are overlapping and positive (constraint 3.10).
Appendix C.3.1 contains the Lagrangian equation and the first order conditions.
Two multipliers from the Lagrangian equation are key to characterizing the optimal
organization. The multiplier for constraint (3.7), ξ0,L, denotes the marginal production
costs. The multiplier for constraint (3.8), ϕ0,L, denotes the marginal benefit of CEO time.
CEO time is fixed: only one unit is available. ϕ0,L reflects how costly this constraint is
for the firm.
The first order conditions show that the firm chooses CEO knowledge such that its
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marginal benefit and its marginal cost are equal in optimum:
w0c =
λe−λz̄0,L
1− e−λz̄0,L
ξ0,Lq̃ (3.11)
The marginal cost of CEO knowledge consists of the increase of CEO remuneration w0c.
The marginal benefit is the reduction of production costs, because more output is pro-
ducible for every unit of labor input with higher CEO knowledge.
The binding constraint (3.7) determines the number of production workers n00,L as
a function of CEO knowledge. Constraint (3.8) determines the knowledge level of the
highest below-CEO layer in the firm. The employees at the highest below-CEO layer
have to solve a sufficient fraction of problems such that only the one unit of CEO time
is used. The first order conditions imply that the knowledge levels of the production
workers and managers at lower layers are a recursive function of the knowledge level at
the highest layer:
eλ(z
`−1
0,L −z
`−2
0,L ) =
(
1 + cz`0,L
) λ
c
∀` = 2, ..., L− 1, (3.12)
eλz
0
0,L =
(
1 + cz10,L
) λθ00
c
. (3.13)
Constraint (3.9) determines the number of middle managers as a function of the
number of production workers and knowledge levels. Finally, the marginal production
costs ξ0,L and the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,L are given by:
ξ0,L =
w0
(
1 + cz00,L +
c
λ
+ 1(L ≥ 2)θ00 cλ
∑L−1
`=1 e
−λz`−10,L
)
1− e−λz̄0,ω
,
ϕ0,L =
w0c
λ
eλ(z
L−1
0,L −z
L−2
0,L ) for L− 1 > 0, ϕ0,L =
w0c
λθ00
eλz
0
0,L for L− 1 = 0.
The key determinant of the optimal organization of a single establishment firm is its
size.
Proposition 1. Given the number of layers of management L of the firm,
a) the number n`0,L and the knowledge z
`
0,L of employees at all below-CEO layers ` < L
and the knowledge of the CEO z̄0,L increase with total output q̃, and
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b) the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,L and the marginal production cost ξ0,L in-
creases with total output q̃.
c) The cost function C0,L(q̃) strictly increases with total output q̃. The average cost
function AC0,L(q̃) is convex in q̃. It reaches a minimum at q̃
∗
L where it intersects
with the marginal cost function, and converges to infinity for q̃ → 0 and q̃ →∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.1.
Intuitively, the number of production workers n00,L and the CEO knowledge z̄0,L
increase because labor and knowledge are complementary inputs in production, so the
firm optimally employs a higher amount of both to achieve higher output. An increase
in the number of production workers implies that more problems are generated. Thus,
more unsolved problems are communicated to higher layers. A higher output therefore
leads to an increase in the number of employees n`0,L at all below-CEO layers. The time
of the CEO is fixed and does not adjust. Consequently, the knowledge of the employees
at the highest below-CEO layer zL−10,L increases. Otherwise, the CEO could not listen
to all problems that are communicated to him. As the lower-layer knowledge levels are
recursive functions of higher-layer knowledge, the knowledge at lower layers z`0,L, ` =
0, ..., L − 2 increases, though to a lesser extent, thereby mitigating the increase in the
number of employees at layers ` = 1, ..., L− 1.
Larger firms generate more problems, more of which have to be solved at below-CEO
layers to meet the CEO’s time constraint. The larger the firm, the more beneficial it
would therefore be to increase CEO time. That is, the shadow price of the CEO time
constraint—the marginal benefit of CEO time—increases with total output. This key
implication of the model implies that the limitation to CEO time becomes more and
more costly as the firm grows. The marginal production costs increase because higher
levels of knowledge at all layers increase the production costs.
The resulting cost function is strictly increasing, as the marginal costs are positive.
The average cost function is U-shaped. The U-shape reflects two counteracting forces.
On the one hand, the marginal costs of production increase with output. On the other
hand, the quasi-fixed costs of the CEO and the middle managers are spread over a
larger output. For quantities below the minimum efficient scale q̃ < q̃∗L, the latter effect
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dominates, and for quantities above q̃ > q̃∗L, the former effect dominates. At the minimum
efficient scale, the firm reaches the minimum average costs. The results in Proposition 1
are consistent with the results derived for a knowledge hierarchy with non-overlapping
knowledge levels and limited CEO time in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
The number of managerial layers is determined by equation (3.5). The minimum
average cost for a given number of layers decreases and the level of output that achieves
this minimum q̃∗L increases with the number of layers. The average cost curves of an
organization with L and L+ 1 layers cross in the interval (q̃∗L, q̃
∗
L+1), and the firm adds a
layer of management at the crossing (as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012, Proposi-
tion 2). We denote the quantity at the crossing q̃L+1L . Figure 3.2a illustrates the average
cost function of a single establishment firm with only a CEO (L = 1) or a CEO and
middle managers (L = 2).
Adding a layer of middle managers releases CEO time. The middle managers solve
part of the problems that are generated by the production workers. They reduce the
number of problems sent to the CEO. They thus reduce the marginal benefit of CEO
time, i.e. the costs related to the CEO time constraint.
3.4.3 The optimal organization of multi-establishment firms
We study the optimal organization of multi-establishment firms in two steps. First, we
allow the firm to hire employees in the separate labor markets at both locations, but
assume that there is a single output market. As we consider a firm in location 0, the
CEO is located in the headquarter establishment in 0. Second, we assume that the firm
needs to incur the iceberg-type transport costs τ > 1 to ship output from one location
to the other.
Single product market
The firm chooses whether to produce in one establishment at either location or two estab-
lishments at both locations as well as the number of managerial layers. We use the term
“organizational structure” and the variable ω to denote the number of establishments
and number of layers per establishment. All other endogenous variables depend on the
location of an establishment and the organizational structure, so we index them by j, ω.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the average cost functions
(a) Single establishment firm
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The figure illustrates the average cost functions of the single and multi-establishment firm for w0 = w1,
θ00 = θ10. Parameter values:
c
λ = .225, θ10 = θ00 = .26 (from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012),
w0 = w1 = 1. (a): The average cost function of a single establishment firm is U-shaped for a given
number of layers L = 1, L = 2. The firm adds a layer at the intersection q̃21 . (b): The average
cost function of a multi-establishment firm with a symmetric number of below-CEO layers {0, 0} or
{1, 1} coincides with the average cost function of a single establishment firm. The firm adds a layer
at one establishment at the minimum efficient scale q̃∗1 and a layer at the other establishment at a
quantity q̃ > q̃21 .
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If the firm produces in two establishments, it chooses how much output qj,ω and which
share sj,ω of CEO time to allocate to each establishment. The firm also determines the
level of CEO knowledge z̄0,ω as well as the number n
`
j,ω and knowledge level z
`
j,ω of the
employees in each layer ` and establishment j.
The optimization problem consists of three parts. First, the firm chooses the optimal
organizational structure ω to minimize the total production costs given the total output q̃,
analogously to choosing the number of layers in the single establishment case:
C (q̃) = min
ω∈Ω
C̃0,ω (q̃) (3.14)
Second, the firm determines how much output qj,ω and which share of CEO time sj,ω
to allocate to each establishment, and chooses CEO knowledge z̄0,ω to minimize the
production costs of the chosen organizational structure. The production costs consist
of the costs at each establishment j and the remuneration of the CEO time that is not
used in production.
C̃0,ω (q̃) = min
{qj,ω ,sj,ω}1j=0,z̄0,ω≥0
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω (qj,ω, sj,ω, z̄0,ω) +
[
1−
1∑
j=0
sj,ω
]
w0 (1 + cz̄0,ω) (3.15)
s.t. s0,ω + s1,ω ≤ 1 (3.16)
q0,ω + q1,ω ≥ q̃ (3.17)
Constraint (3.16) describes that the CEO has only one unit of time. The production
quantities have to sum up at least to the total output q̃, as stated in constraint (3.17).
Third, the firm determines the number of employees and their knowledge for each
layer and establishment. If the firm decides to produce a positive amount of output at
an establishment, the production costs consist of the below-CEO personnel costs as well
as the remuneration for the CEO time allocated to the establishment. Otherwise, the
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production costs are zero.
Cj,ω (qj,ω, sj,ω, z̄0,ω)

qj,ω>0
= min
{n`j,ω ,z`j,ω}
Lj
`=0≥0
Lj∑
`=0
n`j,ωwj
(
1 + cz`j,ω
)
+ sj,ωw0 (1 + cz̄0,ω)
qj,ω=0
= 0
(3.18)
s.t. n0j,ω
(
1− e−λz̄0,ω
)
≥ qj,ω (3.19)
sj,ω ≥ n0j,ωθj0e−λz
Lj
j,ω (3.20)
n`j,ω ≥ n0j,ωθjje−λz
`−1
j,ω ∀` = 1, ..., Lj (3.21)
z̄0,ω ≥ z
Lj
j,ω, z
`
j,ω ≥ z`−1j,ω ∀` = 1, ..., Lj (3.22)
Lj denotes the number of layers of management at the establishment below the CEO.
The constraints (3.19)-(3.22) are analogous to the constraints (3.7)-(3.10).
We solve the problem by backward induction. We first determine the number of
employees and their knowledge per layer and establishment, taking as given the firm
level choices as well as the organizational structure. We then solve for the knowledge
of the CEO, the allocation of his time and of output given the organizational structure,
which we determine in the last step. Appendix C.3.2 contains the Lagrangian equations
and the first order conditions.
Establishment-level choices. The establishment outcomes depend on the choices
at the firm level—CEO knowledge, the allocation of output and CEO time—through
the binding constraints (3.19)-(3.21). The formal expressions are variants of those for
the single establishment outcomes in section 3.4.2, which is why we state them in Ap-
pendix C.3.2.
Constraint (3.19) determines the number of production workers that depends on the
allocated output and CEO knowledge. Constraint (3.20) fixes the knowledge level of the
highest layer at the establishment as a function of the allocated share of CEO time and
the number of production workers. The knowledge levels of the production workers and
managers at lower layers are a recursive function of the knowledge level at the highest
layer. Constraint (3.21) determines the number of middle managers as a function of
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the number of production workers and knowledge levels. The Lagrangian multipliers ξj,ω
denote the marginal production costs and the multipliers ϕj,ω denote the marginal benefit
of CEO time at an establishment.
Firm-level choices. The firm optimally uses the full unit of CEO time and produces
only the required quantity, i.e. the constraints (3.16) and (3.17) are binding. If the firm
produces at two establishments, it can reduce the production costs by reallocating total
output or CEO time as long as the marginal production costs or the marginal benefit of
CEO time are not equal. This key insight drives many of the model’s implications.
Proposition 2. Suppose the firm produces at two establishments. The firm allocates
output to equate the marginal production costs across establishments and CEO time to
equate the marginal benefit of CEO time across establishments. Formally, in optimum,
ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω and (3.23)
ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω. (3.24)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
Hence, the firm produces the total quantity in one establishment if the endogenous
marginal costs of total output at this establishment are lower than the marginal costs
at the other establishment. It spends the full unit of CEO time for one establishment
if the endogenous marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal benefit of spending
time for the other establishment.
Corollary 1. It is not optimal to produce at two establishments with the same number of
below-CEO management layers L0 = L1 if the communication costs across space exceed
those within a location, θ10 > θ00, but the wages are equal or higher at the subordinate
location than at the headquarters location, w1 ≥ w0.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
Intuitively, the firm only produces at both locations if some advantage at location j =
1 counterbalances the higher communication costs across space θ10. The advantage can
consist of lower wages or a different managerial structure of the establishment.
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Concerning CEO knowledge, the firm balances its marginal benefit and marginal cost,
analogously to the single establishment case:
w0c =
λe−λz̄0,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
1∑
j=0
ξj,ωqj,ω. (3.25)
Comparative statics with respect to total output q̃. We first determine the
impact of total output q̃ on multi-establishment firm organization.
Proposition 3. Suppose the firm produces at two establishments. Suppose further that
there is some asymmetry between the establishments, i.e., either θ10 > θ00, or w1 6= w0,
or L1 6= L0. Given the organizational structure ω,
a) the total number of employees at all below-CEO layers
∑1
j=0 n
`
j,ω, ∀` < L and CEO
knowledge z̄0,ω increase with total output q̃, while the knowledge of the employees
at all below-CEO layers z`j,ω is constant,
b) the share of CEO time sj,ω, and the number of employees at all below-CEO lay-
ers n`j,ω at the location with relatively lower (higher) wages increase (decrease) with
total output q̃, where the threshold ratio of wages depends on ω. Local output qj,ω
increases if the share of CEO time sj,ω does, and
c) the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕj,ω does not vary and the marginal production
cost ξj,ω decreases with total output q̃.
d) The cost function C0,ω(q̃) is strictly increasing with total output q̃.
For full symmetry, i.e., θ10 = θ00, w1 = w0 and L1 = L0, the total output has the same
effect on the choices of a multi-establishment firm as on those of a single establishment
firm.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
As in a single establishment firm, a higher total output q̃ leads to a higher total
number of production workers and a higher CEO knowledge because labor and knowledge
are complementary inputs in production. The higher number of production workers leads
to a higher number of employees at all below-CEO layers.
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The impact of higher output on the other endogenous variables is quite different
as long as there is some asymmetry between establishments. The asymmetry may stem
from differences in location characteristics, asymmetric numbers of layers or both. Unlike
in the single establishment firm, the knowledge levels do not vary with total output. If
the firm produces at two establishments, it maintains the same marginal production
costs and the same marginal benefit of CEO time across them. For each organizational
structure, only one combination of knowledge levels ensures both. Therefore, the below-
CEO knowledge levels do not vary with the quantity produced.
The allocation of total output and CEO time reflects that the firm leverages the
asymmetries between the establishments. Maintaining two asymmetric establishments
effectively allows the firm to produce with two different “production functions”, because
the firm uses labor and knowledge in different ways in the two establishments. The
firm optimally combines the production functions by allocating CEO time and total
output. The optimal combination changes with firm size. The larger the firm is, the
more important are low wages relative to low communication costs, because the firm
hires more employees. The firm thus allocates higher shares of total output and CEO
time to the establishment with relatively low wages as it grows. The threshold ratio
of wages depends on the organizational structure ω because the impact of lower wages
on the production costs depends on the number of layers at the establishments. The
number of employees at an establishment depends on the local production quantity and
thus varies like it.
As the marginal benefit of CEO time only depends on the below-CEO knowledge
levels, it is constant. In contrast, higher CEO knowledge decreases the marginal cost of
production, which therefore decreases with total output. The marginal production costs
are positive, so the cost function increases with total output. The average production
costs are decreasing. This property results because below-CEO knowledge levels are
constant. Thus, the costs per unit of labor input are constant. However, CEO knowledge
increases with total output. Therefore, more output is producible for every unit of labor
input, which leads to the decrease of average costs.
If the two establishments are fully symmetric with respect to both location charac-
teristics and the number of layers, the multi-establishment firm makes the same choices
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as a single establishment firm. Consequently, changes in total output affect multi-
establishment firm organization as stated in Proposition 1 for single establishment firms.
Organizational structure for w0 = w1, θ10 = θ00. The firm chooses the organiza-
tional structure with the minimal production costs. We therefore compare the average
production costs of different organizational structures of the multi-establishment firm.
Lj denotes the number of below-CEO layers at establishment j and L = maxj{Lj} + 1
denotes the number of layers of the firm including the CEO. To simplify the exposition,
we first consider the optimal organization when both wages and communication costs
are equal, w0 = w1 and θ10 = θ00.
Proposition 4. Suppose that wages and communication costs are equal: w0 = w1, θ10 =
θ00. Let “{Lj/Lj}-organization” denote the organizational structure of a multi-establish-
ment firm with Lj below-CEO layers at both establishments. Let “{Lj/Lj + 1}-organiza-
tion” denote the organizational structure of a multi-establishment firm with Lj below-
CEO layers at establishment j and Lj + 1 below-CEO layers at establishment k 6= j.
a) The average costs of the {Lj/Lj}-organization coincide with the average costs of a
single establishment firm with L layers characterized in Proposition 1c): The aver-
age cost function of the {Lj/Lj}-organization is U-shaped and reaches a minimum
at q̃∗L.
b) The average costs of the {Lj/Lj + 1}-organization are lower than the average costs
of the {Lj/Lj}-organization for output levels q̃ > q̃∗L.
c) The average cost function of the {Lj+1/Lj+1}-organization intersects the average
cost function of the {Lj/Lj}-organization at the output q̃L+1L , with q∗L+1 > q̃
L+1
L >
q∗L. It intersects the average cost function of the {Lj/Lj + 1}-organization at the
output q̃ > q̃L+1L .
As a result, the multi-establishment firm with Lj below-CEO layers at both establishments
adds a layer of management at one establishment at the output q̃∗L and a layer at the
other establishment at a output q̃ ∈ (q̃L+1L , q̃∗L+1).
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
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Figure 3.2b illustrates the average costs of the multi-establishment firm, taking an
organization with 0 or 1 below-CEO layers as example. The figure shows that the
average costs of the {0/0}-organization increase for quantities above the minimum effi-
cient scale q∗1, whereas the average costs of the {0/1}-organization decrease, as stated in
parts a) and b) of Proposition 4. Consequently, the former intersect the average costs of
the {1/1}-organization at a lower quantity than the latter, illustrating part c).11
Proposition 4 is a key result of the model. It states that the multi-establishment
firm reorganizes gradually. A single establishment firm with Lj below-CEO layers adds
a managerial layer at the size q̃L+1L . The multi-establishment firm with Lj below-CEO
layers adds a layer at one establishment at output q̃∗L < q̃
L+1
L . It adds a layer at the
other establishment at output q̃ > q̃L+1L .
This difference results because the multi-establishment organization is free to allocate
total output and CEO time. The quantity q∗L is the minimum efficient scale of the
{Lj/Lj}-organization, because the organization has the minimum average costs at that
quantity. A multi-establishment firm with a {Lj/Lj + 1}-organization would allocate
total output to the establishment with Lj below-CEO layers at q
∗
L. For quantities q̃ > q
∗
L,
the average costs of the {Lj/Lj}-organization increase. The average costs of the multi-
establishment firm with the {Lj/Lj + 1}-organization decrease, because it can allocate a
share of total output to the establishment with Lj + 1 below-CEO layers. For quantities
close to the minimum efficient scale, only a small share is allocated to the establishment
with Lj + 1 below-CEO layers, but the larger the quantity q̃, the larger its share of
production. The additional managerial layer releases CEO time that is allocated to the
establishment with Lj below-CEO layers. The additional managerial layer thus increases
efficiency at both establishments. In consequence, the multi-establishment firm only
switches to the {Lj + 1/Lj + 1}-organization at output q̃ > q̃L+1L .
The flexible allocation of output and CEO time explains why the multi-establishment
firm does not increase the knowledge at below-CEO layers when it grows, as explained
in Proposition 3a). The marginal benefit of CEO time is constant and the marginal cost
11The average costs of the {0/1}-organization coincide with the average costs of the the {0/0}-
organization and the {1/1}-organization for quantities below and above their minimum efficient scales,
because in these ranges, single establishment production is more efficient than production with the
{0/1}-organization.
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of production decreases at both establishments in the multi-establishment firm.
Proposition 4 contains an important insight about the optimal organization of the
multi-establishment firm: The organization of its establishments is interdependent. The
number of layers at one establishment depends on the number of layers at the other
establishment.
Organizational structure for w0 > w1, θ10 > θ00. The communication costs across
space θ10 only affect the multi-establishment firm organization.
Proposition 5. Suppose the firm produces at two establishments. Suppose further that
θ10 > θ00 and that w1 is low relative to w0. Given the organizational structure ω,
a) the total number of employees at all below-CEO layers
∑1
j=0 n
`
j,ω, ∀` < L decreases
with the communication costs θ10, while the knowledge of the CEO z̄0,ω and the
knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers z`j,ω, ∀` < L increase, and
b) the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕj,ω and the marginal production cost ξj,ω increase
with the communication costs θ10.
The increase of the below-CEO knowledge levels with the communication costs θ10 is
stronger at higher than at lower layers and at the subordinate establishment than at the
headquarters.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
An increase in the communication costs θ10 implies that it is more costly to use the
CEO’s knowledge. Generating problems is more costly, because they may have to be
communicated to the CEO to produce output. The firm therefore hires fewer production
workers and thus fewer middle managers at all below-CEO layers. To nevertheless pro-
duce the required amount of output, the firm adjusts the optimal levels of knowledge.
The firm increases CEO knowledge to maintain total output despite the lower number of
production possibilities due to the lower number of workers. The firm also increases the
knowledge at the below-CEO levels because of the CEO time constraint: With higher
communication costs, the CEO spends more time listening to a given communication,
so more problems have to be solved by the below-CEO layers. These adjustments lead
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to higher marginal costs and a higher marginal benefit of CEO time. The increase of
knowledge is stronger at higher layers because the number of employees is lower at higher
layers, so it is cheaper to increase their knowledge.
Proposition 5 again illustrates the interdependence of multi-establishment firm or-
ganization: Changes of parameters that affect one establishment lead to organizational
adjustments at both establishments because the firm maintains equal marginal costs and
marginal benefit of CEO time across establishments. Higher communication costs θ10
imply that accessing CEO knowledge is more expensive for employees in location j = 1.
Their knowledge increases, so they communicate fewer problems. As the problem prob-
ability distribution function is downward sloping, the marginal product of knowledge
is decreasing. The firm optimally compensates for the additional communication costs
by not only increasing the knowledge at the subordinate establishment, but also at the
headquarters. The requirement to equate both marginal production costs and marginal
benefit of CEO time (Proposition 2) implies that the increase is higher at the subordinate
establishment than at the headquarters.
Higher communication costs θ10 increase the average production costs. They thus
modify, but do not fundamentally alter the insights about the optimal organizational
structure in Proposition 4. The higher θ10 is, the higher the average production costs
are, and the smaller the range of quantities is for which multi-establishment production
is efficient. Still, the multi-establishment firm reorganizes gradually.
Separate product markets
Assuming that the firm freely allocates both total output and CEO time across estab-
lishments makes it easier to analytically solve the model. It implies that the below-CEO
knowledge levels do not vary with total output (Proposition 3). However, firms are
likely limited in their flexibility to allocate total output in practice. We therefore extend
the model to separate local output markets. We assume that the firm has to pay an
iceberg-type transport cost τ if it sells output produced in location j in location k 6= j.
The firm faces two possibly different levels of local demand, {q̃j}1j=0. The additional
assumption does not affect the optimization problem at the establishment level outlined
in equations (3.18)-(3.22), nor does it change the choice of the optimal organizational
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the average cost functions, local demand
Quantity
 
 
Average production costs, 10=00
Average production costs, 10=200
The figure illustrates the average cost function of a multi-establishment firm for w0 = w1, θ00 ≤ θ10. At
each kink, the multi-establishment firm adds a layer at one establishment. The communication costs
affect the quantity at which the firm reorganizes.
structure in equation (3.14). However, it alters the optimal allocation of output and
CEO time:
C̃0,ω
(
{q̃j}1j=0
)
= min
{qj,ω ,sj,ω}1j=0,z̄0,ω≥0
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω (qj,ω, sj,ω, z̄0,ω) +
[
1−
1∑
j=0
sj,ω
]
w0 (1 + cz̄0,ω)
(3.26)
s.t. s0,ω + s1,ω ≤ 1 (3.27)
1(qj,ω ≥ q̃j ∧ qk,ω ≤ q̃k)(qj,ω − q̃j + τ(qk,ω − q̃k)) ≥ 0, k 6= j (3.28)
Constraint (3.28) states that output at a location j qj,ω has to be large enough to satisfy
demand at j and a possible difference between local production and local demand at
location k including transport cost: qj,ω ≥ q̃j + τ(qk,ω − q̃k).
The transport friction leads to different marginal production costs across locations.
Proposition 6. Suppose the firm produces at two establishments and incurs transport
costs τ > 1 to ship output from one location to the other. The firm allocates CEO time
to equate the marginal benefit of CEO time across establishments:
ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω.
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The firm allocates output to equate the marginal production costs, adjusted by the trans-
port costs, across establishments if possible. Formally, in optimum,
ξ0,ω = τ
−1ξ1,ω if q0,ω = q̃0 + τ(q1,ω − q̃1), (3.29)
ξ0,ω = τξ1,ω if q1,ω = q̃1 + τ(q0,ω − q̃0), and (3.30)
τ−1ξ1,ω < ξ0,ω < τξ1,ω if q1,ω = q̃1 ∧ q0,ω = q̃0. (3.31)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
Proposition 6 distinguishes three cases. The firm may produce output at location 0 to
satisfy local demand and part of the demand at location 1 (equation 3.29). In this case,
it allocates output such that the marginal production costs at location 1 are equal to the
marginal production costs at location 0 adjusted by the transport costs. Reversely, the
firm equates the marginal production costs at location 0 and the marginal production
costs at location 1 adjusted by the transport costs if it produces more output than
demanded at 1 (equation 3.30). However, this allocation is only feasible under certain
parameter conditions. The firm produces output strictly for local demand if the marginal
costs at one location cannot be equalized to the transport adjusted marginal costs at
the other (equation 3.31). If the marginal production costs at one location adjusted for
transport costs are lower than the marginal costs at the other location, the firm produces
total output at this location, i.e. is a single establishment firm.
The allocation of output across locations has implications for the comparative statics
results of the model. If the firm equates the marginal production costs adjusted for
transport costs (i.e., if either (3.29) or (3.30) hold), the results from Proposition 3 apply.
In particular, the below-CEO knowledge levels do not vary with output. Otherwise,
the comparative statics results are similar to those for a single establishment firm in
Proposition 1. In particular, the below-CEO knowledge levels increase with higher output
and the average cost function is U-shaped. Intuitively, if the firm cannot freely allocate
output, it faces similar constraints as a single establishment firm: The firm allocates
the CEO time to equate its marginal benefit across establishments. It then chooses the
number and knowledge level of employees in order to minimize the production costs of
local demand, taking as given the allocated share of CEO time. Figure 3.3 illustrates
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the resulting average cost function.
Figure 3.3 also illustrates that the communication costs across space θ10 affect the
number of managerial layers of the firm in a setting with local demand. The higher the
communication costs are, the smaller is the quantity at which the firm adds a layer at one
establishment, as a comparison of the solid and dashed lines show. Higher communication
costs increase the knowledge levels of employees and thus the marginal production costs.
Adding a layer helps the firm to mitigate the cost increase, because it allows decreasing
production worker knowledge and thus marginal costs. In contrast, the firm avoids the
high communication costs across space by producing total output at one establishment
if it can freely allocate output (see Corollary 1).
Importantly, the main implications of the model in section 3.4.3 are unchanged. In
both settings, the organization of establishments is interdependent: As the firm allo-
cates CEO time to equate its marginal benefit across establishments, changes to the
communication costs θ10 and other parameters affect the number and knowledge levels
of employees at both establishments. Likewise, the number of layers at an establish-
ment depends on the managerial structure of the other establishment. In both settings,
the multi-establishment firm reorganizes gradually. The firm adds a layer at one estab-
lishment at a smaller size than if it were a single establishment firm and at the other
establishment at a larger size.
3.4.4 The optimal total output
For simplicity, we endogenize the optimal total output in the setting with a single output
market studied in section 3.4.3.
We consider a setting with many firms i that each produce a differentiated product.
Agents maximize their utility (3.4) subject to their budget constraint. The total demand
results from multiplying the individual demand by the number of agents per location:
q(αi) = αi(R0 +R1)P
σ−1p(x(αi))
−σ
Rj = Njwj denotes income and P is the price index. We normalize the price index to 1.
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Each firm chooses the optimal output to maximize profits given the taste draw:
max
q̃≥0
πi(αi) = p(q̃(αi))q̃(αi)− C(q̃) (3.32)
Substituting the demand function and solving for the optimal output yields
q̃(αi) = αi (R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ − 1
ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ
, (3.33)
where we make explicit that the marginal costs ξ0,ω are a function of αi through output.
The optimal price is a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
p(αi) =
σ
σ − 1
ξ0,ω (q̃(αi)) (3.34)
Proposition 7. The optimal output q̃(αi) increases continuously with the taste param-
eter αi. If the firm produces at both locations, the optimal output decreases with the
communication costs across space θ10.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.3.
This result implies that firm geography affects firm size. The higher the commu-
nication costs across space are, the higher the marginal production costs are and in
consequence, the lower total output is. Higher communication costs thus decrease total
profits and the incentive to produce at both locations.
3.4.5 Summary
As stated at the beginning of this section, the objective of the model is to explain why
the number of establishments of a firm affects its managerial organization. Taking stock,
we find that the model is consistent with the three facts uncovered in section 3.3.
Proposition 4 shows that multi-establishment firms add a managerial layer at one
establishment at a lower output and at the other establishment at a larger output than
single establishment firms. This is consistent with Facts 2 and 3. Multi-establishment
firms are predicted to have more managerial layers than single establishment firms and
to reorganize gradually.
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Extending the model with transport frictions helps understand why the number of
layers of a multi-establishment firm increases with establishment distance, as found in
Fact 2. Proposition 6 implies that the marginal costs differ across establishments de-
pending on the transport costs. The extended model is therefore consistent with recent
evidence from the literature that distance to the headquarters decreases establishment
performance (e.g., Giroud, 2013). It explains the negative effect of distance on the loca-
tion probability and establishment size uncovered in Fact 1.
The key driver of the model implications is that firms allocate the common resource
CEO time such that its marginal benefit is equal across establishments. Consequently,
the organizational structure is interdependent across establishments. We next use an
exogenous change of spatial frictions to provide evidence for this model prediction.
3.5 Organizational response to new high speed train
routes
Section 3.5 traces the organizational response of multi-establishment firms to an exoge-
nous change of the economic environment. We exploit the opening of new high-speed
train routes between major cities in Germany (similar to Charnoz et al., 2015; Bernard
et al., 2017). The high speed train routes make it easier for managers to travel be-
tween the headquarters and subordinate establishments and thus facilitate face-to-face
interactions within multi-establishment firms. They thus provide a plausibly exogenous
reduction of the costs to manage subordinate establishments from the headquarters. In
the vocabulary of the model, they decrease θ10, the communication costs across space.
3.5.1 Travel time changes due to new high speed train routes
We use information on the changes in the travel times between German cities due to the
introduction of four high-speed train routes. Deutsche Bahn AG, the state-owned Ger-
man railway firm, either constructed new rails (routes 1, 3, 4) or substantially upgraded
the existing railway network (route 2). Route 1 almost halved the travel time between
Frankfurt and Cologne from 135 minutes to 76 minutes. Service started in August 2002
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Figure 3.4: The new high speed train routes and the high speed railway network
Hamburg 
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Leipzig 
Munich 
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The map shows the German high speed rail network (black) including the new high speed train routes
(red). Trains run at up to 300 km/h on the red routes, around 100 km/h faster than on the black routes.
Data source: Deutsche Bahn AG (http://data.deutschebahn.com/dataset/geo-strecke).
(Eurailpress.de, 2002). Route 2 reduced the travel time between Hamburg and Berlin
from 135 minutes to 90 minutes from December 2004 (Eurailpress.de, 2004). Deutsche
Bahn AG launched train service on Route 3, the new train route between Ingolstadt
and Nuremberg in May 2006. The route reduced the travel time between the two cities
from 66 minutes to 30 minutes (Brux, 2006). Route 4 decreased the travel time between
Leipzig and Berlin from 145 minutes to 75 minutes in the same year (Eurailpress.de,
2006). Figure 3.4 shows a map of the new high speed train routes and how they connect
to the existing high speed rail network.
Trains on all routes exclusively transport people. Except for the Hamburg-Berlin
connection, the high speed trains run at up to 300 km/h and thus around 100 km/h
faster than on the other routes of the German high speed rail network. Between the
connected cities, it is faster to take the train than the car or even plane (if one ac-
counts for waiting times at the airport). In fact, regular plane service between Cologne
Bonn Airport and Stuttgart Airport was discontinued in 2002,12 and the service between
Cologne Bonn Airport and Frankfurt Airport was discontinued in 2007.13 The number
12It takes about 80 minutes to travel from Frankfurt to Stuttgart by train.
13The carrier Lufthansa explicitly referred to the new high speed train route as main reason for lower
demand (Eurailpress.de, 2007).
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of flights between Cologne Bonn Airport and Nuremberg Airport dropped substantially
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2007).
As figure 3.4 shows, the German railway network is very complex compared to other
countries. Paris, for instance, is the center of the French railway network that has ap-
proximately a “star” network structure. In contrast, there are many different connections
between medium sized cities in the German railway network. The travel time reductions
therefore propagate through the network and affect more locations than only those at
the immediate ends. For example, Route 3 between Ingolstadt and Nuremberg decreased
travel times from Munich to many medium sized cities such as Würzburg or Bamberg,
Leipzig, and, together with Route 4, Berlin.
To capture the impact of the train routes, we obtain information on the mean and
minimum travel times in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008 from the Deutsche Bahn AG.
Our data comprise 115 train stations that are connected to the ICE network, the German
high speed train network, in at least one of the three years. To make sure that tem-
porary construction works do not affect the travel times, Deutsche Bahn AG computed
the mean travel times based on information from three different weekdays in March,
June and November. Travel times may change over time for several reasons, including
adjustments of the time table, construction works, new changeover connections, or new
high speed routes. To allow us to disentangle lower travel times due to the new routes
and other reasons, the data contain an indicator for station pairs where more than 50%
of passengers used one of the new high speed routes in 2008. We merge the travel times
and the data on multi-establishment firms using the information on the county where
the establishment is located.
3.5.2 Model predictions
Section 3.4 shows that the parameter θ10 is an important determinant of multi-establishment
firm organization. It affects the organization of the establishments and CEO knowledge
(Proposition 5) and has an impact on the organizational structure (section 3.4.3). Im-
portantly, it affects the production quantity (Proposition 7), another key determinant of
multi-establishment firm organization (Proposition 3, 4). We take this complexity into
account in our empirical analysis.
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Figure 3.5: Response of endogenous variables to change in the travel times
 Travel time Communication costs , Total output
Organizational structure
CEO knowledge, allocation of CEO time/ output
̅ , , , , , ∀
Number and knowledge of employees
,
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The graph illustrates the response of the endogenous variables to a change of the travel time according to
the model in Section 3.4. The arrows denote causal relationships between the variables at the nodes. The
node symbol • (◦) denotes that a variable is (un)observable. G# denotes that part of a group of variables is
observable and the other part is unobservable. The change of the travel time affects the communication
costs between a subordinate establishment k and the headquarters θk0,k 6=0. θk0 has a direct effect on the
managerial organization and affects the organizational structure ω, CEO knowledge z̄0,ω, the allocation
of CEO time and output {sj,ω, qj,ω}∀j , and the number and knowledge of employees n`j,ω, z`j,ω. θk0,k 6=0
has an indirect effect on these variables through the impact on total output q̃.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the model implications using a directed graph. Solid circles
denote observable variables and hollow circles denote unobservable variables. The arrows
denote causal links between the variables at the nodes. To keep the graph simple, we
group variables and use semi-solid circles if only part of the group is observable.
The figure shows that changes to the communication costs between an establish-
ment k and the headquarters θk0,k 6=0 have direct effects on the organization of multi-
establishment firms and indirect effects. First, changes to θk0 affect the optimal total
output q̃. θk0 has a direct effect on the organizational structure ω and an indirect ef-
fect through q̃ because total output is a determinant of ω. The firm level choices CEO
knowledge z̄0,ω, the allocation of CEO time sj,ω and the allocation of output qj,ω depend
directly on θk0, but also indirectly through q̃ and ω. Similarly, the establishment level
choices concerning the number and knowledge of employees per layer n`j,ω, z
`
j,ω depend
directly on θk0 and indirectly through z̄0,ω, sj,ω, qj,ω and ω.
The figure makes clear that the changes to the travel times provide an exogenous
change of the model parameter θk0 that affects many endogenous variables. Put differ-
ently, we have more endogenous variables than exogenous instruments. In result, we can
only estimate the total, direct plus indirect, effect of θk0 on the organization of firms.
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We cannot test the predictions of Proposition 5, for example, because the Proposition
derives the impact of θk0 on endogenous outcomes taking as given total output and the
organizational structure. Only Proposition 7 is testable, because output only directly
depends on θk0. Nevertheless, our empirical exercise is informative about the main model
prediction: The key insight of the model is that changes to the economic environment
of one establishment affect the organizational structure of all establishments of a multi-
establishment firm. We take two predictions to the data:
Prediction 1. Firm size increases after a reduction in the travel time between a subor-
dinate establishment and the headquarters of the multi-establishment firm.
Prediction 2. A reduction in the travel time between one subordinate establishment and
the headquarters of the multi-establishment firm affects the organization of all establish-
ments.
To provide evidence for these predictions, we estimate three specifications. At the
firm level, we estimate:
yit = δ0 + δ1D∃j s.t. θ↓,it + αi + αct + εit (3.35)
i refers to a multi-establishment firm, j to a subordinate establishment, c to the head-
quarters county and t indexes time. yijt denotes the outcome variables. The main
variable of interest is the indicator variable D∃j s.t. θ↓,it . It is equal to one if the travel
time between at least one subordinate establishment and the headquarters decreases. αi
is a firm fixed effect. αct is a county-year fixed effect.
With view to Figure 3.5, we choose the following outcome variables: We use the
number of employees to capture total output and the allocation of output across es-
tablishments. We employ the number of hierarchical layers to reflect the organizational
structure ω of the firm. The share of employees in managerial occupations captures both
the number of hierarchical layers and the allocation of employees and their knowledge
across layers. Given Prediction 1, we expect δ1 > 0 for firm size.
The specification mimics a differences-in-differences estimation equation. The “treat-
ment” is faster travel time between at least one subordinate establishment and the head-
quarters. Its baseline effect is captured by the firm fixed effect. The time fixed effect
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captures the “after” dummy. The indicator variable D∃j s.t. θ↓,it is equivalent to the
interaction term of the “treatment” and “after” dummy variables.
To understand the impact of the “treatment” on the establishment outcomes, we
estimate:
yijt = β0 + β1Dθ↓,ijt + αj + αct + εijt (3.36)
where the main variable of interest is Dθ↓,ijt, an indicator variable for lower travel times
between the establishment and its headquarters. αj is an establishment fixed effect. We
use the same outcome variables as for the firm level.
As the model predicts that changes of the communication costs between one sub-
ordinate establishment and the headquarters may affect the organization of the other
establishments, we exclude “non-treated” subordinate establishments of firms with at
least one treated subordinate establishment from the control group. The regressions
estimate how outcomes of subordinate establishments with a lower travel time to the
headquarters evolve compared to subordinate establishments that belong to firms where
none of the subordinate establishments is treated. In the baseline regressions, we also
restrict the sample to establishments at locations connected to the high speed rail net-
work to avoid that unobservable differences between establishments connected and not
connected to the network drive the results.
We adjust the estimation equation to explore the impact on non-treated subordinate
establishments of treated firms following Prediction 2:
yikt = γ0 + γ1D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt + αk + αct + εikt, k 6= j (3.37)
k refers to an untreated subordinate establishment. The indicator variable D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt
is equal to one if the travel time between one of the other establishments of the firm
and the headquarters decreased by at least 30 minutes. The control group consists of
subordinate establishments of non-treated firms.
In our baseline specification, we set the indicatorsDθ↓,ijt, D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt andD∃j s.t. θ↓,it
equal to one if the travel time between the subordinate establishment j and the head-
quarters decreases by at least 30 minutes. The high-speed train routes decrease the
travel times by at least 30 minutes. As Appendix Table C.11 shows, virtually none of
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Table 3.8: Regression results, firm size
Firm Treated establishment Untreated est.
Number of employees (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D∃j s.t. θ↓,it 0.045
∗∗
(0.013)
Dθ↓,ijt −0.008 −0.000 0.077∗
(0.030) (0.059) (0.032)
D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt −0.209∗∗∗−0.213∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
R-squared 0.976 0.920 0.920 0.874 0.859 0.860
Firm FE Y N N N N N
Establishment FE N Y Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 11,218 12,210 4,086 24,489 20,314 22,416
2000-2010 panel, only firms with at least 10 employees. Standard errors clustered at county level in
parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: number of
employees of a firm (column 1) or subordinate establishment (columns 2-6). Independent variables:
D∃j s.t. θ↓,it: 1 if travel time to headquarters is reduced by at least 30 minutes at one establishment of
firm. Dθ↓,ijt: 1 if travel time to headquarters is reduced by at least 30 minutes. D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt 1 if travel
time to headquarters is reduced by at least 30 minutes at another establishment of firm. Column 3:
subordinate establishments with maximum travel time to headquarters of 150 minutes in 2000.
the non-high-speed-route connections exhibit a decrease in travel times of 30 minutes or
more. The threshold thus helps us to ensure that the reduction is indeed driven by the
exogenous new route instead of potentially endogenous adjustments to the time table
that may respond to changes of demand. We exclude subordinate establishments with
minor travel time reductions from the control group. We conduct robustness checks to
show that our insights are robust to these restrictions.
One may be worried that the difference in the travel times also affects other model
parameters, such as local wages because employees commute longer distances. The
empirical methodology isolates the impact of lower face-to-face frictions on firm organi-
zation from the effect of other economic forces. Lower local wages benefit establishments
of treated and untreated firms, so our estimation strategy differences out their effect. In
addition, the county-year fixed effects capture the local economic conditions.
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3.5.3 Regression results
We present our regression results by outcome variable. Table 3.8 presents the regression
results for size. The first column refers to the results for the firm. Columns 2-4 refer
to the treated establishment. Column 2 contains the baseline specification. Column 3
restricts the sample to establishments with initial travel time of at most 2.5 hours,
because we expect the train routes to reduce management costs to a larger degree at
shorter distances, where round-trips are feasible within a day. Column 4 includes non-
treated establishments of the same firm in the control group. Columns 5 and 6 present
the results for the untreated establishments. In column 5, we restrict the control group
to establishments of firms with at least three establishments to make it more comparable
to the treated group. In column 6, we drop this restriction.
Consistent with Prediction 1, we find that treated firms grow compared to untreated
firms. The reduction of travel time thus seems to enhance firm efficiency. The growth
rate of treated establishments is not significantly different from the growth rate of es-
tablishments of untreated firms (columns 2, 3). However, treated establishments grow
significantly faster than the control group if we include untreated establishments of the
firm. This indicates that employment is reallocated within the firm towards the treated
establishment. The negative impact of faster train routes on the untreated establish-
ments in columns 5 and 6 is consistent with this interpretation.
Table 3.9 contains the regression results for the organizational structure. At the
firm level, we find that the managerial share tends to increase, but the effect is not
significantly different from zero (column 1). The number of layers increases (column 2).
This finding indicates that the positive impact of a larger size on the number of layers
derived in Proposition 3 outweighs the negative direct effect of the communication costs.
At the establishment level, the managerial share of treated establishments decreases
compared to the managerial share of subordinate establishments of untreated firms. The
estimates in column 3 are equivalent to a reduction by 10% at the mean. The decrease is
considerably stronger when we restrict the sample to subordinate establishments with a
maximum travel time to the headquarters of 2.5 hours in 2000 in column 4. In contrast,
including the untreated subordinate establishments of a treated firm in column 5 miti-
gates the effect. It is still negative, but only marginally significant (P-value 13.0%). The
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Table 3.9: Regression results, managerial share
Managerial share/ Firm Treated establishment Untreated est.
# layers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D∃j s.t. θ↓,it 0.266 0.045
∗
(0.217) (0.019)
Dθ↓,ijt −1.572∗ −2.832∗∗ −0.917
(0.706) (0.842) (0.606)
D∃j 6=k s.t. θ↓,ikt −1.336∗∗ −1.398∗∗
(0.471) (0.463)
R-squared 0.964 0.887 0.846 0.846 0.813 0.803 0.804
Firm FE Y Y N N N N N
Establishment FE N N Y Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 11,218 11,218 12,210 4,086 24,489 20,314 22,416
2000-2010 panel, only firms with at least 10 employees. Standard errors clustered at county level in
parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: share of employees
in managerial occupations of firm (column 1) or subordinate establishment (columns 3-7); # layers of
firm (column 2). Independent variables: see Table 3.8. Column 3: subordinate establishments with
maximum travel time to headquarters of 150 minutes in 2000.
managerial share at the untreated subordinate establishments decreases for both defini-
tions of the control group. In unreported regressions, we find that the share of managers
at the headquarters increases, in particular at levels 2 and 3 (coefficient all manage-
ment layers .307 (s.e. .242), levels 2 and 3 .543∗ (s.e. .240)). This finding reconciles the
difference between the establishment level management shares and the headquarters.
The main take-away from the table is that changes in the economic environment of
one establishment affect the managerial share of all establishments of the firm, consis-
tent with Prediction 2. Several factors may contribute to the estimated negative effect.
Lower communication costs decrease the need for local management, as illustrated in
section 3.4.3. Further, larger firm size leads to higher knowledge levels at all layers ac-
cording to Proposition 3, which additionally decreases the ratio of managers to workers.
Robustness. We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we restrict the sample
to the years 2000, 2004, and 2008 for which we have travel time information. Second, we
include establishments with travel time reduction of less than 30 minutes in the control
group. Third, we add establishments in counties without an ICE train station. Finally,
we redefine treatment as a travel time reduction of at least 10 minutes. Appendix
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Table C.12 shows that our results are robust to these modifications for the treated
establishments. Throughout, the effect of lower travel time on the managerial share is
negative and significant (if only marginally so in column 3, P-value of 11.3%).
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that geographic frictions between one subordinate establishment
and the headquarters affect the managerial organization of all establishments of a multi-
establishment firm. Our insights imply that the impact of local economic conditions on
multi-establishment firms goes beyond their impact on specific establishments. Multi-
establishment firms account for disproportionate shares of aggregate output and em-
ployment. Understanding how local conditions propagate through the network of multi-
establishment firms is an exciting and relevant area for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Descriptive statistics and illustrations
A.1.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of non-manufacturing firms with donut, 2000
0.5-2 km 2.8-4.2 km difference
Mean SD N Mean SD N (4) - (1) SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance
Log(sales, survey) 14.11 1.88 536 13.88 1.72 120 −0.22 0.19
Log(value added, survey) 13.37 1.94 467 13.23 1.80 107 −0.14 0.20
Share of purchased inputs 0.43 0.23 474 0.43 0.20 111 0.01 0.02
Log(sales per FTE) 12.41 1.60 513 12.32 1.50 115 −0.09 0.16
Log(sales per empl.) 11.17 0.73 509 11.11 0.73 115 −0.06 0.08
Employment size
Log(full-time empl., SIAB) 1.66 1.49 536 1.59 1.45 120 −0.07 0.15
Log(total empl., survey) 3.16 1.67 536 3.00 1.57 120 −0.16 0.17
Log(daily wage sum, SIAB) 5.87 1.66 536 5.81 1.60 120 −0.06 0.17
Log(monthly wage sum, survey) 10.34 1.99 516 10.20 1.84 117 −0.15 0.20
Skill composition
Share low-skilled 0.07 0.18 536 0.05 0.15 120 −0.01 0.02
Share medium-skilled 0.81 0.29 536 0.87 0.22 120 0.06 0.03
Share high-skilled 0.10 0.23 536 0.08 0.16 120 −0.03 0.02
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the firms in panel sample 2000 to 2011 in the first year. Data
sources are reported in the table. The shares of skill groups are calculated based on the composition in
SIAB.
113
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of non-manufacturing firms without donut, 2000
0.5-2 km 2-3.5 km difference
Mean SD N Mean SD N (4) - (1) SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance
Log(Sales, survey) 14.13 1.91 577 14.08 1.76 233 −0.05 0.15
Log(Value added, survey) 13.39 1.95 501 13.45 1.84 207 0.06 0.16
Share of purchased inputs 0.43 0.23 509 0.42 0.21 212 −0.01 0.02
Log(Sales per FTE) 12.43 1.63 552 12.32 1.48 224 −0.10 0.13
Log(Sales per empl.) 11.17 0.76 548 11.11 0.73 223 −0.05 0.06
Employment size
Log(Full-Time Empl., SIAB) 1.66 1.50 577 1.75 1.53 233 0.08 0.05
Log(Total Empl., survey) 3.19 1.71 577 3.12 1.53 233 −0.06 0.13
Log(Daily wage sum, SIAB) 5.87 1.67 577 5.95 1.73 233 0.07 0.13
Log(Monthly wage sum, survey) 10.37 2.03 556 10.37 1.82 228 −0.00 0.15
Skill composition
Share Low Skilled 0.07 0.18 577 0.05 0.16 233 −0.02 0.01
Share Medium Skilled 0.81 0.29 577 0.84 0.25 233 0.03 0.02
Share High Skilled 0.11 0.24 577 0.10 0.21 233 −0.01 0.02
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the firms in panel sample 2000 to 2011 in the first year. Data
sources are reported in the table. The shares of skill groups are calculated based on the composition in
SIAB.
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A.1.2 Identification strategy
Figure A.1: Map of main distribution frames
 
Main distribution frames 
County borders Control group 
Treated group 
The figure illustrates the definition of treatment and control group for the analysis of speed upgrades.
Grey lines show county borders. Black triangles resemble MDFs. Grey circles resemble the areas of
treated firms. Light circles resemble the areas of firms in the control group.
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Figure A.2: Number of DSL subscriptions in Germany
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The figure shows the number of DSL subscriptions in Germany over time (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011)
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Figure A.3: Timeline
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The figure shows the timeline of the introduction and upgrading of broadband internet technology
following Schnabel (2015). In 2000, customers received ADSL with a maximum download speed of 768
kBit/s. In later years, the speed was upgraded up to 6 MBit/s. In 2006, however, ADSL2+ provided
a much larger speed upgrades with up to 16 MBit/s provided by most telecoms companies. Further,
VDSL was introduced but required large infrastructure investments which took several years. Own
illustration.
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A.2 Results
A.2.1 Results of introduction of the broadband internet
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Table A.3: Robustness checks on timing of introduction
Dpost Excl. early
Dependent variable from 2000 municip.
Performance
Log(revenues) −0.018 −0.012
Source: survey (0.077) (0.081)
N 1,255 1,201
Log(value added) −0.015 0.033
Source: survey (0.108) (0.107)
N 987 937
Log(revenues per full-time 0.086 0.132
employee (FTE)) (0.111) (0.113)
Sources: survey and SIAB N 1,123 1,073
Log(revenues per employee) 0.144∗∗ 0.147∗∗
Source: survey (0.063) (0.061)
N 1,121 1,071
Employment
Log(total employment) −0.084 −0.066
Source: survey (0.068) (0.073)
N 1,255 1,201
Log(full-time employment) −0.077 −0.094
Source: SIAB (0.108) (0.114)
N 1,255 1,201
Log(wage sum) −0.118 −0.128
Source: SIAB (0.117) (0.122)
N 1,255 1,201
Log(wage sum) −0.147∗ −0.152∗
Source: survey (0.077) (0.084)
N 1,216 1,162
Skill composition
Share of low-skilled −0.020 −0.024
Source: SIAB (0.015) (0.019)
N 1,255 1,201
Share of medium-skilled 0.033∗ 0.046∗∗
Source: SIAB (0.019) (0.022)
N 1,255 1,201
Share of high-skilled −0.014 −0.024
Source: SIAB (0.016) (0.017)
N 1,255 1,201
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment period and 2001 to 2005 as the treatment period. The estimation equation is:
yi,t = β0 +β1 DSL accessiDpost,t +αi +αt +uit, where Dpost,t is an indicator variable for the treatment
period from 2001 on. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between
2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7 km from the MDF. The
table reports the results for β1. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control
groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations
reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The regression in the first column defines the post period from 2000 on.
The sample in the second column excludes municipalities in which any MDF was upgraded to the first
generation of broadband internet in 2000.
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Table A.4: Yearly effects of the introduction of broadband internet: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D1997 −0.033 −0.050 −0.019 −0.107
(0.142) (0.086) (0.149) (0.109)
DDSL ×D1998 0.007 −0.013 0.020 −0.049
(0.127) (0.083) (0.134) (0.100)
DDSL ×D1999 0.021 −0.009 −0.007 −0.066
(0.123) (0.086) (0.126) (0.105)
DDSL ×D2000 −0.017 −0.094 −0.053 −0.134
(0.123) (0.083) (0.126) (0.100)
DDSL ×D2001 0.009 −0.103 −0.034 −0.230∗∗
(0.127) (0.086) (0.132) (0.106)
DDSL ×D2002 0.011 −0.005 −0.015 −0.084
(0.141) (0.093) (0.143) (0.112)
DDSL ×D2003 −0.153 −0.100 −0.194 −0.305∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.088) (0.146) (0.110)
DDSL ×D2004 −0.219 −0.175∗−0.272∗−0.332∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.104) (0.156) (0.121)
DDSL ×D2005 −0.224 −0.197 −0.286 −0.198
(0.176) (0.154) (0.183) (0.152)
R-squared 0.937 0.965 0.948 0.967
Obs. 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,216
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment and 2001 to 2005 as treatment period. The estimation equation is: yi,t =
β0+β1,t DSL accessiDyear,t+αi+αt+uit, whereDyear,t is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between 2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and
zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7 km from the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To
adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the
weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard
errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on
total employment and monthly wage sum (last column) retrieved from survey data. The sample only
contains non-manufacturing firms.
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Table A.5: Yearly effects of the introduction of broadband internet: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D1997 0.029 0.053 0.005 0.031 0.174
(0.084) (0.143) (0.046) (0.159) (0.122)
DDSL ×D1998 0.040 0.060 −0.009 0.058 0.140
(0.079) (0.147) (0.043) (0.143) (0.123)
DDSL ×D1999 −0.010 −0.171 0.078∗ −0.008 0.207
(0.078) (0.141) (0.043) (0.142) (0.126)
DDSL ×D2000 0.015 −0.067 0.039 0.012 0.200
(0.083) (0.136) (0.040) (0.144) (0.129)
DDSL ×D2001 0.001 −0.050 0.017 0.088 0.275∗∗
(0.088) (0.167) (0.044) (0.146) (0.130)
DDSL ×D2002 0.047 −0.058 0.031 0.083 0.354∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.143) (0.043) (0.159) (0.135)
DDSL ×D2003 −0.030 −0.003 −0.020 0.147 0.260∗
(0.093) (0.149) (0.046) (0.159) (0.134)
DDSL ×D2004 −0.098 −0.097 0.005 0.138 0.278∗
(0.107) (0.170) (0.049) (0.168) (0.148)
DDSL ×D2005 0.019 0.116 −0.005 0.288+ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.177) (0.049) (0.167) (0.157)
R-squared 0.973 0.937 0.662 0.934 0.839
Obs. 1,255 987 1,002 1,123 1,121
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment and 2001 to 2005 as treatment period. The estimation equation is: yi,t =
β0+β1,t DSL accessiDyear,t+αi+αt+uit, whereDyear,t is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between 2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and
zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7 km from the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To
adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the
weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard
errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on
revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total employment retrieved from survey data. The number
of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based on social-security data. The sample only contains
non-manufacturing firms.
121
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.6: Main regression results of the introduction of broadband internet
Dependent variable Pooled Non-manuf. Manuf.
Performance
Log(revenues) −0.006 −0.023 0.004
Source: survey (0.031) (0.040) (0.047)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Log(value added) 0.029 0.007 0.034
Source: survey (0.054) (0.068) (0.087)
N 1,734 987 747
Log(revenues per full-time 0.096∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.070
employee (FTE)) (0.044) (0.060) (0.064)
Sources: survey and SIAB N 1,971 1,123 848
Log(revenues per employee) 0.118∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗
Source: survey (0.036) (0.052) (0.049)
N 1,967 1,121 846
Employment
Log(total employment) −0.074∗ −0.091 −0.068
Source: survey (0.041) (0.056) (0.061)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Log(full-time employment) −0.075∗∗∗ −0.071∗ −0.100∗∗∗
Source: SIAB (0.027) (0.038) (0.037)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Log(wage sum) −0.101∗∗ −0.125∗∗ −0.086
Source: SIAB (0.043) (0.057) (0.064)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Log(wage sum) −0.079∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.013
Source: survey (0.037) (0.047) (0.060)
N 2,114 1,216 898
Skill composition
Share of low-skilled −0.015∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.006
Source: SIAB (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Share of medium-skilled 0.017 0.043∗∗∗ −0.020
Source: SIAB (0.012) (0.013) (0.022)
N 2,184 1,255 929
Share of high-skilled −0.001 −0.022∗∗ 0.025
Source: SIAB (0.011) (0.010) (0.021)
N 2,184 1,255 929
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment period and 2001 to 2005 as the treatment period. The estimation equation is:
yi,t = β0 +β1 DSL accessiDpost,t +αi +αt +uit, where Dpost,t is an indicator variable for the treatment
period from 2001 on. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between
2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7 km from the MDF. The
table reports the results for β1. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control
groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations
reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.2.2 Main results of speed upgrades
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Table A.7: Main results on speed upgrades: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.008 0.120 −0.004 0.019 −0.043
(0.055) (0.088) (0.024) (0.067) (0.055)
DDSL ×D2002 0.028 0.124 −0.016 −0.018 −0.035
(0.052) (0.087) (0.023) (0.073) (0.059)
DDSL ×D2003 0.128∗∗ 0.210∗∗ −0.009 0.120 0.061
(0.053) (0.100) (0.025) (0.079) (0.060)
DDSL ×D2004 0.168∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗−0.025 0.108 0.083
(0.057) (0.096) (0.026) (0.074) (0.060)
DDSL ×D2005 0.138∗∗ 0.222∗∗ −0.035 0.063 0.039
(0.060) (0.097) (0.025) (0.081) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2006 0.147∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗−0.048∗ 0.072 0.037
(0.061) (0.099) (0.029) (0.082) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2007 0.191∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗−0.021 0.069 0.058
(0.064) (0.106) (0.031) (0.078) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2008 0.150∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.005 0.075 0.034
(0.061) (0.106) (0.029) (0.077) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2009 0.158∗∗ 0.242∗∗ −0.009 0.076 0.105
(0.063) (0.103) (0.032) (0.080) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2010 0.161∗∗ 0.255∗∗ −0.008 0.072 0.093
(0.063) (0.103) (0.032) (0.081) (0.064)
DDSL ×D2011 0.168∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗−0.039 0.084 0.112
(0.066) (0.101) (0.029) (0.093) (0.072)
R-squared 0.973 0.944 0.699 0.925 0.822
Obs. 6,274 5,054 5,189 5,472 5,455
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data.
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Table A.8: Main results on speed upgrades: firm size and skill composition
log(employment) log(wage sum) skill shares
full-time total daily survey low med. high
DDSL ×D2001 −0.019 0.069 0.015 0.070 −0.015 0.001 0.013
(0.055) (0.049) (0.056) (0.066) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016)
DDSL ×D2002 0.046 0.065 0.052 0.066 −0.007 0.013−0.006
(0.058) (0.049) (0.057) (0.066) (0.009) (0.019) (0.017)
DDSL ×D2003 0.017 0.078 0.047 0.094 −0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.061) (0.052) (0.060) (0.069) (0.009) (0.021) (0.018)
DDSL ×D2004 0.062 0.119∗∗ 0.101 0.205∗∗∗−0.008 0.026−0.018
(0.064) (0.058) (0.064) (0.074) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016)
DDSL ×D2005 0.059 0.132∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.005 0.007−0.008
(0.062) (0.058) (0.064) (0.074) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018)
DDSL ×D2006 0.083 0.118∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.123∗−0.008 0.030∗−0.018
(0.061) (0.056) (0.062) (0.072) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015)
DDSL ×D2007 0.087 0.100∗ 0.110∗ 0.143∗−0.006 0.042∗∗−0.031∗
(0.061) (0.055) (0.061) (0.075) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
DDSL ×D2008 0.069 0.124∗∗ 0.090 0.198∗∗−0.001 0.040∗−0.039∗
(0.067) (0.058) (0.067) (0.079) (0.010) (0.023) (0.020)
DDSL ×D2009 0.066 0.107∗ 0.114∗ 0.198∗∗−0.016 0.054∗∗−0.037∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.066) (0.083) (0.011) (0.022) (0.020)
DDSL ×D2010 0.077 0.103∗ 0.083 0.118 −0.025∗ 0.059∗∗∗−0.031∗
(0.070) (0.059) (0.073) (0.077) (0.015) (0.023) (0.018)
DDSL ×D2011 0.078 0.131∗∗ 0.115 0.102 −0.019 0.067∗∗−0.045∗
(0.091) (0.066) (0.091) (0.077) (0.015) (0.030) (0.026)
R-squared 0.951 0.978 0.960 0.971 0.762 0.809 0.833
Obs. 6,274 6,274 6,274 6,068 6,274 6,274 6,274
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum retrieved
from survey data. Information on skills reported in social security data. Low-skilled employees do
not have any vocational training. Medium-skilled employees have vocational training. High-skilled
employees have at least a college degree. The sample only contains non-manufacturing firms.
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A.2.3 Results of speed upgrades in manufacturing
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Table A.9: Results on speed upgrades, manufacturing: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.008 0.120 −0.004 0.019 −0.043
(0.055) (0.088) (0.024) (0.067) (0.055)
DDSL ×D2002 0.028 0.124 −0.016 −0.018 −0.035
(0.052) (0.087) (0.023) (0.073) (0.059)
DDSL ×D2003 0.128∗∗ 0.210∗∗ −0.009 0.120 0.061
(0.053) (0.100) (0.025) (0.079) (0.060)
DDSL ×D2004 0.168∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗−0.025 0.108 0.083
(0.057) (0.096) (0.026) (0.074) (0.060)
DDSL ×D2005 0.138∗∗ 0.222∗∗ −0.035 0.063 0.039
(0.060) (0.097) (0.025) (0.081) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2006 0.147∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗−0.048∗ 0.072 0.037
(0.061) (0.099) (0.029) (0.082) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2007 0.191∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗−0.021 0.069 0.058
(0.064) (0.106) (0.031) (0.078) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2008 0.150∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.005 0.075 0.034
(0.061) (0.106) (0.029) (0.077) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2009 0.158∗∗ 0.242∗∗ −0.009 0.076 0.105
(0.063) (0.103) (0.032) (0.080) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2010 0.161∗∗ 0.255∗∗ −0.008 0.072 0.093
(0.063) (0.103) (0.032) (0.081) (0.064)
DDSL ×D2011 0.168∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗−0.039 0.084 0.112
(0.066) (0.101) (0.029) (0.093) (0.072)
R-squared 0.973 0.944 0.699 0.925 0.822
Obs. 6,274 5,054 5,189 5,472 5,455
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data.
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Table A.10: Results on speed upgrades, manufacturing: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total prod. daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 −0.019 0.069 −0.043 0.015 0.070
(0.055) (0.049) (0.059) (0.056) (0.066)
DDSL ×D2002 0.046 0.065 0.015 0.052 0.066
(0.058) (0.049) (0.062) (0.057) (0.066)
DDSL ×D2003 0.017 0.078 −0.017 0.047 0.094
(0.061) (0.052) (0.066) (0.060) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2004 0.062 0.119∗∗ 0.036 0.101 0.205∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.058) (0.068) (0.064) (0.074)
DDSL ×D2005 0.059 0.132∗∗ 0.049 0.120∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.058) (0.067) (0.064) (0.074)
DDSL ×D2006 0.083 0.118∗∗ 0.050 0.107∗ 0.123∗
(0.061) (0.056) (0.066) (0.062) (0.072)
DDSL ×D2007 0.087 0.100∗ 0.064 0.110∗ 0.143∗
(0.061) (0.055) (0.065) (0.061) (0.075)
DDSL ×D2008 0.069 0.124∗∗ 0.047 0.090 0.198∗∗
(0.067) (0.058) (0.072) (0.067) (0.079)
DDSL ×D2009 0.066 0.107∗ 0.029 0.114∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.071) (0.066) (0.083)
DDSL ×D2010 0.077 0.103∗ 0.047 0.083 0.118
(0.070) (0.059) (0.081) (0.073) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2011 0.078 0.131∗∗−0.120 0.115 0.102
(0.091) (0.066) (0.128) (0.091) (0.077)
R-squared 0.951 0.978 0.939 0.960 0.971
Obs. 6,274 6,274 6,274 6,274 6,068
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data.
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Table A.11: Results on speed upgrades, manufacturing: shares of skill groups
low- medium- high-
skill skill skill
DDSL ×D2001 0.004 −0.007 0.004
(0.008) (0.015) (0.012)
DDSL ×D2002 −0.000 −0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
DDSL ×D2003 −0.000 −0.021 0.020∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
DDSL ×D2004 0.012 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2005 0.004 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2006 0.001 −0.042∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2007 −0.006 −0.034∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.012)
DDSL ×D2008 −0.003 −0.033∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011)
DDSL ×D2009 −0.020∗ −0.028∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2010 −0.008 −0.023 0.020
(0.009) (0.016) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2011 −0.021 −0.003 0.015
(0.014) (0.020) (0.018)
R-squared 0.824 0.801 0.771
Observations 6,117 6,117 6,117
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on skills reported in social security data. Low-skilled
employees do not have any vocational training. Medium-skilled employees have vocational training.
High-skilled employees have at least a college degree.
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A.2.4 Robustness checks on introduction of the broadband in-
ternet
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Table A.12: Other robustness checks for the introduction of broadband internet
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Performance
Log(revenues) −0.006−0.208−0.440∗∗−0.043 0.066
Source: survey (0.123) (0.152) (0.185) (0.081) (0.099)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Log(value added) 0.050−0.073−0.389∗−0.011 0.172
Source: survey (0.168) (0.233) (0.194) (0.109) (0.136)
N 428 319 164 1,179 626
Log(revenues per full-time 0.161 0.060−0.028−0.102 0.207
employee (FTE)) (0.170) (0.211) (0.224) (0.111) (0.143)
Sources: survey and SIAB N 506 354 199 1,054 704
Log(revenues per employee) 0.154 0.134−0.126 0.144∗∗ 0.131
Source: survey (0.110) (0.087) (0.255) (0.061) (0.083)
N 505 354 198 1,052 702
Employment
Log(total employment) −0.067−0.217−0.393−0.098−0.036
Source: survey (0.159) (0.157) (0.331) (0.107) (0.150)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Log(full-time employment) −0.061−0.139−0.126−0.087 0.043
Source: SIAB (0.113) (0.100) (0.211) (0.071) (0.096)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Log(wage sum) −0.144−0.252∗−0.423−0.127−0.075
Source: SIAB (0.190) (0.151) (0.316) (0.112) (0.158)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Log(wage sum) −0.174−0.207∗−0.275−0.158∗−0.074
Source: survey (0.129) (0.110) (0.296) (0.082) (0.104)
N 553 373 211 1,140 793
Skill composition
Share of low-skilled −0.020 0.002 0.026−0.016−0.023
Source: SIAB (0.028) (0.009) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Share of medium-skilled 0.038 0.043−0.024 0.033∗ 0.052∗
Source: SIAB (0.030) (0.048) (0.040) (0.018) (0.030)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
Share of high-skilled −0.016−0.051−0.021−0.016−0.029
Source: SIAB (0.012) (0.046) (0.014) (0.012) (0.025)
N 572 381 211 1,179 793
The table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to 2000
as pre-treatment period and 2001 to 2005 as the treatment period. The estimation equation is: yi,t =
β0 +β1 DSL accessiDpost,t+αi+αt+uit, where Dpost,t is an indicator variable for the treatment period
from 2001 on. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between 2 and 3.5
km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 4.2 and 5.7 km from the MDF. The table reports
the results for β1. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control groups by three-
digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations reported for each
regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01. All samples only contain non-manufacturing firms. Samples are further restricted by robustness
check. Column (1) contains firms that did not invest in ICT in 2000. Column (2) contains firms that
invested in ICT in 2000. Column (3) contains firms in Western Germany. Column (4) contains firms in
municipalities with at least one household with DSL access in 2005. Column (5) contains firms founded
in 1992 or before.
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A.2.5 Robustness checks using the distance
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Table A.13: Results on speed upgrades, distance: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
Distance×D2001 −0.016 −0.058 −0.025 −0.049
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.048)
Distance×D2002 −0.058 −0.083∗∗−0.056 −0.065
(0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.049)
Distance×D2003 −0.063 −0.114∗∗∗−0.073∗−0.098∗
(0.045) (0.040) (0.044) (0.052)
Distance×D2004 −0.148∗∗∗−0.168∗∗∗−0.148∗∗∗−0.200∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.043) (0.045) (0.055)
Distance×D2005 −0.146∗∗∗−0.165∗∗∗−0.158∗∗∗−0.185∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.052)
Distance×D2006 −0.120∗∗∗−0.154∗∗∗−0.133∗∗∗−0.153∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.054)
Distance×D2007 −0.139∗∗∗−0.158∗∗∗−0.161∗∗∗−0.184∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.056)
Distance×D2008 −0.103∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗−0.110∗∗−0.180∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.044) (0.049) (0.058)
Distance×D2009 −0.084∗ −0.150∗∗∗−0.119∗∗−0.177∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.061)
Distance×D2010 −0.109∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗−0.129∗∗−0.117∗∗
(0.051) (0.043) (0.052) (0.057)
Distance×D2011 −0.108 −0.144∗∗∗−0.124 −0.103∗
(0.076) (0.046) (0.077) (0.060)
Constant 1.851∗∗∗ 2.999∗∗∗6.054∗∗∗10.181∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
R-squared 0.950 0.977 0.959 0.971
Obs. 6,352 6,352 6,352 6,145
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in 2006.
The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,t log(distance)iDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t is an
indicator variable for each year. log(distance)i is a continuous variable indicating the distance between
the firm and the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms
in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al.
(2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly
wage sum (last column) retrieved from survey data.
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Table A.14: Results on speed upgrades, distance: performance
Shr. of log(revenues log(revenues
log(revenues) log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
Distance×D2001 0.018 −0.046 0.007 0.026 0.060
(0.045) (0.067) (0.017) (0.051) (0.044)
Distance×D2002 −0.043 −0.103 0.022 −0.012 0.042
(0.041) (0.071) (0.018) (0.055) (0.047)
Distance×D2003 −0.105∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.048 −0.008
(0.043) (0.077) (0.018) (0.058) (0.049)
Distance×D2004 −0.116∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ 0.021 0.008 0.010
(0.046) (0.076) (0.019) (0.058) (0.049)
Distance×D2005 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.006 0.028
(0.047) (0.079) (0.020) (0.061) (0.054)
Distance×D2006 −0.128∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ −0.012 0.075
(0.048) (0.076) (0.019) (0.062) (0.053)
Distance×D2007 −0.124∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.044 0.075
(0.049) (0.083) (0.020) (0.057) (0.051)
Distance×D2008 −0.118∗∗ −0.194∗∗ 0.016 −0.027 0.057
(0.048) (0.082) (0.020) (0.059) (0.053)
Distance×D2009 −0.121∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ 0.034 −0.033 −0.009
(0.049) (0.079) (0.022) (0.061) (0.053)
Distance×D2010 −0.124∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ 0.044∗ −0.035 −0.006
(0.049) (0.081) (0.024) (0.063) (0.050)
Distance×D2011 −0.139∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ −0.003 0.022
(0.051) (0.082) (0.022) (0.087) (0.055)
Constant 13.906∗∗∗ 13.235∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 11.983∗∗∗ 11.160∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.027) (0.007) (0.021) (0.018)
R-squared 0.972 0.943 0.700 0.924 0.813
Obs. 6,352 5,111 5,247 5,538 5,520
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in 2006.
The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,t log(distance)iDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t is an
indicator variable for each year. log(distance)i is a continuous variable indicating the distance between
the firm and the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms
in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al.
(2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of
inputs, and total employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is
calculated based on social-security data.
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Table A.15: Results on speed upgrades, distance: performance
low- medium- high-
skill skill skill
Distance×D2001 0.003 −0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Distance×D2002 −0.007 −0.010 0.017∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Distance×D2003 −0.007 −0.003 0.008
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Distance×D2004 −0.010 −0.007 0.018∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Distance×D2005 −0.019∗∗ −0.000 0.019∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
Distance×D2006 −0.011 −0.007 0.019∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Distance×D2007 −0.012 −0.000 0.013
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010)
Distance×D2008 −0.025∗∗ 0.010 0.022∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
Distance×D2009 −0.007 −0.006 0.014
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
Distance×D2010 −0.006 −0.003 0.010
(0.015) (0.018) (0.012)
Distance×D2011 −0.002 −0.021 0.028
(0.013) (0.022) (0.017)
Constant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
R-squared 0.758 0.810 0.835
Observations 6,352 6,352 6,352
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,t log(distance)iDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. log(distance)i is a continuous variable indicating the distance
between the firm and the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers
of firms in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus
et al. (2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the
firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on skills reported in social
security data. Low-skilled employees do not have any vocational training. Medium-skilled employees
have vocational training. High-skilled employees have at least a college degree.
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A.2.6 Robustness check on introduction: 2-3.5 km to 3.5-5 km
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Table A.16: Regression results comparing 2-3.5 km to 3.5-5 km
Pooled Non-manuf. Manuf.
Performance
log(revenues) −0.064∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.057
(0.030) (0.041) (0.042)
2,359 1,381 978
log(value added) −0.034 −0.107∗ 0.048
(0.053) (0.065) (0.086)
1,874 987 792
log(revenues per FTE) −0.023 −0.020 −0.024
(0.039) (0.057) (0.053)
2,115 1,123 894
log(revenues per employee) −0.006 0.016 −0.031
(0.034) (0.051) (0.044)
2,110 1,121 892
Employment
log(total employment) −0.040 −0.038 −0.050
(0.033) (0.048) (0.041)
2,359 1,381 978
log(full-time employment) −0.045∗ −0.038 −0.061∗
(0.024) (0.035) (0.032)
2,359 1,381 978
log(wage sum, soc. sec.) −0.041 −0.060 −0.025
(0.033) (0.047) (0.045)
2,359 1,381 978
log(wage sum, survey) −0.040 −0.124∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.033) (0.044) (0.050)
2,268 1,329 939
Skill composition
share of low-skilled −0.006 −0.001 −0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
2,359 1,381 978
share of medium-skilled 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
2,359 1,381 978
share of high-skilled 0.001 −0.003 0.007
(0.009) (0.007) (0.017)
2,359 1,381 978
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 1996 to
2000 as pre-treatment period and 2001 to 2005 as the treatment period. The estimation equation is:
yi,t = β0 +β1 DSL accessiDpost,t +αi +αt +uit, where Dpost,t is an indicator variable for the treatment
period from 2001 on. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located between
2 and 3.5 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 3.5 and 5 km from the MDF. The
table reports the results for β1. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment and control
groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of observations
reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
137
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.2.7 Robustness checks speed upgrades: 0.5-2 km vs. 2-3.5
km
Table A.17: Results on speed upgrades, 0.5-2 km to 2-3.5 km: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 −0.014 0.021 0.018 0.035
(0.087) (0.030) (0.083) (0.039)
DDSL ×D2002 0.022 −0.002 0.037 0.005
(0.089) (0.030) (0.084) (0.041)
DDSL ×D2003 0.082 0.010 0.107 0.040
(0.078) (0.031) (0.074) (0.042)
DDSL ×D2004 0.109 0.007 0.156∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.086) (0.032) (0.083) (0.043)
DDSL ×D2005 0.176∗ 0.019 0.216∗∗ 0.077∗
(0.106) (0.035) (0.098) (0.044)
DDSL ×D2006 0.145 −0.007 0.165 0.005
(0.106) (0.033) (0.101) (0.043)
DDSL ×D2007 0.106 −0.045 0.120 0.011
(0.108) (0.032) (0.102) (0.045)
DDSL ×D2008 0.043 −0.043 0.065 0.010
(0.089) (0.036) (0.086) (0.048)
DDSL ×D2009 0.035 −0.050 0.068 0.012
(0.087) (0.038) (0.083) (0.052)
DDSL ×D2010 0.041 −0.020 0.054 0.023
(0.089) (0.039) (0.085) (0.051)
DDSL ×D2011 0.019 0.011 0.058 0.018
(0.107) (0.044) (0.104) (0.052)
R-squared 0.947 0.979 0.958 0.974
Obs. 7854 7854 7854 7605
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2 and 3.5 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data.
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Table A.18: Results on speed upgrades, 0.5-2 km to 2-3.5 km: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.013 0.073 −0.009 0.000 −0.016
(0.036) (0.066) (0.018) (0.100) (0.043)
DDSL ×D2002 0.011 −0.048 0.000 −0.028 −0.024
(0.035) (0.066) (0.018) (0.108) (0.045)
DDSL ×D2003 0.065∗ 0.057 −0.001 −0.041 0.072
(0.036) (0.068) (0.019) (0.094) (0.045)
DDSL ×D2004 0.104∗∗∗ 0.052 0.013 −0.027 0.103∗∗
(0.037) (0.064) (0.019) (0.102) (0.046)
DDSL ×D2005 0.050 −0.024 −0.007 −0.193 0.059
(0.039) (0.066) (0.019) (0.122) (0.048)
DDSL ×D2006 0.061 0.084 −0.020 −0.103 0.067
(0.039) (0.063) (0.019) (0.122) (0.050)
DDSL ×D2007 0.057 0.063 −0.018 −0.104 0.073
(0.041) (0.069) (0.020) (0.121) (0.051)
DDSL ×D2008 0.059 0.070 −0.012 −0.010 0.124∗∗
(0.042) (0.071) (0.020) (0.100) (0.050)
DDSL ×D2009 0.058 0.074 −0.000 0.001 0.154∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.072) (0.023) (0.101) (0.051)
DDSL ×D2010 0.080∗ 0.032 0.004 −0.019 0.107∗∗
(0.041) (0.074) (0.023) (0.105) (0.051)
DDSL ×D2011 0.068 0.116 −0.023 0.013 0.132∗∗
(0.044) (0.078) (0.024) (0.104) (0.052)
R-squared 0.977 0.950 0.686 0.922 0.829
Obs. 7854 6334 6503 6859 6842
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2 and 3.5 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data.
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A.2.8 Other robustness checks
Table A.19: Founded 1992 or later: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 −0.042 0.026 −0.004 −0.009
(0.074) (0.048) (0.074) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2002 0.032 0.020 0.044 −0.016
(0.079) (0.048) (0.077) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2003 −0.038 0.011 −0.000 −0.007
(0.083) (0.052) (0.080) (0.071)
DDSL ×D2004 0.044 0.045 0.096 0.096
(0.086) (0.060) (0.086) (0.079)
DDSL ×D2005 0.028 0.075 0.110 0.131
(0.084) (0.062) (0.086) (0.085)
DDSL ×D2006 0.081 0.052 0.137∗ 0.067
(0.080) (0.054) (0.081) (0.075)
DDSL ×D2007 0.094 0.043 0.118 0.109
(0.079) (0.053) (0.079) (0.076)
DDSL ×D2008 0.085 0.086 0.115 0.200∗∗
(0.089) (0.057) (0.087) (0.083)
DDSL ×D2009 0.121 0.077 0.169∗∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.084) (0.058) (0.086) (0.088)
DDSL ×D2010 0.142 0.084 0.147 0.098
(0.089) (0.062) (0.090) (0.086)
DDSL ×D2011 0.132 0.112 0.178 0.081
(0.118) (0.073) (0.119) (0.085)
R-squared 0.941 0.972 0.951 0.965
Obs. 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,046
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data. The sample only contains firms founded 1992 or later.
140
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.20: Founded 1992 or later: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.012 0.176∗ −0.038 −0.000 −0.002
(0.057) (0.098) (0.027) (0.078) (0.065)
DDSL ×D2002 0.011 0.191∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.027 0.001
(0.057) (0.095) (0.025) (0.086) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2003 0.070 0.169 −0.032 0.108 0.064
(0.059) (0.109) (0.027) (0.090) (0.070)
DDSL ×D2004 0.099 0.257∗∗∗−0.050∗ 0.034 0.094
(0.060) (0.099) (0.029) (0.085) (0.070)
DDSL ×D2005 0.061 0.194∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.013 0.045
(0.062) (0.104) (0.028) (0.087) (0.074)
DDSL ×D2006 0.099 0.357∗∗∗−0.098∗∗∗ 0.006 0.056
(0.064) (0.107) (0.032) (0.089) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2007 0.170∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗−0.022 0.024 0.157∗
(0.069) (0.111) (0.035) (0.088) (0.084)
DDSL ×D2008 0.152∗∗ 0.245∗∗ −0.024 0.038 0.105
(0.069) (0.122) (0.036) (0.083) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2009 0.131∗ 0.257∗∗ −0.027 −0.053 0.115
(0.072) (0.117) (0.038) (0.088) (0.075)
DDSL ×D2010 0.189∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗−0.028 0.032 0.163∗∗
(0.072) (0.116) (0.039) (0.099) (0.078)
DDSL ×D2011 0.210∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗−0.061∗ 0.068 0.186∗∗
(0.073) (0.115) (0.035) (0.111) (0.090)
R-squared 0.973 0.940 0.713 0.916 0.830
Obs. 4,182 3,378 3,468 3,619 3,608
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data. The sample only contains firms founded 1992 or later.
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Table A.21: Founded 1992 or before: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 0.008 0.098∗ 0.033 0.108
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.082)
DDSL ×D2002 0.053 0.098∗ 0.058 0.112
(0.065) (0.059) (0.063) (0.080)
DDSL ×D2003 0.069 0.117∗ 0.083 0.140∗
(0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.084)
DDSL ×D2004 0.050 0.093 0.080 0.169∗
(0.069) (0.065) (0.069) (0.088)
DDSL ×D2005 0.042 0.130∗ 0.095 0.157∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.091)
DDSL ×D2006 0.032 0.122∗ 0.047 0.100
(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.093)
DDSL ×D2007 0.055 0.110∗ 0.087 0.105
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.097)
DDSL ×D2008 0.097 0.140∗∗ 0.105 0.187∗
(0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.099)
DDSL ×D2009 0.064 0.150∗∗ 0.087 0.199∗∗
(0.071) (0.071) (0.067) (0.098)
DDSL ×D2010 0.095 0.129∗ 0.099 0.159∗
(0.074) (0.069) (0.075) (0.091)
DDSL ×D2011 0.198∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.137
(0.098) (0.075) (0.100) (0.094)
R-squared 0.962 0.984 0.969 0.978
Obs. 4,062 4,062 4,062 3,932
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data. The sample only contains firms founded 1992 or earlier.
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Table A.22: Founded 1992 or before: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.010 0.154 −0.004 0.010 −0.036
(0.067) (0.108) (0.032) (0.070) (0.058)
DDSL ×D2002 0.056 0.103 0.014 0.003 −0.028
(0.061) (0.102) (0.028) (0.081) (0.065)
DDSL ×D2003 0.150∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 0.004 0.095 0.069
(0.060) (0.125) (0.035) (0.083) (0.062)
DDSL ×D2004 0.196∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗ −0.006 0.111 0.071
(0.068) (0.121) (0.034) (0.083) (0.066)
DDSL ×D2005 0.160∗∗ 0.236∗∗ −0.023 0.107 0.082
(0.070) (0.116) (0.031) (0.092) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2006 0.154∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗−0.047 0.136 0.052
(0.072) (0.121) (0.037) (0.092) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2007 0.203∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗−0.020 0.111 0.085
(0.078) (0.130) (0.043) (0.089) (0.081)
DDSL ×D2008 0.152∗∗ 0.207 0.026 0.040 0.034
(0.070) (0.140) (0.044) (0.087) (0.073)
DDSL ×D2009 0.211∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.010 0.156+ 0.142∗
(0.070) (0.130) (0.044) (0.087) (0.072)
DDSL ×D2010 0.173∗∗ 0.240∗ 0.003 0.046 0.042
(0.070) (0.131) (0.047) (0.084) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2011 0.167∗∗ 0.281∗∗ −0.015 −0.018 0.082
(0.072) (0.117) (0.034) (0.111) (0.078)
R-squared 0.975 0.948 0.699 0.939 0.848
Observations 4,062 3,272 3,354 3,554 3,546
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and year
dummies included but now shown. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data. The sample only contains firms founded 1992 or before.
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Table A.23: West Germany: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 0.040 0.196 0.071 0.248
(0.069) (0.129) (0.074) (0.157)
DDSL ×D2002 0.046 0.191 0.030 0.288∗
(0.080) (0.134) (0.091) (0.174)
DDSL ×D2003 0.127 0.209 0.141 0.292∗
(0.086) (0.140) (0.095) (0.176)
DDSL ×D2004 0.105 0.288∗ 0.132 0.463∗∗
(0.084) (0.147) (0.099) (0.189)
DDSL ×D2005 0.117 0.263∗ 0.132 0.324∗∗
(0.087) (0.148) (0.093) (0.164)
DDSL ×D2006 0.157∗ 0.276∗ 0.079 0.236
(0.090) (0.152) (0.100) (0.182)
DDSL ×D2007 0.098 0.204 0.073 0.215
(0.100) (0.154) (0.114) (0.193)
DDSL ×D2008 0.064 0.145 0.038 0.219
(0.105) (0.155) (0.115) (0.193)
DDSL ×D2009 0.025 0.139 0.066 0.254
(0.104) (0.156) (0.104) (0.206)
DDSL ×D2010 −0.076 0.105 −0.085 0.149
(0.101) (0.142) (0.121) (0.173)
DDSL ×D2011 −0.068 0.140 −0.052 0.110
(0.138) (0.144) (0.133) (0.169)
R-squared 0.965 0.984 0.969 0.975
Obs. 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,495
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data. The sample only contains firms in West Germany.
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Table A.24: West Germany: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.001 0.008 0.096∗∗ 0.081 −0.149
(0.119) (0.174) (0.041) (0.139) (0.110)
DDSL ×D2002 0.068 0.067 0.019 0.019 −0.149
(0.120) (0.192) (0.041) (0.158) (0.118)
DDSL ×D2003 0.227∗ 0.343 0.004 0.108 −0.023
(0.122) (0.233) (0.042) (0.167) (0.113)
DDSL ×D2004 0.272∗∗ 0.421∗ 0.003 0.207 0.009
(0.135) (0.216) (0.041) (0.156) (0.114)
DDSL ×D2005 0.343∗∗ 0.360∗ −0.005 0.257 0.043
(0.143) (0.212) (0.040) (0.187) (0.152)
DDSL ×D2006 0.328∗∗ 0.332 0.000 0.212 0.072
(0.143) (0.204) (0.039) (0.187) (0.144)
DDSL ×D2007 0.305∗∗ 0.561∗∗ −0.074∗ 0.208 −0.103
(0.139) (0.222) (0.043) (0.172) (0.116)
DDSL ×D2008 0.251∗∗ 0.284 0.014 0.196 −0.010
(0.127) (0.208) (0.039) (0.181) (0.151)
DDSL ×D2009 0.289∗∗ 0.280 0.008 0.342∗∗ 0.224∗
(0.127) (0.190) (0.038) (0.171) (0.133)
DDSL ×D2010 0.214∗ 0.263 −0.009 0.261∗ 0.080
(0.127) (0.197) (0.040) (0.154) (0.122)
DDSL ×D2011 0.178 0.288 −0.030 0.248 0.114
(0.129) (0.195) (0.039) (0.180) (0.127)
R-squared 0.968 0.940 0.679 0.928 0.781
Obs. 2,600 2,056 2,123 2,274 2,267
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data. The sample only contains firms in West Germany.
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Table A.25: Excluding municipalities without broadband internet access: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 −0.009 0.082 0.026 0.090
(0.056) (0.051) (0.057) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2002 0.048 0.076 0.054 0.080
(0.060) (0.051) (0.059) (0.068)
DDSL ×D2003 0.013 0.077 0.047 0.098
(0.063) (0.054) (0.062) (0.072)
DDSL ×D2004 0.051 0.112∗ 0.100 0.208∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.061) (0.066) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2005 0.052 0.124∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.189∗∗
(0.064) (0.060) (0.066) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2006 0.078 0.100∗ 0.107∗ 0.099
(0.062) (0.058) (0.064) (0.073)
DDSL ×D2007 0.064 0.077 0.089 0.137∗
(0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.078)
DDSL ×D2008 0.052 0.101∗ 0.068 0.171∗∗
(0.069) (0.060) (0.069) (0.082)
DDSL ×D2009 0.058 0.086 0.105 0.188∗∗
(0.066) (0.062) (0.067) (0.086)
DDSL ×D2010 0.061 0.076 0.065 0.094
(0.071) (0.060) (0.074) (0.079)
DDSL ×D2011 0.074 0.114∗ 0.113 0.095
(0.091) (0.068) (0.091) (0.078)
R-squared 0.951 0.978 0.960 0.971
Obs. 5,956 5,956 5,956 5,760
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data. Firms in municipalities where no household has DSL access in
2005 or later years are excluded. Information on the share of household with DSL access retrieved from
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2009).
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Table A.26: Excluding municipalities without broadband internet access: performance
log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues log(VA) Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.007 0.109 0.001 0.008 −0.043
(0.057) (0.091) (0.026) (0.069) (0.058)
DDSL ×D2002 0.029 0.111 −0.011 −0.016 −0.049
(0.054) (0.091) (0.024) (0.076) (0.064)
DDSL ×D2003 0.123∗∗ 0.190∗ −0.004 0.120 0.058
(0.055) (0.104) (0.026) (0.082) (0.063)
DDSL ×D2004 0.158∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗−0.026 0.107 0.076
(0.060) (0.099) (0.027) (0.077) (0.063)
DDSL ×D2005 0.122∗ 0.201∗∗ −0.035 0.054 0.031
(0.062) (0.100) (0.026) (0.083) (0.070)
DDSL ×D2006 0.125∗∗ 0.262∗∗ −0.041 0.051 0.037
(0.063) (0.102) (0.031) (0.084) (0.071)
DDSL ×D2007 0.166∗∗ 0.253∗∗ −0.005 0.072 0.051
(0.066) (0.108) (0.033) (0.081) (0.072)
DDSL ×D2008 0.127∗∗ 0.108 0.019 0.077 0.031
(0.063) (0.104) (0.030) (0.079) (0.071)
DDSL ×D2009 0.155∗∗ 0.208∗∗ −0.002 0.078 0.116∗
(0.065) (0.105) (0.034) (0.083) (0.070)
DDSL ×D2010 0.156∗∗ 0.229∗∗ −0.004 0.075 0.096
(0.065) (0.105) (0.033) (0.083) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2011 0.159∗∗ 0.257∗∗ −0.035 0.079 0.122∗
(0.067) (0.103) (0.030) (0.093) (0.074)
R-squared 0.973 0.944 0.703 0.924 0.823
Obs. 5,956 4,799 4,925 5,194 5,178
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and
total employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated
based on social-security data. Firms in municipalities where no household has DSL access in 2005 or
later years are excluded. Information on the share of household with DSL access retrieved from Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology (2009).
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Table A.27: Excluding counties with VDSL till 2008: firm size
log(employment) log(wage sum)
full-time total daily survey
DDSL ×D2001 −0.063 0.073 −0.035 0.056
(0.050) (0.051) (0.044) (0.079)
DDSL ×D2002 0.055 0.083 0.055 0.052
(0.075) (0.060) (0.071) (0.087)
DDSL ×D2003 0.009 0.076 0.050 0.085
(0.079) (0.068) (0.072) (0.088)
DDSL ×D2004 0.051 0.128 0.110 0.236∗∗
(0.087) (0.078) (0.087) (0.106)
DDSL ×D2005 0.086 0.157∗ 0.157∗ 0.222∗∗
(0.089) (0.080) (0.094) (0.103)
DDSL ×D2006 0.074 0.144∗ 0.128 0.170∗
(0.090) (0.084) (0.091) (0.103)
DDSL ×D2007 0.112 0.149∗ 0.154∗ 0.178∗
(0.089) (0.083) (0.089) (0.098)
DDSL ×D2008 0.096 0.159∗ 0.130 0.228∗∗
(0.092) (0.087) (0.091) (0.110)
DDSL ×D2009 0.062 0.133 0.105 0.200∗
(0.095) (0.091) (0.099) (0.120)
DDSL ×D2010 0.060 0.135 0.061 0.125
(0.101) (0.092) (0.105) (0.117)
DDSL ×D2011 0.019 0.158 0.054 0.109
(0.124) (0.102) (0.128) (0.114)
R-squared 0.943 0.972 0.952 0.965
Obs. 4,349 4,349 4,349 4,177
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number
of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on total employment and monthly wage sum (last
column) retrieved from survey data. The sample contains non-manufacturing firms in counties in which
VDSL was not introduced till 2008.
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Table A.28: Excluding counties with VDSL till 2008: performance
log log Shr. of log(rev. log(rev.
revenues VA Inputs p. FTE) p. empl.)
DDSL ×D2001 0.003 0.107 −0.001 0.039 −0.026
(0.037) (0.087) (0.022) (0.071) (0.061)
DDSL ×D2002 0.049 0.171∗ −0.012 −0.007 −0.010
(0.063) (0.101) (0.027) (0.097) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2003 0.123∗ 0.177 0.002 0.094 0.024
(0.074) (0.126) (0.026) (0.095) (0.074)
DDSL ×D2004 0.171∗∗ 0.241∗∗−0.007 0.084 0.047
(0.081) (0.123) (0.026) (0.104) (0.077)
DDSL ×D2005 0.169∗ 0.222∗ −0.022 0.053 0.053
(0.093) (0.128) (0.028) (0.122) (0.095)
DDSL ×D2006 0.175∗ 0.306∗∗−0.046 0.077 0.031
(0.099) (0.137) (0.028) (0.125) (0.099)
DDSL ×D2007 0.194∗ 0.299∗ −0.024 −0.002 −0.028
(0.104) (0.156) (0.044) (0.113) (0.086)
DDSL ×D2008 0.115 0.161 0.009 −0.017 −0.068
(0.096) (0.153) (0.042) (0.099) (0.088)
DDSL ×D2009 0.112 0.208 0.002 0.018 0.021
(0.095) (0.157) (0.045) (0.111) (0.084)
DDSL ×D2010 0.151 0.261∗ −0.016 0.084 0.060
(0.102) (0.150) (0.046) (0.114) (0.090)
DDSL ×D2011 0.162 0.235 −0.033 0.136 0.074
(0.101) (0.146) (0.040) (0.131) (0.101)
R-squared 0.969 0.936 0.703 0.905 0.814
Obs. 4,349 3,526 3,631 3,789 3,776
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Information on revenues, value added, share of inputs, and total
employment retrieved from survey data. The number of full-time employees (FTE) is calculated based
on social-security data. The sample contains non-manufacturing firms in counties in which VDSL was
not introduced till 2008.
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A.2.9 Other outcome variables
Table A.29: Outcome variable: firms exits
Non-manuf. Manuf. Pooled
DDSL ×D2001 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
DDSL ×D2002 −0.006∗ −0.001 −0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
DDSL ×D2003 0.002 −0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
DDSL ×D2004 −0.007 −0.009 −0.008
(0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
DDSL ×D2005 −0.016 −0.002 −0.009
(0.024) (0.013) (0.015)
DDSL ×D2006 −0.013 −0.009 −0.011
(0.024) (0.017) (0.015)
DDSL ×D2007 −0.012 0.001 −0.007
(0.027) (0.015) (0.017)
DDSL ×D2008 −0.022 −0.000 −0.014
(0.030) (0.016) (0.019)
DDSL ×D2009 −0.020 0.001 −0.012
(0.030) (0.017) (0.019)
DDSL ×D2010 0.000 0.005 0.002
(0.030) (0.018) (0.019)
DDSL ×D2011 −0.014 0.020 −0.000
(0.030) (0.020) (0.019)
R-squared 0.511 0.405 0.484
Observations 8,720 6,501 15,275
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
150
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.30: Outcome variable: firm invests in ICT, panel 1996-2005
Pooled Non-manufacturing Manufacturing
DDSL ×Dpost −0.024 0.037 0.017
(0.047) (0.052) (0.077)
R-squared 0.489 0.450 0.456
Observations 2,027 1,255 929
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDpost + αi + αt + uit, where Dpost is an
indicator variable for the post-treatment period. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if
the firm is located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and
4.2 km from the MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms
in the treatment and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al.
(2009). Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Investments in ICT retrieved from survey data.
Firms are asked whether they invested in ICT. Samples are split by firms reporting to invest in ICT in
2000 or not.
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Table A.31: Outcome variable: firm invests in ICT, panel 2000-2011
Pooled Non-manufacturing Manufacturing
DDSL ×D2001 0.031 −0.062 −0.031
(0.038) (0.057) (0.049)
DDSL ×D2002 −0.003 −0.076 0.014
(0.040) (0.058) (0.050)
DDSL ×D2003 −0.059 0.075 0.037
(0.045) (0.064) (0.055)
DDSL ×D2004 −0.053 0.072 0.060
(0.045) (0.066) (0.056)
DDSL ×D2005 −0.011 −0.014 0.024
(0.049) (0.068) (0.062)
DDSL ×D2006 −0.066 0.002 0.102∗
(0.047) (0.068) (0.061)
DDSL ×D2007 −0.042 0.008 0.061
(0.049) (0.068) (0.066)
DDSL ×D2008 0.050 −0.038 −0.092
(0.053) (0.073) (0.069)
DDSL ×D2009 −0.036 0.018 0.039
(0.052) (0.075) (0.067)
DDSL ×D2010 0.051 −0.042 −0.098
(0.055) (0.073) (0.072)
DDSL ×D2011 −0.043 −0.041 0.091
(0.061) (0.080) (0.083)
R-squared 0.506 0.463 0.457
Observations 11,345 6,274 6,117
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation with 2000 to 2002
as pre-treatment period, small speed upgrades in 2003 to 2005 and a major upgrade to ADSL2+ in
2006. The estimation equation is: yi,t = β0 + β1,tDSL accessiDyear,t + αi + αt + uit, where Dyear,t
is an indicator variable for each year. DSL accessi is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
located between 0.5 and 2 km from the MDF and zero for firms located between 2.8 and 4.2 km from the
MDF. The table reports the results for β1,t. To adjust for different numbers of firms in the treatment
and control groups by three-digit sector, I use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Investments in ICT retrieved from survey data. Firms are asked
whether they invested in ICT. Samples are split by firms reporting to invest in ICT in 2000 or not.
152
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
B.1.1 Data sources and record linkage procedure
Social Security records
Employee history. The Integrated Employment Biographies (Integrierte Erwerbsbi-
ografien, IEB) are based on records from the German Social Security System. They
contain information on all employees subject to social insurance contributions since 1975
and are updated at least annually. The data cover nearly all private sector employees
in Germany, but do not cover civil servants and the self-employed. The IEB contain
information on birth year, gender, nationality, education, occupation, full time or part-
time status and daily earnings of each employee. Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) and
Antoni et al. (2016) provide a detailed description of the structure of the data.1
Information on education is not reported for all periods for every individual, but
can be inferred from other observations on the same individual. We follow imputation
procedure in Fitzenberger et al. (2005) and impute missing values for the education
variable based on past and future information.
Establishment history panel. The Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorik-
panel, BHP) is a panel data set that contains information on the sector, number of
1The paper by Antoni et al. (2016) focuses on the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies
(SIAB), a 2% random sample drawn from the IEB.
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employees and location of all establishments with at least one dependent employee on
30 June of each year since 1975. Following the regulations of the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency, an establishment is defined as the aggregation of all employees in a
municipality that are working for the same firm in the same sector.2 Sectors are defined
based on the Classification of Economic Activities of the German Statistical Office (see
also section C.1.2). The location of establishments is provided at the county level. Ger-
many is divided into 402 counties with around 200,000 inhabitants on average. German
counties are roughly comparable to counties in the US. Schmucker et al. (2016) provide
a detailed description of the data set.
Extension file entry and exit. The extension file entry and exit uses information on
worker flows to identify establishment openings and closings. Establishment identifiers
may change when a firm restructures. The extension file helps mitigate bias related to
restructurings. Hethey and Schmieder (2010) provide details on the file.
ORBIS
We use a linkage table between the Social Security Records and the firm-level database
Orbis of the commercial data provider Bureau van Dijk (BvD). BvD compiles its firm-
level data from publicly available sources as well as by acquiring data from other com-
mercial data providers. For Germany, BvDs main data provider is Creditreform. Inter-
nationally, BvD offers more than 20 different databases with the main customers being
privates companies looking for business intelligence on, for instance, competitors, busi-
ness partners or potential targets for acquisitions. Within BvDs databases, a company
is defined as an independent unit that holds a specific legal form and may incorporate
one or more establishments.
It is important to note that BvDs financial information on firms in Germany is most
reliable since 2006, as there have been some changes in the financial reporting system
in Germany at that time. In the years before these changes, a higher share of financial
information is missing.
2That is, if a firm has several plants in one and the same municipality, all plants in the same sector
are assigned the same establishment identifier. Plants in different sectors have distinct identifiers.
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Record linkage procedure
The record linkage between Orbis and the Social Security data was performed indepen-
dently of our project by the German Record Linkage Center (GRLC, see Antoni and
Schnell (2017) or www.record-linkage.de for more details on the GRLC). The basis of
the linkage was an extract of Orbis acquired by the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB). This extract contained data on all German firms at the reference date of January
30, 2014. Of the 1,938,990 firms contained in the data, 1,627,668 were marked as active
in Germany at that reference date.
Apart from a wide range of financial variables, the extract contained the name, legal
form and address of each firm. The GRLC used these identifiers to link the firm-level
data to the administrative establishment-level data of the IAB. This was made possible
by the fact that firms have to apply for an establishment number to be issued centrally
by the Federal Employment Agency (BA) for each establishment they set up. During
this process, firms are required by law to provide their name, legal form and address
to be recorded in the Data Warehouse (DWH) of the BA. At the time of the record
linkage, the DWH included names, the superordinate firm’s legal form and addresses
of establishments that had been active only before or in 2013. To increase the linkage
success while also limiting the computational and memory requirements, the GRLC used
linkage identifiers of all establishments that had been recorded as active in Germany at
least one day during the years 2011 to 2013. Despite this restriction, names, legal forms
and addresses of more than 12 million different establishment numbers could be used for
the record linkage.
The whole set of identifiers is used to identify the headquarters establishment of the
firm. Other establishments within the same firm do not have to be located in the same
municipality as the headquarters, which is why additional establishments were linked
using only the name and legal form of the firm. In some steps of the iterative linkage
process, the GRLC also used the main sector of activity, as this is also contained in both
databases.
As these identifiers are non-unique and error-prone, the GRLC developed extensive
cleaning, standardization and parsing routines (usually referred to as pre-processing)
to achieve records that could successfully be compared between the two data sources.
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To deal with remaining differences in, for instance, the spelling or abbreviations of the
identifiers, the GRLC applied error-tolerant methods of record linkage (see Christen,
2012). The resulting linkage process consists of 17 consecutive steps, not counting the
pre-processing, that varied in terms of which identifiers were used and how strict the
requirements on agreement of the compared records were. Schild (2016) provides a more
detailed description of the record linkage process. Antoni et al. (2018) report on the
linkage success and the representativeness of the resulting data set.
To rule out that we classify independent firms with similar names as multi-establishment
firms by accident, we only keep establishments that were matched based on the following
criteria: exact long name and legal form, exact short name and legal form, exact long
name (with or without activity component) and zip code, exact short name (with or
without activity component) and zip code.
Identification of headquarters
The linkage process explained in the previous subsection aimed at identifying as many
establishments per firm as possible without trying to determine which of the linked
establishments had been the headquarters of the firm. This information was added by
the Research Data Centre (FDZ) at the IAB afterwards. To do so, the FDZ performed
several iterative steps that mainly relied on the address of the firm according to Orbis
and of the establishments according to the administrative data. During later steps the
FDZ also used information on the share of administrative staff or the industry code
of the establishments under consideration. Given that the administrative data do not
contain information that directly identifies an establishment as the headquarters of a
superordinate company, this process had to rely on variables that allow the identification
of the most likely headquarters among the linked establishments. Antoni et al. (2018)
provide more details on the whole process and on the remaining uncertainty regarding
the identified headquarters.
B.1.2 Sector and occupation classification
The information on the establishment sector changes over time. The sector informa-
tion uses the respective latest sector classification of the German Statistical Office that
156
Appendix to Chapter 2
updated the classification in 1993, 2003 and 2008. We follow Eberle et al. (2011) and
transfer the sector classification after 2003 into the classification as of 1993.
The information on the occupation of employees follows the German classification of
occupations “Klassifikation der Berufe” (KldB). The years 1998-2010 contain the three
digit occupation according to the 1988 version of the KldB.
B.1.3 Identification strategy
Figure B.1: Number of DSL subscriptions in Germany
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The figure shows the number of DSL subscriptions in Germany over time Bundesnetzagentur (2011).
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B.2 Results
B.2.1 Additional results
Table B.1: Results by initial skill composition: additional regressions
Share of low-skilled Share of high-skilled
Incl. skilled in 1999 Without skilled in 1999
HQ distance×D2000−03 0.029 −0.027
(0.087) (0.047)
HQ distance×D2004−05 0.032 −0.063
(0.110) (0.093)
HQ distance×D2006−10 0.015 −0.112
(0.143) (0.109)
Sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 −0.062 0.173∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.048)
Sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 −0.110 0.287∗∗
(0.112) (0.091)
Sub-estab. distance×D2006−10 −0.123 0.405∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.111)
R-squared 0.872 0.578
Obs. 51,239 103,518
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the
results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered
at the county-year-level in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Infor-
mation on skills reported in social security data. Low-skilled employees do not have any vocational
training. Medium-skilled employees have vocational training. High-skilled employees have at least a
college degree. Samples are split by zero or positive employment of high-skilled labor in 1999.
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B.2.2 Yearly effects
159
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.2: Employment at subordinate establishment level: yearly effects
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
Sub-e. distance×D2000 0.001 −0.120 0.172+ −0.052
(0.005) (0.085) (0.093) (0.054)
Sub-e. distance×D2001 −0.013∗ −0.088 0.052 0.036
(0.006) (0.099) (0.114) (0.068)
Sub-e. distance×D2002 −0.008 −0.194+ 0.150 0.044
(0.007) (0.109) (0.137) (0.095)
Sub-e. distance×D2003 0.026∗∗∗ −0.104 0.056 0.048
(0.007) (0.111) (0.146) (0.104)
Sub-e. distance×D2004 0.019∗ −0.253∗ 0.141 0.111
(0.008) (0.119) (0.156) (0.113)
Sub-e. distance×D2005 0.016∗ −0.343∗∗ 0.190 0.153
(0.008) (0.130) (0.172) (0.114)
Sub-e. distance×D2006 0.019∗ −0.306∗ 0.070 0.236∗
(0.008) (0.126) (0.167) (0.114)
Sub-e. distance×D2007 0.034∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗ 0.023 0.325∗∗
(0.008) (0.132) (0.176) (0.124)
Sub-e. distance×D2008 0.032∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗ 0.146 0.265+
(0.009) (0.134) (0.185) (0.137)
Sub-e. distance×D2009 0.024∗ −0.429∗∗ 0.171 0.258∗
(0.010) (0.142) (0.185) (0.125)
Sub-e. distance×D2010 0.022∗ −0.436∗∗ 0.187 0.249+
(0.009) (0.134) (0.182) (0.131)
HQ distance×D2000 −0.003 0.118 −0.192∗ 0.074
(0.004) (0.084) (0.092) (0.053)
HQ distance×D2001 0.010+ 0.069 −0.070 0.001
(0.006) (0.097) (0.109) (0.065)
HQ distance×D2002 0.001 0.149 −0.147 −0.001
(0.007) (0.107) (0.133) (0.092)
HQ distance×D2003 −0.039∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.041 −0.000
(0.007) (0.110) (0.144) (0.101)
HQ distance×D2004 −0.035∗∗∗ 0.163 −0.115 −0.048
(0.008) (0.118) (0.153) (0.109)
HQ distance×D2005 −0.034∗∗∗ 0.250+ −0.178 −0.072
(0.008) (0.130) (0.168) (0.108)
HQ distance×D2006 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.199 −0.058 −0.140
(0.008) (0.125) (0.164) (0.109)
HQ distance×D2007 −0.055∗∗∗ 0.231+ −0.007 −0.224+
(0.008) (0.132) (0.173) (0.116)
HQ distance×D2008 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.290∗ −0.164 −0.126
(0.009) (0.134) (0.179) (0.130)
HQ distance×D2009 −0.046∗∗∗ 0.292∗ −0.188 −0.104
(0.009) (0.142) (0.182) (0.122)
HQ distance×D2010 −0.045∗∗∗ 0.269∗ −0.179 −0.090
(0.009) (0.135) (0.181) (0.128)
R-squared 0.902 0.759 0.828 0.884
Obs. 217,387 217,387 217,387 217,387
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i × Y eart + β2,t × log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j × Y eart +
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i
and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the subordinate
establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of obser-
vations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B.3: Employment at HQ level: yearly effects
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
HQ distance×D2000 0.007∗∗ −0.042 0.031 0.011
(0.003) (0.033) (0.045) (0.037)
HQ distance×D2001 0.005 −0.063∗ 0.084 −0.021
(0.003) (0.034) (0.052) (0.044)
HQ distance×D2002 0.006∗ −0.109∗∗∗ 0.043 0.066
(0.003) (0.040) (0.064) (0.055)
HQ distance×D2003 0.003 −0.176∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.071
(0.004) (0.041) (0.061) (0.055)
HQ distance×D2004 0.001 −0.203∗∗∗ 0.047 0.155∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.044) (0.061) (0.054)
HQ distance×D2005 −0.000 −0.190∗∗∗ 0.002 0.188∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.051) (0.071) (0.061)
HQ distance×D2006 0.002 −0.178∗∗∗ 0.011 0.167∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.055) (0.076) (0.062)
HQ distance×D2007 0.005 −0.158∗∗∗−0.029 0.186∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.055) (0.076) (0.063)
HQ distance×D2008 0.009∗ −0.215∗∗∗−0.006 0.221∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.059) (0.082) (0.068)
HQ distance×D2009 0.008 −0.241∗∗∗−0.022 0.264∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.058) (0.082) (0.070)
HQ distance×D2010 0.008 −0.254∗∗∗−0.043 0.297∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.059) (0.088) (0.077)
Sub-e. distance×D2000 −0.003 0.026 −0.032 0.006
(0.004) (0.035) (0.049) (0.041)
Sub-e. distance×D2001 0.001 0.039 −0.074 0.035
(0.004) (0.037) (0.057) (0.050)
Sub-e. distance×D2002 −0.001 0.060 −0.047 −0.013
(0.004) (0.041) (0.067) (0.057)
Sub-e. distance×D2003 0.001 0.093∗∗ −0.071 −0.022
(0.004) (0.040) (0.064) (0.061)
Sub-e. distance×D2004 0.001 0.079∗ −0.031 −0.048
(0.004) (0.042) (0.062) (0.058)
Sub-e. distance×D2005 0.000 0.052 0.018 −0.070
(0.005) (0.052) (0.070) (0.061)
Sub-e. distance×D2006 −0.001 0.016 0.013 −0.029
(0.005) (0.049) (0.068) (0.056)
Sub-e. distance×D2007 −0.001 −0.015 0.025 −0.010
(0.005) (0.052) (0.074) (0.063)
Sub-e. distance×D2008 −0.004 0.029 −0.023 −0.006
(0.005) (0.056) (0.078) (0.068)
Sub-e. distance×D2009 −0.004 0.024 0.000 −0.025
(0.005) (0.054) (0.080) (0.071)
Sub-e. distance×D2010 −0.004 0.015 −0.007 −0.008
(0.005) (0.058) (0.089) (0.080)
R-squared 0.959 0.866 0.888 0.919
Obs. 55,047 55,047 55,047 55,047
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i × Y eart + β2,t × avg. subordinate establishment distance to MDFj × Y eart +
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i
and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the average
subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t.
Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level
in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B.4: Employment at firm level: yearly effects
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
HQ distance×D2000 0.006∗∗ −0.003 −0.001 0.042
(0.002) (0.028) (0.039) (0.030)
HQ distance×D2001 0.004 −0.035 0.050 0.038
(0.003) (0.033) (0.048) (0.033)
HQ distance×D2002 0.005∗ −0.083∗∗ 0.054 0.076∗∗
(0.003) (0.034) (0.053) (0.035)
HQ distance×D2003 0.002 −0.129∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.046
(0.003) (0.034) (0.057) (0.038)
HQ distance×D2004 −0.000 −0.189∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.003) (0.040) (0.056) (0.036)
HQ distance×D2005 −0.000 −0.188∗∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.045) (0.063) (0.041)
HQ distance×D2006 0.003 −0.193∗∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.003) (0.047) (0.074) (0.047)
HQ distance×D2007 0.004 −0.167∗∗∗ 0.109 0.139∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.046) (0.075) (0.049)
HQ distance×D2008 0.008∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ 0.114 0.165∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.048) (0.080) (0.053)
HQ distance×D2009 0.005 −0.222∗∗∗ 0.104 0.190∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.049) (0.083) (0.056)
HQ distance×D2010 0.006 −0.268∗∗∗ 0.098 0.207∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.051) (0.088) (0.057)
Sub-e. distance×D2000 −0.002 −0.020 0.040 −0.035
(0.003) (0.031) (0.045) (0.033)
Sub-e. distance×D2001 0.002 0.008 0.004 −0.032
(0.003) (0.037) (0.053) (0.037)
Sub-e. distance×D2002 0.000 0.031 −0.023 −0.045
(0.003) (0.036) (0.055) (0.037)
Sub-e. distance×D2003 0.002 0.054 −0.079 −0.021
(0.003) (0.038) (0.057) (0.041)
Sub-e. distance×D2004 0.002 0.080∗ −0.097∗ −0.020
(0.003) (0.043) (0.058) (0.041)
Sub-e. distance×D2005 0.001 0.077 −0.062 −0.039
(0.003) (0.049) (0.062) (0.040)
Sub-e. distance×D2006 −0.001 0.059 −0.068 0.004
(0.003) (0.047) (0.067) (0.043)
Sub-e. distance×D2007 0.001 0.023 −0.051 0.002
(0.003) (0.049) (0.071) (0.046)
Sub-e. distance×D2008 −0.000 0.050 −0.079 0.008
(0.004) (0.051) (0.076) (0.054)
Sub-e. distance×D2009 0.001 0.031 −0.079 0.010
(0.004) (0.052) (0.081) (0.058)
Sub-e. distance×D2010 −0.000 0.057 −0.088 0.025
(0.004) (0.053) (0.087) (0.060)
R-squared 0.972 0.902 0.903 0.949
Obs. 55,151 55,151 55,151 55,151
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i × Y eart + β2,t × avg. subordinate establishment distance to MDFj × Y eart +
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i
and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the average
subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t.
Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level
in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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B.2.3 Robustness checks
Table B.5: Robustness checks: employment
Founded Western Mun. had No VDSL
before 1992 Germany DSL in 2005 till 2008
Sub-e. distance×D2000−03 0.025∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 −0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015)
Sub-e. distance×D2004−05 0.026∗ 0.020∗ 0.011 0.017
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019)
Sub-e. distance×D2006−10 0.030∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.048∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.036∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.007 0.010
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.048∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.034+
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.057∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
R-squared 0.923 0.904 0.902 0.877
Obs. 86,483 153,612 214,695 43,359
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the
results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered
at the county-year-level in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The first
column reports the results for subordinate establishments founded before 1992. The second sample only
contains subordinate establishments in Western Germany. The third sample excludes municipalities
in which no household had DSL in 2005. The fourth sample excludes counties in which VDSL was
introduced until 2008.
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Table B.6: Robustness checks: share of low-skilled employment
Founded Western Mun. had No VDSL
before 1992 Germany DSL in 2005 till 2008
Sub-e. distance×D2000−03 −0.088 −0.114 −0.132 0.005
(0.109) (0.101) (0.081) (0.209)
Sub-e. distance×D2004−05 −0.355∗ −0.344∗ −0.325∗∗ −0.515+
(0.177) (0.137) (0.111) (0.287)
Sub-e. distance×D2006−10 −0.261 −0.443∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.403
(0.168) (0.140) (0.114) (0.254)
HQ distance×D2000−03 0.042 0.094 0.104 −0.045
(0.108) (0.097) (0.079) (0.212)
HQ distance×D2004−05 0.269 0.267∗ 0.250∗ 0.430
(0.178) (0.132) (0.109) (0.295)
HQ distance×D2006−10 0.104 0.313∗ 0.293∗ 0.291
(0.170) (0.135) (0.114) (0.255)
R-squared 0.797 0.750 0.759 0.770
Obs. 86,483 153,612 214,695 43,359
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the
results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered
at the county-year-level in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The first
column reports the results for subordinate establishments founded before 1992. The second sample only
contains subordinate establishments in Western Germany. The third sample excludes municipalities
in which no household had DSL in 2005. The fourth sample excludes counties in which VDSL was
introduced until 2008.
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Table B.7: Robustness checks: share of medium-skilled employment
Founded Western Mun. had No VDSL
before 1992 Germany DSL in 2005 till 2008
Sub-e. distance×D2000−03 0.091 0.090 0.118 0.033
(0.137) (0.114) (0.095) (0.267)
Sub-e. distance×D2004−05 0.187 0.236 0.217 0.446
(0.217) (0.170) (0.144) (0.421)
Sub-e. distance×D2006−10 0.017 0.161 0.142 0.202
(0.214) (0.182) (0.152) (0.400)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.083 −0.094 −0.125 −0.034
(0.135) (0.109) (0.092) (0.266)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.197 −0.220 −0.203 −0.420
(0.213) (0.162) (0.139) (0.428)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.030 −0.159 −0.137 −0.193
(0.211) (0.178) (0.146) (0.410)
R-squared 0.842 0.808 0.828 0.845
Obs. 86,483 153,612 214,695 43,359
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the
results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered
at the county-year-level in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The first
column reports the results for subordinate establishments founded before 1992. The second sample only
contains subordinate establishments in Western Germany. The third sample excludes municipalities
in which no household had DSL in 2005. The fourth sample excludes counties in which VDSL was
introduced until 2008.
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Table B.8: Robustness checks: share of high-skilled employment
Founded Western Mun. had No VDSL
before 1992 Germany DSL in 2005 till 2008
Sub-e. distance×D2000−03 −0.003 0.023 0.014 −0.038
(0.085) (0.072) (0.064) (0.207)
Sub-e. distance×D2004−05 0.169 0.108 0.108 0.069
(0.141) (0.108) (0.099) (0.276)
Sub-e. distance×D2006−10 0.245 0.282∗ 0.259∗ 0.201
(0.151) (0.114) (0.108) (0.267)
HQ distance×D2000−03 0.042 −0.000 0.021 0.078
(0.081) (0.070) (0.062) (0.207)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.072 −0.047 −0.048 −0.010
(0.135) (0.105) (0.094) (0.273)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.074 −0.154 −0.156 −0.098
(0.145) (0.114) (0.102) (0.272)
R-squared 0.896 0.877 0.884 0.884
Obs. 86,483 153,612 214,695 43,359
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Periodt+β2,t× log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j×Periodt+
αj +αct+ εi(j)t, where Periodt describes the time periods from 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2005, and 2006 to
2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the dis-
tance of the HQ or the subordinate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the
results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered
at the county-year-level in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The first
column reports the results for subordinate establishments founded before 1992. The second sample only
contains subordinate establishments in Western Germany. The third sample excludes municipalities
in which no household had DSL in 2005. The fourth sample excludes counties in which VDSL was
introduced until 2008.
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B.2.4 Sample: max. 4.2 km
Table B.9: Subordinate establishments: max. 4.2 km
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
Sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 0.002 −0.150+ 0.148 0.003
(0.006) (0.091) (0.106) (0.073)
Sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 0.020∗ −0.344∗∗ 0.269+ 0.075
(0.008) (0.123) (0.156) (0.108)
Sub-estab. distance×D2006−10 0.033∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗ 0.204 0.202+
(0.009) (0.129) (0.165) (0.119)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.007 0.120 −0.154 −0.034
(0.006) (0.089) (0.103) (0.070)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.034∗∗∗ 0.267∗ −0.257+ −0.010
(0.008) (0.121) (0.150) (0.102)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.053∗∗∗ 0.294∗ −0.202 −0.091
(0.008) (0.129) (0.160) (0.112)
R-squared 0.901 0.759 0.829 0.885
Obs. 195,832 195,832 195,832 195,832
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Y eart+β2,t×avg. subordinate establishment distance to MDFj×Y eart+αj+
αct + εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and
log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the average subordi-
nate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level in paren-
theses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The sample only contains subordinate
establishments located up to 4.2 km from the MDF. The same restriction applies to their HQ.
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B.2.5 Sample: Non-manufacturing
Table B.11: Subordinate establishments: non-manufacturing
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
Sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 0.004 −0.120 0.037 0.083
(0.006) (0.095) (0.109) (0.075)
Sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 0.019∗ −0.340∗∗ 0.163 0.177
(0.008) (0.124) (0.159) (0.109)
Sub-estab. distance×D2006−10 0.033∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗ 0.086 0.313∗
(0.009) (0.130) (0.174) (0.127)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.009 0.108 −0.059 −0.049
(0.005) (0.092) (0.105) (0.073)
HQ distance×D2004−05 −0.031∗∗∗ 0.285∗ −0.161 −0.124
(0.007) (0.122) (0.154) (0.104)
HQ distance×D2006−10 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.316∗ −0.111 −0.205+
(0.008) (0.129) (0.169) (0.121)
R-squared 0.883 0.733 0.817 0.881
Obs. 177,637 177,637 177,637 177,637
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Y eart+β2,t×avg. subordinate establishment distance to MDFj×Y eart+αj+
αct + εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and
log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the average subordi-
nate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level in paren-
theses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The sample only contains subordinate
establishments in non-manufacturing firms defined by the HQ’s sector classification.
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B.2.6 Sample: Manufacturing
Table B.13: Subordinate establishments: manufacturing
Skill shares
Employment Low Medium High
Sub-estab. distance×D2000−03 −0.004 −0.102 0.428∗ −0.326∗
(0.011) (0.163) (0.213) (0.148)
Sub-estab. distance×D2004−05 −0.024 −0.048 0.253 −0.205
(0.015) (0.232) (0.320) (0.212)
Sub-estab. distance×D2006−10 −0.034+ −0.257 0.245 0.012
(0.018) (0.242) (0.357) (0.274)
HQ distance×D2000−03 −0.004 0.021 −0.386+ 0.365∗
(0.011) (0.161) (0.209) (0.147)
HQ distance×D2004−05 0.006 −0.098 −0.199 0.297
(0.015) (0.226) (0.315) (0.213)
HQ distance×D2006−10 0.019 0.056 −0.129 0.073
(0.018) (0.238) (0.353) (0.272)
R-squared 0.942 0.864 0.876 0.899
Obs. 39,309 39,309 39,309 39,309
This table shows the results from the fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimation using 1999
as reference year. The estimation equation for the subordinate establishment is: yjt = β1,t ×
log(HQ distance to MDF)i×Y eart+β2,t×avg. subordinate establishment distance to MDFj×Y eart+αj+
αct + εi(j)t, where Y eart describes the year dummies from 2000 to 2010. log(HQ distance to MDF)i and
log(subordinate establishment distance to MDF)j describe the distance of the HQ or the average subordi-
nate establishment to their respective MDFs. The table reports the results for β1,t and β2,t. Number of
observations reported for each regression. Standard errors clustered at the county-year-level in paren-
theses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The sample only contains subordinate
establishments in manufacturing firms defined by the HQ’s sector classification.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data
C.1.1 Data sources and record linkage procedure
Social Security records
Employee history. The Integrated Employment Biographies (Integrierte Erwerbsbi-
ografien, IEB) are based on records from the German Social Security System. They
contain information on all employees subject to social insurance contributions since 1975
and are updated at least annually. The data cover nearly all private sector employees
in Germany, but do not cover civil servants and the self-employed. The IEB contain
information on birth year, gender, nationality, education, occupation, full time or part-
time status and daily earnings of each employee. Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) and
Antoni et al. (2016) provide a detailed description of the structure of the data.1
Information on education is not reported for all periods for every individual, but
can be inferred from other observations on the same individual. We follow imputation
procedure in Fitzenberger et al. (2005) and impute missing values for the education
variable based on past and future information.
Establishment history panel. The Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorik-
panel, BHP) is a panel data set that contains information on the sector, number of
1The paper by Antoni et al. (2016) focuses on the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies
(SIAB), a 2% random sample drawn from the IEB.
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employees and location of all establishments with at least one dependent employee on
30 June of each year since 1975. Following the regulations of the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency, an establishment is defined as the aggregation of all employees in a
municipality that are working for the same firm in the same sector.2 Sectors are defined
based on the Classification of Economic Activities of the German Statistical Office (see
also section C.1.2). The location of establishments is provided at the county level. Ger-
many is divided into 402 counties with around 200,000 inhabitants on average. German
counties are roughly comparable to counties in the US. Schmucker et al. (2016) provide
a detailed description of the data set.
Extension file entry and exit. The extension file entry and exit uses information on
worker flows to identify establishment openings and closings. Establishment identifiers
may change when a firm restructures. The extension file helps mitigate bias related to
restructurings. Hethey and Schmieder (2010) provide details on the file.
ORBIS
We use a linkage table between the Social Security Records and the firm-level database
Orbis of the commercial data provider Bureau van Dijk (BvD). BvD compiles its firm-
level data from publicly available sources as well as by acquiring data from other com-
mercial data providers. For Germany, BvDs main data provider is Creditreform. Inter-
nationally, BvD offers more than 20 different databases with the main customers being
privates companies looking for business intelligence on, for instance, competitors, busi-
ness partners or potential targets for acquisitions. Within BvDs databases, a company
is defined as an independent unit that holds a specific legal form and may incorporate
one or more establishments.
It is important to note that BvDs financial information on firms in Germany is most
reliable since 2006, as there have been some changes in the financial reporting system
in Germany at that time. In the years before these changes, a higher share of financial
information is missing.
2That is, if a firm has several plants in one and the same municipality, all plants in the same sector
are assigned the same establishment identifier. Plants in different sectors have distinct identifiers.
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Record linkage procedure
The record linkage between Orbis and the Social Security data was performed indepen-
dently of our project by the German Record Linkage Center (GRLC, see Antoni and
Schnell (2017) or www.record-linkage.de for more details on the GRLC). The basis of
the linkage was an extract of Orbis acquired by the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB). This extract contained data on all German firms at the reference date of January
30, 2014. Of the 1,938,990 firms contained in the data, 1,627,668 were marked as active
in Germany at that reference date.
Apart from a wide range of financial variables, the extract contained the name, legal
form and address of each firm. The GRLC used these identifiers to link the firm-level
data to the administrative establishment-level data of the IAB. This was made possible
by the fact that firms have to apply for an establishment number to be issued centrally
by the Federal Employment Agency (BA) for each establishment they set up. During
this process, firms are required by law to provide their name, legal form and address
to be recorded in the Data Warehouse (DWH) of the BA. At the time of the record
linkage, the DWH included names, the superordinate firm’s legal form and addresses
of establishments that had been active only before or in 2013. To increase the linkage
success while also limiting the computational and memory requirements, the GRLC used
linkage identifiers of all establishments that had been recorded as active in Germany at
least one day during the years 2011 to 2013. Despite this restriction, names, legal forms
and addresses of more than 12 million different establishment numbers could be used for
the record linkage.
The whole set of identifiers is used to identify the headquarters establishment of the
firm. Other establishments within the same firm do not have to be located in the same
municipality as the headquarters, which is why additional establishments were linked
using only the name and legal form of the firm. In some steps of the iterative linkage
process, the GRLC also used the main sector of activity, as this is also contained in both
databases.
As these identifiers are non-unique and error-prone, the GRLC developed extensive
cleaning, standardization and parsing routines (usually referred to as pre-processing)
to achieve records that could successfully be compared between the two data sources.
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To deal with remaining differences in, for instance, the spelling or abbreviations of the
identifiers, the GRLC applied error-tolerant methods of record linkage (see Christen,
2012). The resulting linkage process consists of 17 consecutive steps, not counting the
pre-processing, that varied in terms of which identifiers were used and how strict the
requirements on agreement of the compared records were. Schild (2016) provides a more
detailed description of the record linkage process. Antoni et al. (2018) report on the
linkage success and the representativeness of the resulting data set.
To rule out that we classify independent firms with similar names as multi-establishment
firms by accident, we only keep establishments that were matched based on the following
criteria: exact long name and legal form, exact short name and legal form, exact long
name (with or without activity component) and zip code, exact short name (with or
without activity component) and zip code.
Identification of headquarters
The linkage process explained in the previous subsection aimed at identifying as many
establishments per firm as possible without trying to determine which of the linked
establishments had been the headquarters of the firm. This information was added by
the Research Data Centre (FDZ) at the IAB afterwards. To do so, the FDZ performed
several iterative steps that mainly relied on the address of the firm according to Orbis
and of the establishments according to the administrative data. During later steps the
FDZ also used information on the share of administrative staff or the industry code
of the establishments under consideration. Given that the administrative data do not
contain information that directly identifies an establishment as the headquarters of a
superordinate company, this process had to rely on variables that allow the identification
of the most likely headquarters among the linked establishments. Antoni et al. (2018)
provide more details on the whole process and on the remaining uncertainty regarding
the identified headquarters.
C.1.2 Sector and occupation classification
The information on the establishment sector changes over time. The sector informa-
tion uses the respective latest sector classification of the German Statistical Office that
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updated the classification in 1993, 2003 and 2008. We follow Eberle et al. (2011) and
transfer the sector classification after 2003 into the classification as of 1993.
The information on the occupation of employees follows the German classification
of occupations “Klassifikation der Berufe” (KldB). The years 1998-2010 contain the
three digit occupation according to the 1988 version of the KldB. The years 2012-2014
contain the five digit occupation according to the 2010 version of the KldB. In 2011,
establishments were free to report using either version of the KldB. We therefore exclude
2011 from our analysis.
C.1.3 Assignment of occupations to layers/categories
Layers. To assign occupations to layers, we build on the classification of Caliendo et al.
(2015b) for the French PCS ESE occupation classification. We transfer the classification
to the international ISCO classification of occupations and from there to the German
occupation classification KldB (see section C.1.2). We use official correspondence tables
from the German Federal Employment Agency and the International Labor Organization
(ILO). In some cases, the translation assigns several layers to the same occupation.
Following Friedrich (2016), we generally assign the minimum level of layers to these
occupations. Table C.1 displays our assignment of occupations to layers.
Managerial occupations according to Blossfeld (1983, 1987). The assignment
treats the following occupations as managerial: 751, 752, 753, 761, 762, 763.
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Table C.1: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
3 751 63124, 71104, 73294, 84394, 94494 Manager, executive, director,
board member
2 721, 722, 724, 752,
753, 761, 763, 843
All sub-groups of type 2 in occupation groups: 434, 524, 815; of type 3 in occupation
groups: 411, 431, 434, 524, 922; of type 4 in occupation groups: 115, 411, 412, 431,
432, 433, 434, 511, 513, 516, 524, 532, 621, 625, 632, 633, 634, 712, 713, 715, 722, 723,
731, 732, 815, 824, 921, 922, 933;
Manager in business organization
and strategy, finanical analyst,
software developer, qualified IT-
specialist, lawyers
plus: 11494, 21194, 23294, 27194, 27294, 27394, 29194, 29294, 31174, 31194, 41203,
41303, 41383, 41304, 41384, 41394, 41403, 41404, 41484, 41494, 42124, 42144, 42314,
42324, 42394, 43152, 43323, 43343, 43353, 43383, 51133, 51233, 51533, 51543, 51594,
53184, 53394, 61194, 61294, 61394, 63114, 63194, 63313, 71224, 71333, 71433, 72144,
72194, 72243, 73394, 81214, 81234, 81404, 81414, 81424, 81434, 81444, 81454, 81464,
81474, 81484, 81804, 81814, 81884, 82594, 83193, 83194, 84194, 84294, 84304, 84494,
91344, 91354, 92113, 92304, 92394, 92424, 92434, 93303, 93313, 93323, 93343, 93383,
94214, 94493, 94404, 94414, 94484, 94534, 94794
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
1 31, 32, 601, 602,
603, 605, 606, 607,
611, 612, 621, 622,
623, 625, 626, 627,
628, 629, 762, 811,
813, 841, 842, 844,
862, 863, 871, 872,
873, 874, 875, 881,
All sub-groups of type 2 in occupation groups: 271, 273, 311, 312, 412, 414, 421, 613,
634, 811, 812, 817, 818, 821, 833, 844, 931, 932, 944, 946, 947; of type 3 in occupation
groups: 233, 271, 312, 341, 421, 422, 423, 432, 523, 531, 532, 533, 541, 611, 612, 613,
625, 634, 721, 723, 733, 811, 812, 816, 817, 818, 821, 822, 833, 842, 845, 912, 913, 923,
924, 931, 941, 942, 945, 946, 947; of type 4 in occupation groups: 117, 221, 222, 223,
231, 233, 234, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 251, 252, 261, 262, 263, 312, 321, 322, 341, 342,
343, 422, 512, 523, 714, 813, 816, 817, 821, 822, 833, 845, 911, 912, 914, 931, 932, 935,
936, 941, 943, 946;
Quality manager, training supervi-
sor, management assistant, scien-
tist, engineer, interpreter
882, 883, 604, 624,
633, 687, 812, 822,
831, 851, 852, 853,
855, 891, 892, 893,
922
plus: 1104, 11132, 11103, 11113, 11123, 11133, 11104, 11114, 11124, 11184, 11233,
11214, 11423, 11424, 11603, 11604, 11713, 11723, 12103, 12113, 12123, 12104,12144,
21113, 21114, 21124, 21213, 21223, 21233, 21313, 21323, 21363, 21413, 21423, 22103,
22183, 22222, 22203, 22303, 22333, 22343, 23113, 23123, 23222, 23223, 23224, 23322,
23413, 23423, 24133, 24203, 24233, 24303, 24413, 24423, 24513, 24523, 24533, 25103,
25133, 25183, 25213, 25223, 25233, 25243, 25253, 26113, 26123, 26223, 26243, 26253,
26263, 26303, 26313, 26323, 26333, 26383, 27104, 27184, 27212, 27223, 27283, 27224,
27284, 27313, 27304, 27314, 28103, 28113, 28123, 28133, 28143, 28104, 28114, 28213,
28223, 28214, 28224, 28313, 28343, 28314, 29103, 29113, 29123, 29133, 29143, 29104,
29114, 29134, 29203, 29213, 29223, 29233, 29243, 29253, 29263, 29273, 29283, 29204,
29284, 31103, 31133, 31143, 31153, 31163, 31173, 31104, 31114, 31124, 31134, 31144,
31154, 31164, 32103, 32113, 32123, 32203, 32223, 32233, 32243, 32253, 32263, 33133,
33213,
Continued on next page
179
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
t
o
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
3
Table C.1: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
33223, 33233, 33243, 33303, 33323, 34203, 34213, 34233, 34303, 34323, 34343, 41213,
41283, 41293, 41322, 41313, 41323, 41314, 41324, 41413, 41423, 41433, 41483, 41414,
41424, 41434, 42114, 42134, 42202, 42334, 43102, 43112, 43122, 43313, 43333, 43363,
51182, 51113, 51123, 51183, 51223, 51243, 51503, 51513, 51523, 51583, 51593, 51504,
51534, 51623, 51663, 53152, 53124, 53134, 53222, 53232, 53312, 53322, 53332, 53314,
61132, 61124, 61204, 61214, 61284, 61314, 62183, 63122, 63132, 63123, 63212, 63213,
71403, 71423, 71522, 71523, 72124, 72134, 72184, 72213, 72223, 72233, 73162, 73163,
73183, 73241, 73202, 73212, 73232, 73242, 73282, 73203, 73213, 73233, 73243, 73253,
73283, 73314, 73324, 73334, 81224, 81294, 81302,81332, 81352, 81382, 81313, 81323,
81333, 81353, 81383, 81393, 81494, 81894, 82212, 82232, 82332, 82343, 82522, 82503,
82523, 82504, 82514, 82524, 82534, 83112, 83132, 83123, 83133, 83124, 83134, 83154,
83223, 84114, 84124, 84134, 84144, 84184, 84214, 84224, 84413, 84404, 84414, 84424,
84434, 84444, 84454, 84484, 91314, 91324, 91334, 91384, 92133, 92384, 92414, 92494,
93213, 93223, 93233, 93333, 93413, 93433, 93513, 93523, 93603, 93613, 93623, 93633,
93643, 93653, 93683, 94224, 94303, 94313, 94323, 94403, 94413, 94483, 94522, 94532,
94582, 94514, 94704, 94714, 94724
0 Others Others Unskilled/semi-skilled occupations
in metal-working, printing, ma-
chine and equipment assemblers,
green keepers, catering, office
clerks
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
The KldB 1988 assigns a three digit code to each occupation. The KldB 2010 assigns a five digit code to each occupation. The first three digits denote
the occupation group. Digit # 4 denotes the occupation sub-group. Digit # 5 denotes the type of occupation (1 = unskilled/semi-skilled, 2 = skilled, 3 =
complex, 4 = highly complex).
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C.1.4 Evidence on the tasks of occupations by layer
The 2006 BiBB/BAuA Survey of the Working Population administered by the German
Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinistitut für Berufs-
bildung, BiBB) and the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (Bunde-
sanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin, BAuA) collects data on the education,
career and current employment conditions of a representative sample of 20,000 working
age individuals in Germany (Hall and Tiemann, 2006). The data contains information
on the occupation of employees. We relate the tasks of employees to the layer assigned
their occupation by estimating, via OLS:
yi = βDlayer,i + γXi + δZi + ui (C.1)
where yi is individual i’s answer to a survey question about i’s tasks, Dlayer,i is a dummy
for the layer to which we assign individual i’s occupation, Xi is a vector of employee
characteristics and Zi are characteristics of i’s employer.
Figure C.1 plots the coefficients and confidence bands by layer. Employees at higher
layers are significantly more likely to be supervisors. The predicted probability that an
employee at layer 3 is a supervisor at the mean is 84%. Employees at higher layers also
supervise larger teams. They are more likely to independently organize their own work.
Their duties comprise organizing work for others, making decisions and solving problems.
The job of employees at higher layers also require more specific skills. Overall, this
descriptive evidence is consistent with the assumption that the assignment of occupations
to layers reflects differences between the managerial tasks and duties of employees in
firms. Table C.2 presents the estimated coefficients.
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Figure C.1: Evidence on tasks by layer, 2006 BiBB/BAuA survey
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The figure plots the estimated coefficients of the layer dummies in equation (C.1) for different survey
questions. See Table C.2 for the survey questions.
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Table C.2: Regression results: tasks by layer, 2006 BiBB/BAuA survey
(a) (b) (c1) (c2) (d1) (d2) (e1) (e2) (f1) (f2) (g)
Layer 1 0.063∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.044) (0.023) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.090)
Layer 2 0.236∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.066) (0.042) (0.057) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.018) (0.027) (0.038) (0.159)
Layer 3 0.474∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 2.494∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.062) (0.047) (0.063) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.022) (0.031) (0.043) (0.177)
Age 0.000 0.003 −0.002 0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Tenure 0.037∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.021 0.018∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.001 0.050∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.005) (.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.043)
Gender −0.114∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.187∗∗∗ −0.021∗ 0.100∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −1.282∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.035) (0.017) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.072)
Constant 0.009 0.664 2.434∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 2.223∗∗∗ 20.451∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.210) (0.121) (0.163) (0.037) (0.036) (0.052) (0.057) (0.044) (0.062) (0.296)
# observations 12,514 4,400 11,958 11,926 12,514 12,514 12,510 12,509 12,511 12,510 10,282
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Regression results of equation C.1. Dependent variables defined by questions from
BiBB survey: (a) Supervisor status (Y/N); (b) How many people do you supervise?; (c1) You are allowed to plan and schedule your work by yourself;
(c2) You are able to influence the amount of work you have to do; (d1) How frequently are you organizing, making plans, working out operations?; (d2)
How frequently are you consulting, advising?; (e1) Making tough choices on own responsibility; (e2) Dealing with a range of duties and responsibilities;
(f1) Having to react to and solving unforeseeable problems; (f2) You are confronted with new problems that remain to be understood/familiarized with;
(g) Skills in specific subject areas. Independent variables: Layer X: dummy variable for layer X; Age: age of survey participant in years; Tenure: tenure
of survey participant in decades; Gender: gender of survey participant, 1=female. Education, firm size and sector fixed effects included.
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C.2 Facts firm location and organization
Table C.3: Share of firms with consecutive layers, Figure 3.1
# management layers 0 1 2 3
Consecutive organization Level 0 Level 0+1 Level 0+1+2 Level 0+1+2+3
SE firms 97% 70% 77% 100%
ME firms 91% 56% 72% 100%
Number of firms 21,288 22,115 25,124 18,872
The table displays the share of firms with consecutive layers in all firms with a given number of man-
agement layers by firm type.
Figure C.2: Number of management layers (firm level) by firm type, 2012 cross-section.
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The figure plots the distribution of the number of layers separately for SE and ME firms in the 2012
cross-section. The lowest level layer at the firm level is non-managerial. The sample includes firms with
at least ten employees.
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Table C.4: Regression results, managerial organization (firm level), 2012 cross-section
# mgmt. layers, Poisson Manag. share
Layers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DME firm 0.144
∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 4.247∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.240)
Log # non-mg. 0.143∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.005
employees (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Log # non-mg. 0.029∗∗∗
employees2 (0.002)
Log sales 0.179∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 105,948 105,948 53,566 53,566 105,947
2012 cross-section, only firms with at least 10 employees. Robust standard errors in ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management layers, defined at firm level, 5 managerial share in wage
sum, layer definition at firm level. Independent variables: see Table 3.4. Constant included.
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Table C.5: Regression results, managerial organization of ME firms (firm level), 2012
cross-section
# mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share
Layers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maximum log distance to HQ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.215)
Log area spanned by firm 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.002) (0.003) (0.162)
Log # non-mg. employees 0.115∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005)
Log sales 0.115∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 9,287 3,320 5,039 1,984 9,275 3,320
2012 cross-section, only multi-establishment firms with at least 10 employees. Columns 2, 4, 6 include
only ME firms with at least two subordinate establishments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management layers, defined at firm level,
5-6 managerial share in wage sum, firm level layer definition. Independent variables: see Table 3.5.
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Table C.6: Regression results, managerial organization, 1998-2010 panel
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share, OLS
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DME firm 0.045
∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.010∗ 1.104∗∗∗ −0.106+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.121) (0.060)
Log # non-mg. 0.270∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
employees (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Log # non-mg. −0.008∗∗∗
employees2 (0.001)
Log sales 0.180∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE N N N N N N
# observations 754,578 754,578 101,858 101,858 318,209 318,209
1998-2010 panel, only firms with at least 10 employees in all years. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management
layers, 5 managerial share in wage sum, layer definition, 6 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld. In-
dependent variables: see Table 3.4. Constant included. Legal form dummies omitted because of missing
information before 2005.
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Table C.7: Regression results, managerial organization of ME firms, 1998-2010 panel
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share, OLS
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.053∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 1.916∗ 0.303∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.001) (0.003) (0.044) (0.021)
Log area 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗
spanned by firm (0.001) (0.002) (0.030) (0.015)
Log # non-mg. 0.196∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
employees (0.001) (0.002)
Log sales 0.111∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 85,899 30,710 15,277 6,978 85,899 30,710 85,899 30,710
1998-2010 panel, only ME firms with at least 10 employees in all years. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 include only
ME firms with at least two subordinate establishments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-4 number of management layers, 5-6 managerial
share in wage sum, layer definition, 7-8 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld. Independent variables:
see Table 3.5. Constant included. Legal form dummies omitted because of missing information before
2005.
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Table C.8: Regression results, managerial organization, 2012 cross-section, by legal form
# mgmt. layers, GmbH & Co. KG GmbH
Poisson (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DME firm 0.082
∗∗∗ 0.029 0.016 0.088∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Log # non-mg. 0.224∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗
employees (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
Log sales 0.220∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
HQ sector dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 18,653 9,242 9,242 84,203 42,468 42,468
# mgmt. layers, AG
Poisson (7) (8) (9)
DME firm 0.037
∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.048∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Log # non-mg. 0.057∗∗∗ 0.001
employees (0.005) (0.007)
Log sales 0.065∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
HQ sector dummies Y Y Y
HQ county dummies Y Y Y
# firms 2,823 1,635 1,635
2012 cross-section, only firms with at least 10 employees, by legal form. A “GmbH & Co. KG” is a
limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner. A “GmbH” is a limited liability
company. An “AG” is a public company. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: number of management layers. Independent variables: see Table 3.4.
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Table C.9: Regression results, managerial organization, 2012 cross-section, robustness
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers, Poisson Managerial share, OLS
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DME firm 0.078
∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ 2.218∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.306) (0.268) (0.235) (0.180) (0.142) (0.124)
Log # non-mg. 0.152∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
employees (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 101,161 103,695 105,543 101,159 103,693 105,541 101,159 101,159 105,541
2012 cross-section, only multi-establishment firms with at least 10 employees. Columns 1, 4, 7 use only ME firms with all establishments in the same sector.
Columns 2, 5, 8 use only ME firms where all subordinate establishments are located outside the headquarters county. Columns 3, 6, 9 use only ME firms
with size smaller than the 95th percentile of the SE firm size distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-3
number of management layers, 4-6 managerial share in wage sum, layer definition, 7-9 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld. Independent variables: see
Table 3.4.
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Table C.10: Regression results, # management layers in ME firms, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # mgmt. layers Manag. share, Manag. share,
Poisson layers, OLS Blossfeld, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D2. quartile of max. log distance 0.014 −1.222+ −0.384
(0.015) (0.701) (0.313)
D3. quartile of max. log distance 0.068
∗∗∗ 1.186 0.516
(0.015) (0.791) (0.355)
D4. quartile of max. log distance 0.093
∗∗∗ 3.113∗∗∗ 1.555∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.866) (0.391)
D2. quartile of log area 0.048
∗ −1.199 −0.183
(0.024) (1.264) (0.602)
D3. quartile of log area 0.118∗∗∗ 0.884 1.420∗
(0.025) (1.474) (0.695)
D4. quartile of log area 0.138
∗∗∗ 3.658∗ 2.627∗∗∗
(0.025) (1.659) (0.797)
Log # non-managerial 0.138∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
employees (0.004) (0.006)
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firm-years 9,275 3,320 9,275 3,320 9,275 3,320
2012 cross-section, only multi-establishment firms with at least 10 employees. Columns 2, 4, 6 include
only ME firms with at least two subordinate establishments. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: 1-2 number of management
layers, 3-4 managerial share in wage sum, layer definition, 5-6 managerial share in wage sum, Blossfeld.
Independent variables: DX. quartile of max. log distance: Xth quartile of log of maximum distance between
subordinate establishment and headquarters; DX. quartile of log area: Xth quartile of log of minimum area
covered by establishments in square kilometers; others see Table 3.4.
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C.3 A model of multi-establishment firm organiza-
tion
Assumption 1. The predictability of the production process λ, the communication costs θj0
and the learning costs c are such that
λθ00 > c.
C.3.1 The optimal organization of a single establishment firm
Lagrangian equation and first order conditions
We use equation (3.9), which is binding in optimum, to substitute for n`0,L, ` > 0:
L = n00,Lw0
(
1 + cz00,L
)
+ n00,L
L−1∑
`=1
θ00e
−λz`−10,L w0
(
1 + cz`0,L
)
+ w0 (1 + cz̄0,L)
+ ξ0,L
(
q̃ − n00,L
(
1− e−λz̄0,L
))
+ ϕ0,L
(
n00,Lθ00e
−λzL−10,L − 1
)
+ η̄L0,L(z
L−1
0,L − z̄0,L) +
L−1∑
`=1
η̄`0,L(z
`−1
0,L − z
`
0,L)− η̄00,Lz00,L − η00,Ln00,L
∂L
∂z̄0,L
= w0c− ξ0,Ln00,Lλe−λz̄0,L − η̄L0,L = 0
∂L
∂zL−10,L

L=1
= n00,1
(
w0c− ϕ0,1θ00λe−λz
0
0,1
)
+ η̄10,1 − η̄00,1 = 0
L>1
= n00,L
(
w0cθ00e
−λzL−20,L − ϕ0,Lθ00λe−λz
L−1
0,L
)
+ η̄L0,L − η̄L−10,L = 0
∂L
∂z`0,L
= n00,Lw0
(
cθ00e
−λz`−10,L − λθ00e−λz
`
0,L(1 + cz`+10,L )
)
− η̄`0,L + η̄`+10,L = 0
for 0 < ` < L− 1, L > 2
∂L
∂z00,L
L>1
= n00,Lw0
(
c− λθ00e−λz
0
0,L(1 + cz10,L)
)
+ η̄10,L − η̄00,L = 0
∂L
∂n00,L
= w0
[(
1 + cz00,L
)
+
L−1∑
`=1
θ00e
−λz`−10,L w0
(
1 + cz`0,L
)]
− ξ0,L
(
1− e−λz̄0,L
)
+ ϕ0,Lθ00e
−λzL−10,L − η00,L = 0
∂L
∂ξ0,L
= q̃ − n00,L
(
1− e−λz̄0,L
)
= 0
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∂L
∂ϕ0,L
= n00,Lθ00e
−λzL−10,L − 1 = 0
Proposition 1: Comparative statics
We focus on L ∈ {1, 2, 3} because these are relevant for the empirics. The second order
conditions are given by:
d2L
dz̄0,Ldq̃
= −dξ0,L
dq̃
n00,Lλe
−λz̄0,L − ξ0,L
dn00,L
dq̃
λe−λz̄0,L + ξ0,Ln
0
0,Lλ
2e−λz̄0,L
dz̄0,L
dq̃
= 0
d2L
dzL−10,L dq̃

L=1
= −dϕ0,1
dq̃
θ00λe
−λz00,1 + ϕ0,1θ00λ
2e−λz
0
0,1
dz00,1
dq̃
= 0
L>1
= −w0cλe−λz
L−2
0,L
dzL−20,L
dq̃
− dϕ0,L
dq̃
λe−λz
L−1
0,L + ϕ0,Lλ
2e−λz
L−1
0,L
dzL−10,L
dq̃
= 0
∂2L
∂z`0,L∂q̃
= −λθ00ce−λz
`−1
0,L
dz`−10,L
dq̃
+ λ2θ00e
−λz`0,L
dz`0,L
dq̃
(1 + cz`+10,L )− λθ00e
−λz`0,Lc
dz`+10,L
dq̃
= 0
for 0 < ` < L− 1, L > 2
d2L
dz00,Ldq̃
= λ2θ00e
−λz00,L
dz00,L
dq̃
(1 + cz10,L)− λθ00e−λz
0
0,Lc
dz10,L
dq̃
= 0 for L > 1
d2L
dn00,Ldq̃
= −dξ0,L
dq̃
(1− e−λz̄0,L)− ξ0,Lλe−λz̄0,L
dz̄0,L
dq̃
+
dϕ0,L
dq̃
θ00e
−λzL−10,L = 0
d2L
dξ0,Ldq̃
= 1−
dn00,L
dq̃
(1− e−λz̄0,L)− n00,Lλe−λz̄0,L
dz̄0,L
dq̃
= 0
∂2L
∂ϕ0,L∂q̃
=
dn00,L
dq̃
θ00e
−λzL−10,L − n00,Lθ00λe
−λzL−10,L
dzL−10,L
dq̃
= 0
where we substitute dL
dz`0,L
, ` < L, into equation d
2L
dnL0,Ldq̃
.
To show (a): The knowledge of the CEO z̄0,L increases with total output q̃.
1. From d
2L
dϕ0,Ldq̃
:
dzL−10,L
dq̃
=
1
λn00,L
dn00,L
dq̃
2. From d
2L
dξ0,Ldq̃
:
dn00,L
dq̃
=
1− n00,Lλe−λz̄0,L
dz̄0,L
dq̃
1− e−λz̄0,L
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3. From d
2L
dn00,Ldq̃
:
dξ0,L
dq̃
=
dϕ0,L
dq̃
θ00e
−λzL−10,L − ξ0,Lλe−λz̄0,L dz̄0,Ldq̃
1− e−λz̄0,L
4. From d
2L
dzL−10,L dq̃
, with d
2L
dz`0,Ldq̃
, ` < L− 1:
dϕ0,1
dq̃
= ϕ0,1λ
dz00,1
dq̃
≡ ϕ0,1λf1 (ϕ0,L)
dzL−10,L
dq̃
dϕ0,2
dq̃
= ϕ0,2λ
dz10,2
dq̃
(1− θ00e−λz
0
0,2) ≡ ϕ0,2λf2 (ϕ0,L)
dzL−10,L
dq̃
dϕ0,3
dq̃
= ϕ0,3λ
dz20,3
dq̃
1− dz10,3dq̃
dz20,3
dq̃
 ≡ ϕ0,3λf3 (ϕ0,L) dzL−10,L
dq̃
with fL (ϕ0,L) > 0 for L = 1, 2, 3.
5. Substituting into d
2L
dz̄0,Ldq̃
yields:
dz̄0,L
dq̃
=
1
n00,Lλe
−λz̄0,L
ξ0,Lλe
−λz̄0,L + λe
−λz̄0,L
1−e−λz̄0,L
θ00e
−λzL−10,L ϕ0,LfL (ϕ0,L)
ξ0,Lλe−λz̄0,L +
λe
−λz̄0,L
1−e−λz̄0,L
θ00e
−λzL−10,L ϕ0,LfL (ϕ0,L) + λξ0,L
> 0.
To show (a): The number n`0,L and the knowledge z
`
0,L of employees at all below-
CEO layers ` < L increase with total output q̃.
Number of employees:
1. ` = 0:
dn00,L
dq̃
> 0 by
dz̄0,L
dq̃
< 1
λn00,Le
−λz̄0,L .
2. ` = L− 1, L > 1: dn
L−1
0,L
dq̃
=
dn00,L
dq̃
θ00e
−λzL−20,L fL(ϕ0,L) > 0 by fL(ϕ0,L) > 0.
3. L− 1 > ` > 0, L > 2: analogously to ` = L− 1.
Knowledge of employees:
1. ` = L− 1: dz
L−1
0,L
dq̃
= 1
λn00,L
dn00,L
dq̃
> 0 by
dn00,L
dq̃
> 0.
2. 0 < ` < L− 1, L > 2: dz
`
0,L
dq̃
=
dz`+10,L
dq̃
e
−λz`0,L
e
−λz`−1
0,L (1−θ00e
−λz`−1
0,L )
> 0 by
dzL−10,L
dq̃
> 0.
3. ` = 0, L > 1:
dz00,L
dq̃
= θ00e
−λz00,L dz
1
0,L
dq̃
> 0 by
dz10,L
dq̃
> 0.
To show (b): The marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,L and the marginal production
cost ξ0,L increase with total output q̃.
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dϕ0,L
dq̃
> 0 follows from
dϕ0,L
dq̃
= ϕ0,LλfL (ϕ0,L)
dzL−10,L
dq̃
> 0 by fL (ϕ0,L) > 0 and
dzL−10,L
dq̃
> 0.
Substituting into
dξ0,L
dq̃
yields:
dξ0,L
dq̃
> 0 if ϕ0,LfL(ϕ0,L)θ00e
−λzL−10,L > ξ0,Le
−λz̄0,L =
w0c
λ
θ00e
−λzL−10,L .
To show (c): The cost function C0,L(q̃) strictly increases with total output q̃.
Follows from
∂C0,L(q̃)
∂q̃
= ξ0,L > 0.
To show (c): The average cost function AC0,L(q̃) is convex in q̃. It reaches a
minimum at q̃∗L where it intersects with the marginal cost function, and converges to
infinity for q̃ → 0 and q̃ →∞.
AC0,L(q̃) =
C0,L(q̃)
q̃
⇒ dAC0,L(q̃)
dq̃
=
1
q̃
(ξ0,L − AC0,L)
= 0 if ξ0,L = AC0,L
d2AC0,L(q̃)
dq̃2
= − 2
q̃2
(ξ0,L − AC0,L) +
1
q̃
dξ0,L
dq̃
=
1
q̃
dξ0,L
dq̃
> 0 at the minimum
lim
q̃→0
AC0,L(q̃) =∞ because C0,L(q̃) ≥ w0 and C0,L(q̃) <∞ for q̃ → 0
lim
q̃→∞
AC0,L(q̃) =∞ by lim
q̃→∞
ξ0,L =∞
C.3.2 The optimal organization of a multi-establishment firm
Lagrangian equation and first order conditions, single output market
Firm-level: CEO knowledge, allocation of CEO time and output
L =
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω(qj,ω, sj,ω, z̄0,ω) + (1− s0,ω − s1,ω)w0(1 + cz̄0,ω)
+ κ̄0,ω
(
1∑
j=0
sj,ω − 1
)
−
1∑
j=0
κj,ωsj,ω + φ̄0,ω
(
q̃ −
1∑
j=0
qj,ω
)
−
1∑
j=0
φj,ωqj,ω − η0,ωz̄0,ω
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∂L
∂qj,ω
=
∂C
∂qj,ω
− φ̄0,ω − φj,ω = 0
∂L
∂sj,ω
=
∂C
∂sj,ω
− w0(1 + cz̄0,ω) + κ̄0,ω − κj,ω = 0
∂L
∂z̄0,ω
=
∑1
j=0
∂Cj,ω
∂z̄0,ω
+ w0c(1− s0,ω − s1,ω)− η0,ω = 0
∂L
∂κ̄0,ω
=
∑1
j=0sj,ω − 1 = 0
∂L
∂φ̄0,ω
= q̃ −
∑1
j=0qj,ω = 0
Establishment-level: The number and knowledge of employees We use equa-
tion (3.21), which is binding in optimum, to substitute for n`j,L, ` > 0. Lj denotes the
number of below-CEO layers at establishment j.
L = n0j,ωwj
(
1 + cz0j,ω
)
+ n0j,ω
Lj∑
`=1
θ00e
−λz`−1j,ω wj
(
1 + cz`j,ω
)
+ sj,ωw0 (1 + cz̄0,ω)
+ ξj,ω
(
qj,ω − n0j,ω
(
1− e−λz̄0,ω
))
+ ϕj,ω
(
n0j,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − sj,ω
)
+ η̄Lj,ω(z
Lj
j,ω − z̄0,ω) +
Lj∑
`=1
η̄`j,ω(z
`−1
j,ω − z`j,ω)− η̄0j,ωz0j,ω − η0j,ωn0j,ω
∂L
∂z
Lj
j,ω

Lj=0
= n0j,ω
(
wjc− ϕj,ωθj0λe−λz
0
j,ω
)
+ η̄Lj,ω − η̄0j,ω = 0
Lj>0
= n0j,ω
(
wjcθ00e
−λz
Lj−1
j,ω − ϕj,ωθj0λe−λz
Lj
j,ω
)
+ η̄Lj,ω − η̄
Lj
j,ω = 0
∂L
∂z`j,ω
= n0j,ωwj
(
cθ00e
−λz`−1j,ω − λθ00e−λz
`
j,ω(1 + cz`+1j,ω )
)
− η̄`j,ω + η̄`+1j,ω = 0
for 0 < ` < Lj − 1, Lj > 1
∂L
∂z0j,ω
Lj>0
= n0j,ωwj
(
c− λθ00e−λz
0
j,ω(1 + cz1j,ω)
)
+ η̄1j,ω − η̄0j,ω = 0
∂L
∂n0j,ω
= wj
(1 + cz0j,ω)+ Lj∑
`=1
θ00e
−λz`−1j,ω wj
(
1 + cz`j,ω
)
− ξj,ω
(
1− e−λz̄0,ω
)
+ ϕj,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − η0j,ω = 0
∂L
∂ξj,ω
= qj,ω − n0j,ω
(
1− e−λz̄0,ω
)
= 0
∂L
∂ϕj,ω
= n0j,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − sj,ω = 0
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Endogenous variables:
eλz
Lj
j,ω =
qj,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
θj0
sj,ω
eλ(z
`−1
j,ω −z
`−2
j,ω ) =
(
1 + cz`j,ω
)
λ ∀` = 2, ..., Lj,
eλz
0
j,ω =
(
1 + cz1j,ω
)
λθjj
ξj,ω =
wj
(
1 + cz0j,ω +
1
λ
+ 1(Lj ≥ 1) θ00λ
∑Lj
`=1 e
−λz`−1j,ω
)
1− e−λz̄0,ω
,
ϕj,ω =
wjc
λθj0
θ00e
λ
(
z
Lj
j,ω−z
Lj−1
j,ω
)
for Lj > 0, ϕj,ω =
wjc
λθj0
eλz
0
j,ω for Lj = 0.
Proposition 2: Allocation of output and CEO time
Proof. The first order conditions imply:
• ∂L
∂qj,ω
: If φj,ω = 0∀j, i.e. if there is positive production at both establishments,
φ0,ω =
∂C
∂q0,ω
− φ̄0,ω =
∂C
∂q1,ω
− φ̄0,ω = φ1,ω = 0 for q0, q1 > 0
⇒ ∂C
∂q0,ω
= ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω =
∂C
∂q1,ω
.
• ∂L
∂sj,ω
: If κj,ω = 0,∀j, i.e. if the CEO spends positive time for both establishments,
κ0,ω =
∂C
∂s0,ω
− w0(1 + cz̄0,ω) + κ̄0,ω =
κ1,ω =
∂C
∂s1,ω
− w0(1 + cz̄0,ω) + κ̄0,ω = 0 for s0, s1 > 0
⇒ ∂C
∂s0,ω
= ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω =
∂C
∂s1,ω
.
Proof of Corollary 1. Proposition 2 requires that both the marginal costs of pro-
duction ξj,ω and the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕj,ω are equal if the firm produces at
two establishments. ϕj,ω is a function of θ10, but ξj,ω is not. Production at two estab-
lishments with the same number of below-CEO layers Lj and symmetric communication
costs θ10 = θ00 but wages w1 ≥ w0 therefore violates Proposition 2.
To see this, consider the case Lj = 0∀j. The following two equations cannot be
fulfilled at the same time, where w0 = w1 = w, because the first requires that the
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knowledge levels are the same, the second requires that they are different:
w(1 + cz00,ω) = w(1 + cz
0
1,ω) (from ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω)
θ10e
λz00,ω = θ00e
λz01,ω (from ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω)
Proposition 3: Comparative statics with respect to q̃
Lj denotes the number of below-CEO layers at establishment j. The second order
conditions for q̃ > qj,ω > 0 ∀j, 1 > sj,ω > 0∀j are given by:
d2L
dz̄0,ωdq̃
= −
1∑
j=0
dξj,ω
dq̃
n0j,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω −
1∑
j=0
ξj,ω
dn0j,ω
dq̃
λe−λz̄0,ω +
1∑
j=0
ξj,ωn
0
j,ωλ
2e−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
= 0
d2L
dq0,ωdq̃
− d
2L
dq1,ωdq̃
=
dξ0,ω
dq̃
− dξ1,ω
dq̃
= 0
d2L
ds0,ωdq̃
− d
2L
ds1,ωdq̃
=
dϕ0,ω
dq̃
− dϕ1,ω
dq̃
= 0
d2L
dκ̄0,ωdq̃
=
ds0,ω
dq̃
− ds1,ω
dq̃
= 0
d2L
dφ̄0,ωdq̃
= 1− dq0,ω
dq̃
− dq1,ω
dq̃
= 0
d2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdq̃

Lj=0
= −dϕj,ω
dq̃
θj0λe
−λz0j,ω + ϕj,ωθj0λ
2e−λz
0
j,ω
dz0j,ω
dq̃
= 0
Lj>0
= −wjcθ00λe−λz
Lj−1
j,ω
dz
Lj−1
j,ω
dq̃
− dϕj,ω
dq̃
θj0λe
−λz
Lj
j,ω + ϕj,ωθj0λ
2e−λz
Lj
j,ω
dz
Lj
j,ω
dq̃
= 0
∂2L
∂z`j,ω∂q̃
= −λθ00ce−λz
`−1
j,ω
dz`−1j,ω
dq̃
+ λ2θ00e
−λz`j,ω
dz`j,ω
dq̃
(1 + cz`+1j,ω )− λθ00e−λz
`
j,ωc
dz`+1j,ω
dq̃
= 0
for 0 < ` < Lj, Lj > 1
d2L
dz0j,ωdq̃
= λ2θ00e
−λz0j,ω
dz0j,ω
dq̃
(1 + cz1j,ω)− λθ00e−λz
0
j,ωc
dz1j,ω
dq̃
= 0 for Lj > 0
d2L
dn0j,ωdq̃
= −dξj,ω
dq̃
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)− ξj,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
+
dϕj,ω
dq̃
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω = 0
d2L
dξj,ωdq̃
=
dqj,ω
dq̃
−
dn0j,ω
dq̃
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)− n0j,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
= 0
∂2L
∂ϕj,ω∂q̃
=
dn0j,ω
dq̃
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − n0j,ωθj0λe−λz
Lj
j,ω
dz
Lj
j,ω
dq̃
− dsj,ω
dq̃
= 0
where we substitute dL
dz`j,ω
, ` < L, into equation d
2L
dn0j,ωdq̃
.
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To show (a): The total number of employees at all below-CEO layers
∑1
j=0 n
`
j,ω, ∀` <
L increases with total output q̃.
• ` = 0: Follows from
∑1
j=0
dn0j,ω
dq̃
=
1−
∑1
j=0 n
0
j,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω dz̄0,ω
dq̃
1−e−λz̄0,ω
and dz̄0,ω
dq̃
< 1−e
−λz̄0,ω
λq̃e−λz̄0,ω
(see
below).
• ` > 0: Follows from
∑1
j=0
dn0j,ω
dq̃
> 0 and
dz`j,ω
dq̃
= 0 (see below).
To show (a): CEO knowledge z̄0,ω increases with total output q̃.
1. As will be shown below,
dϕj,ω
dq̃
= 0 and
dz`j,ω
dq̃
= 0∀` < L. Thus, d2L
dn0j,ωdq̃
yields:
dξj,ω
dq̃
= −ξj,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
2. From d
2L
dξj,ωdq̃
:
dn0j,ω
dq̃
=
dqj,ω
dq̃
− n0j,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
1− e−λz̄0,ω
3. Substituting into d
2L
dz̄0,ωdq̃
together with dξ0,ω
dq̃
− dξ1,ω
dq̃
= 0 and 1 − dq0,ω
dq̃
− dq1,ω
dq̃
= 0
yields:
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
=
1− e−λz̄0,ω
λq̃(1 + e−λz̄0,ω)
> 0
To show (a): The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers z`j,ω, ∀` < L
is constant.
We know: ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω and ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω. These equations uniquely determine the
knowledge levels (two equations in two unknowns). They do not depend on q̃, so the
knowledge levels do not depend on q̃.
⇒ dz
`
j,ω
dq̃
= 0∀`, j
To show (b): The share of CEO time sj,ω and the number of employees at all below-
CEO layers n`j,ω at the location with relatively lower (higher) wages increase (decreases)
with total output q̃, where the threshold ratio of wages depends on ω. Local output qj,ω
increases if the share of CEO time sj,ω does.
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We focus on L ∈ {1, 2, 3}, because these are relevant for the empirics.
1.
dsj,ω
dq̃
> 0 if f(wj) < f(wk) k 6= j. For L0 = L1 = 0, ds0,ωdq̃ > 0 if w0 < w1. For
L0 = L1 = 1,
ds0,ω
dq̃
> 0 if w0e
λ(z01,ω−z00,ω) < w1. For L0 = 0, L1 = 1,
ds0,ω
dq̃
> 0 if
w0
1
θ00
eλz
0
1,ω < w1. For L0 = 1, L1 = 0,
ds0,ω
dq̃
> 0 if w0θ00e
−λz00,ω < w1. Analogous
results hold for L = 3.
2. sgn
(
dn`j,ω
dq̃
)
= sgn
(
dn0j,ω
dq̃
)
and sgn
(
dn0j,ω
dq̃
)
= sgn
(
dsj,ω
dq̃
)
, i.e. the number of em-
ployees varies as the share of CEO time.
3. sgn
(
dqj,ω
dq̃
)
= sgn
(
dsj,ω
dq̃
)
for
dsj,ω
dq̃
> 0. By dq0,ω
dq̃
+ dq1,ω
dq̃
= 1 and ds0,ω
dq̃
+ ds1,ω
dq̃
= 0,
the sign is indeterminate if
dsj,ω
dq̃
< 0.
To show (c): The marginal benefit of CEO time ϕj,ω does not vary with total
output q̃.
From d
2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdq̃
:
dϕj,ω
dq̃
= ϕj,ωλ
dz0j,ω
dq̃
if Lj = 0
dϕj,ω
dq̃
= ϕj,ωλ
dz
Lj
j,ω
dq̃
− w0ceλ(z
Lj
j,ω−z
Lj−1
j,ω )
dz
Lj−1
j,ω
dq̃
if Lj > 0
⇒ dϕj,ω
dq̃
= 0∀j by dz
`
j,ω
dq̃
= 0∀j, `
To show (c): The marginal production cost ξj,ω decreases with total output q̃.
Follows from
dξj,ω
dq̃
= − ξj,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω
1−e−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dq̃
and dz̄0,ω
dq̃
> 0.
To show (d): The cost function C0,ω(q̃) is strictly increasing with total output q̃.
Follows from ∂C0,ω(q̃)
∂q̃
= φ̄0,ω ≥ 0 with φ̄0,ω = w0c(e
λz̄0,ω−1)
λq̃
.
Full symmetry. Under full symmetry, the cost function coincides with the cost
function of a single-establishment firm. Therefore, Proposition 1 applies.
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Figure C.3: Illustration: Proof of Proposition 4.
101 102
Quantity
 
 
Average costs, L0=L1=0
Average costs, L0=0, L1=1, fixed knowledge
Average costs, L0=0, L1=1, endogenous knowledge
Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ10 = θ00 = .26 (from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = w1 = 1.
Proposition 4: The optimal number of layers
a) To show: The average costs of the {Lj/Lj}-organization coincide with the average
costs of a single establishment firm with L layers characterized in Proposition 1c):
The average cost function of the {Lj/Lj}-organization is U-shaped and reaches a
minimum at q̃∗L.
The firm with a {Lj/Lj}-organization chooses symmetric knowledge levels by
ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω and ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω. The cost function thus coincides with the cost func-
tion of a single-establishment firm given
∑1
j=0 n
0
j,ω = n
0
0,Lj+1
. Correspondingly,
Proposition 1 applies.
b) To show: The average costs of the {Lj/Lj + 1}-organization are lower than the
average costs of the {Lj/Lj}-organization for output levels q̃ > q̃∗L.
That is, consider an ME firm with Lj below-CEO layers at both establishments
at the minimum efficient scale q̃∗L. There exists a range of quantities q̃ > q̃
∗
L such
that the average cost of an ME firm with Lj below-CEO layers at establishment j
and Lj + 1 below-CEO layers at establishment k 6= j are lower than the minimum
average cost of an ME firm with Lj below-CEO layers at both establishments.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we choose j = 0, k = 1 and Lj = 0.
We proceed in two steps. Figure C.3 illustrates the argument.
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1. We construct an ME organization with L0 = 0 below-CEO layers at establish-
ment 0 and L1 = 1 below-CEO layers at establishment 1 that has the same
average cost as an ME organization with L1 = L0 = 0 below-CEO layers at
both establishments at the minimum efficient scale q̃∗1.
Consider an ME firm with L1 = L0 = 0. By w1 = w0, θ10 = θ00, its cost
function coincides with the cost function of a SE firm with one layer L = 1.
At the minimum efficient scale q̃∗1,
ξ0,1 = AC0,1 ≡ ACMES0,1 (C.2)
λz00,1 = ln
(
λz̄0,1 +
λ
c
)
+ ln θ00 (C.3)
λz̄0,1 = λz
0
0,1 + ln
(
λz00,1 +
λ
c
+ 1 + θ00e
−λz00,1
)
− ln θ00 (C.4)
q̃∗0,1 =
1
θ00
eλz
0
0,1(1− e−λz̄0,1) (C.5)
Consider an ME firm with organization ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1}. Fix the
knowledge levels of the firm such that
z00,ω = z
0
0,1 (C.6)
z̄0,ω = z̄0,1 (C.7)
w0
(
1 + cz00,1 +
c
λ
)
= w1
(
1 + cz01,ω +
c
λ
+
c
λ
θ11e
−λz01,ω
)
, i.e. ξ1,ω = ξ0,1,
(C.8)
and
w0
θ00
eλz
0
0,1 =
w1θ11
θ10
eλ(z
1
1,ω−z01,ω), i.e. ϕ1,ω = ϕ0,1, (C.9)
with z11,ω =
1
λθ11
eλz
0
1,ω − 1
c
.
By construction, the average cost of the ME firm at q̃∗1 are AC0,ω = AC
MES
0,1 .

2. We show that the average cost of an ME firm with organization ω = {L0 =
0, L1 = 1} and optimal knowledge levels are lower than the minimum av-
erage costs of the ME organization with Lj layers at both establishments
for q̃ > q̃∗1, because they are lower than the average cost an ME firm with
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organization ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1} and fixed knowledge levels.
The maximum producible quantity q̃MAX of the ME firm with organiza-
tion ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1} and fixed knowledge levels is given by
q̃MAX =
1
θ10
eλz
1
1,ω(1− e−λz̄0,1) (C.10)
At q̃MAX ,
ξ1,ω = ξ0,ω = ξ0,1 by construction (C.11)
AC0,ω =
w1
(
1 + cz01,ω +
c
λ
)
+ θ10e
−λz11,ωw0(1 + cz̄0,ω)
1− e−λz̄0,ω
(C.12)
= ξ0,ω −
w1c
λ
θ11e
−λz01,ω − θ10e−λz
1
1,ωw0(1 + cz̄0,ω)
1− e−λz̄0,ω
= ξ0,ω − w1θ00
c
λ
e−λz
0
1,ωe−λz
0
0,ω
(
eλz
0
0,ω − θ00
(
λ
c
+ λz̄0,ω
))
by ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω
(C.13)
= ξ0,ω = AC
MES
0,1 by (C.3) (C.14)
i.e. the ME firm produces both q̃∗1 and q̃
MAX at the same average costs.
The ME firm produces quantities q̃ with q̃MAX ≥ q̃ ≥ q̃∗1 by allocating the
share s to the establishment with one below-CEO layer and the share 1 − s
of the production quantity to the establishment with two below-CEO layers,
where
s =
q̃ − 1
θ10
eλz
1
1,ω(1− e−λz̄0,1)
1
θ00
eλz
0
0,ω(1− e−λz̄0,1)− 1
θ10
eλz
1
1,ω(1− e−λz̄0,1)
(C.15)
Both numerator and denominator are negative. The denominator is constant.
0 ≤ s ≤ 1, because the numerator achieves its minimum at q̃ = 1
θ00
eλz
0
0,ω(1 −
e−λz̄0,1) (so s = 1), and its maximum at q̃ = 1
θ10
eλz
1
1,ω(1− e−λz̄0,1) (so s = 0).
That is, the average cost function of the ME firm with fixed knowledge levels
is flat for q̃ ∈
[
q̃∗1, q̃
MAX
]
(see the light dashed line in Figure C.3).
The average cost of an ME firm with organization ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1} and
optimal knowledge levels is lower than the average cost of the ME firm with
organization ω but fixed knowledge levels (compare the light and bold dashed
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line in Figure C.3) because
C(q̃) ≤ C(q̃, z̄0,ω, z00,1, z01,ω(z00,1), z11,ω(z00,1)) (C.16)
Consequently, there exist quantities q̃ > q̃∗1 such that the average cost of an
ME firm with organization ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1} are lower than the average
cost of an ME firm with L0 = 0 below-CEO layers at both establishments, as
well as an SE firm with L = 1. 
c) To show: The average cost function of the {Lj +1/Lj +1}-organization intersects
the average cost function of the {Lj/Lj}-organization at the output q̃L+1L , with
q∗L+1 > q̃
L+1
L > q
∗
L. It intersects the average cost function of the {Lj/Lj + 1}-
organization at the output q̃ > q̃L+1L .
That is, the average cost function of an ME organization with Lj below-CEO
layers at establishment j and Lj +1 below-CEO layers at establishment k intersect
the average cost function of an organization with Lj + 1 below-CEO layers at
both establishments at a higher quantity than the average cost function of an
organization with Lj below-CEO layers at both establishments does.
We exploit the characteristics of the average cost function.
• AC0,ω ≤ ACMES0,1 ∀ q̃∗1 ≤ q̃ ≤ q̃MAX ,
• AC0,1 is increasing for q̃ > q̃∗1,
• AC0,2 is decreasing for q̃ ≤ q̃∗2, where q̃MAX ≤ q̃∗2,
• at q̃∗1, AC0,2 > AC0,1.
In consequence, the increasing average costs function of the ME firm with Lj = 0
below-CEO layers AC0,1 intersects the decreasing average costs function of the
ME firm with Lj = 1 below CEO layers at both establishments AC0,2 at a lower
quantity than the (weakly) decreasing average cost function of the ME firm with
organization ω = {L0 = 0, L1 = 1} AC0,ω intersects the average cost function
AC0,2. 
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Proposition 5: Comparative statics with respect to θ10
The second order conditions for q̃ > qj,ω > 0∀j, 1 > sj,ω > 0 ∀j are given by:
d2L
dz̄0,ωdθ10
= −
1∑
j=0
dξj,ω
dθ10
n0j,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω −
1∑
j=0
ξj,ω
dn0j,ω
dθ10
λe−λz̄0,ω +
1∑
j=0
ξj,ωn
0
j,ωλ
2e−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dq0,ωdθ10
− d
2L
dq1,ωdθ10
=
dξ0,ω
dθ10
− dξ1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
ds0,ωdθ10
− d
2L
ds1,ωdθ10
=
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
− dϕ1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dκ̄0,ωdθ10
=
ds0,ω
dθ10
− ds1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dφ̄0,ωdθ10
= −dq0,ω
dθ10
− dq1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dzL00,ωdθ10

L0=0= −dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θ00λe
−λz00,ω + ϕ0,ωθ00λ
2e−λz
0
0,ω
dz00,ω
dθ10
= 0
L0>0= −w0cλθ00e−λz
L0−1
0,ω
dz
L0−1
0,ω
dθ10
− dϕ0,ω
dθ10
λθ00e
−λzL00,ω + ϕ0,ωθ00λ
2e−λz
L0
0,ω
dz
L0
0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dzL11,ωdθ10

L1=0= −dϕ1,ω
dθ10
θ10λe
−λz01,ω + ϕ1,ωθ10λ
2e−λz
0
1,ω
dz01,ω
dθ10
− ϕ1,ωλe−λz
0
1,ω = 0
L0>0= −w1cλθ00e−λz
L1−1
1,ω
dz
L1−1
1,ω
dθ10
− dϕ1,ω
dθ10
λθ10e
−λzL11,ω + ϕ1,ωθ10λ
2e−λz
L1
1,ω
dz
L1
1,ω
dθ10
−ϕ1,ωθ10λe−λz
L1
1,ω = 0
∂2L
∂z`j,ω∂θ10
= −λθ00ce−λz
`−1
j,ω
dz`−1j,ω
dθ10
+ λ2θ00e
−λz`j,ω
dz`j,ω
dθ10
(1 + cz`+1j,ω )− λθ00e−λz
`
j,ωc
dz`+1j,ω
dθ10
= 0
for 0 < ` < Lj, Lj > 1
d2L
dz0j,ωdθ10
= λ2θ00e
−λz0j,ω
dz0j,ω
dθ10
(1 + cz1j,ω)− λθ00e−λz
0
j,ωc
dz1j,ω
dθ10
= 0 for Lj > 0
d2L
dn00,ωdθ10
= −dξ0,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)− ξ0,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
+
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θ00e
−λzL00,ω = 0
d2L
dn01,ωdθ10
= −dξ1,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)− ξ1,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
+
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
θ10e
−λzL11,ω + ϕ1,ωe
−λzL11,ω = 0
d2L
dξj,ωdθ10
=
dqj,ω
dθ10
−
dn0j,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)− n0j,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
= 0
∂2L
∂ϕ0,ω∂θ10
=
dn00,ω
dθ10
θ00e
−λzL00,ω − n00,ωθ00λe−λz
L0
0,ω
dzL00,ω
dθ10
− ds0,ω
dθ10
= 0
∂2L
∂ϕ1,ω∂θ10
=
dn01,ω
dθ10
θ10e
−λzL11,ω − n01,ωθ10λe−λz
L1
1,ω
dzL11,ω
dθ10
− ds1,ω
dθ10
+ n01,ωλe
−λzL11,ω = 0
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where we substitute dL
dz`j,ω
, ` < L, into equation d
2L
dn0j,ωdθ10
.
To show (a): The total number of employees at all below-CEO layers
∑1
j=0 n
`
j,ω, ∀` <
L decreases with the communication costs θ10.
• ` = 0: Follows from d2L
dξj,ωdθ10
, with −dq0,ω
dθ10
− dq1,ω
dθ10
= 0:
1∑
j=0
dn0j,ω
dθ10
= −
1∑
j=0
n0j,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
< 0 as
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
> 0 (see below)
• ` > 0: Follows from
∑1
j=0
dn0j,ω
dθ10
< 0 and
dz`j,ω
dθ10
> 0.
To show (a): The knowledge of the CEO z̄0,ω increases with the communication
costs θ10.
1. The two equations d
2L
dn0j,ωdq̃
j = 0, 1 yield, together with dξ0,ω
dθ10
− dξ1,ω
dθ10
= 0, ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω,
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
− dϕ1,ω
dθ10
= 0 and ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω:
dξ0,ω
dθ10
=
θ00ϕ0,ω − ξ0,ωλe−λz̄0,ω dz̄0,ωdθ10 (θ00e
λz
L1
1,ω − θ10eλz
L0
0,ω)
(1− e−λz̄0,ω)(θ00eλz
L1
1,ω − θ10eλz
L0
0,ω)
2. From d
2L
dξj,ωdθ10
:
dn0j,ω
dθ10
=
dqj,ω
dθ10
− n0j,ωλe−λz̄0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
1− e−λz̄0,ω
3. Substituting into d
2L
dz̄0,ωdθ10
together with dξ0,ω
dθ10
− dξ1,ω
dθ10
= 0 and −dq0,ω
dθ10
− dq1,ω
dθ10
= 0
yields:
dξ0,ω
dθ10
=
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
ξ0,ωλ
1− e−λz̄0,ω
4. Combining the two expressions for dξ0,ω
dθ10
yields:
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
=
ϕ0,ωθ00
λξ0,ω(1 + e−λz̄0,ω)(θ00e
λz
L1
1,ω − θ10eλz
L0
0,ω)
> 0 for sufficiently low w1
To show (a): The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers z`j,ω, ∀` < L
increases with the communication costs θ10.
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Follows from d
2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdθ10
and ∂
2L
∂z`j,ω∂θ10
, ∂
2L
∂z0j,ω∂θ10
by dϕ0,ω
dθ10
> 0.
To show (b): The marginal benefit of CEO time ϕj,ω increases with the commu-
nication costs θ10.
d2L
dn00,ωdq̃
yields, together with dϕ0,ω
dθ10
− dϕ1,ω
dθ10
= 0 and dz̄0,ω
dθ10
> 0:
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
=
1
θ00e
λz
L0
0,ω
dz̄0,ω
dθ10
λξ0,ω(1 + e−λz̄0,ω)
> 0.
To show (b): The marginal production cost ξj,ω increases with the communication
costs θ10.
Follows from dξ0,ω
dθ10
= dz̄0,ω
dθ10
ξ0,ωλ
1−e−λz̄0,ω
and dz̄0,ω
dθ10
> 0.
To show: The increase of the below-CEO knowledge levels with the communication
costs θ10 is stronger at higher than at lower layers and at the subordinate establishment
than at the headquarters.
• Higher vs. lower layers: From d2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdθ10
, Lj > 0:
dz
Lj
j,ω
dθ10
−
dz
Lj−1
j,ω
dθ10
=
dϕj,ω
dθ10
1
λϕj,ω
+ 1(j = 1)ϕ1,ωθ10λe
−λzL11,ω > 0
• Subordinate establishment vs. headquarters: From d2L
dz
L0
0,ωdθ10
and d
2L
dz
L1
1,ωdθ10
with
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
− dϕ1,ω
dθ10
= 0 and ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω:
dz01,ω
dθ10
=
dz00,ω
dθ10
+
1
λθ10
Proposition 6: Allocation of production quantity and CEO time (extension)
L0,ω =
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω(qj,ω, sj,ω, z̄0,ω) +
[
1−
1∑
j=0
sj,ω
]
w0(1 + cz̄0,ω)
+ κ̄0,ω
(
1∑
j=0
sj,ω − 1
)
−
1∑
j=0
κj,ωsj,ω −
1∑
j=0
φj,ω q̃j,ω −−η0,ωz̄0,ω
− 1(q0,ω ≥ q̃0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q̃1)φ̄0,ω(q0,ω − q̃0 + τ(q1,ω − q̃1))
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− 1(q1,ω ≥ q̃1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q̃0)φ0,ω(q1,ω − q̃1 + τ(q0,ω − q̃0))
First-order conditions:
∂L0,ω
∂q0,ω
= ξ0,ω − 1(q0,ω ≥ q̃0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q̃1)φ̄0,ω − 1(q1,ω ≥ q̃1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q̃0)φ0,ωτ − φ0,ω = 0
∂L0,ω
∂q1,ω
= ξ1,ω − 1(q0,ω ≥ q̃0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q̃1)φ̄0,ωτ − 1(q1,ω ≥ q̃1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q̃0)φ0,ω − φ1,ω = 0
∂L0,ω
∂sj,ω
=
∂Cj,ω
∂sj,ω
− w0(1 + cz̄0,ω) + κ̄0,ω − κj,ω = 0
∂L0,ω
∂z̄0,ω
=
∑1
j=0
∂Cj,ω
∂z̄0,ω
+ w0c(1− s0,ω − s1,ω)− η0,ω = 0
Implications:
φj,ω = 0∀j ⇒ ξ1,ω = τξ0,ω if q0,ω > q̃0 ∧ q1,ω < q̃1
ξ0,ω = τξ1,ω if q1,ω > q̃1 ∧ q0,ω < q̃0
1
τ
ξ1,ω < ξ0,ω < τξ1,ω if q0,ω = q̃0 ∧ q1,ω = q̃1
∃φj,ω > 0 ⇒ ξj,ω > τξ−j,ω at q̃j,ω = 0
C.3.3 Proposition 7: Optimal output
Using the implicit function theorem, we show:
dq̃(αi)
dαi
=
(R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ−1ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ
1 + αi (R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ−1ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ−1 σ2
σ−1
dξ0,ω
dq̃
> 0
dq̃(αi)
dθ10
= −
αi (R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ−1ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ−1 σ2
σ−1
dξ0,ω
dθ10
1 + αi (R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ−1ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ−1 σ2
σ−1
dξ0,ω
dq̃
< 0 by
dξ0,ω
dθ10
> 0
The denominator is positive by
1 + αi (R0 +R1)
(
σ
σ − 1
ξ0,ω (q̃(αi))
)−σ−1
σ2
σ − 1
dξ0,ω
dq̃
=1− q̃σ
σ−1ξ0,ω
σ2
σ − 1
ξ0,ωλe
−λz̄0,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
1− e−λz̄0,ω
λq̃(1 + e−λz̄0,ω)
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=1− σe
−λz̄0,ω
1 + e−λz̄0,ω
> 0 for σ < eλz̄0,ω + 1.
C.4 Organizational response to new high speed train
routes
Table C.11: Reduction of travel times in minutes through high speed routes
High speed Mean p25 p50 p75
2000-2004 0 -1.6 -5.8 0.2 5.1
1 -22.7 -51.5 -8.7 3.6
2004-2008 0 -1.4 -5.8 -0.2 3.1
1 -16.8 -28.8 -9.9 -1.2
The table displays summary statistics on the reduction of travel time between 2000 and 2004 and 2004
and 2008 separately for the new high speed routes and other routes.
Table C.12: Robustness check, managerial share, treated establishments
Establishment managerial share (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dθ↓,ijt −2.856∗ −0.643∗ −0.614 −0.669∗
(1.086) (0.364) (0.387) (0.288)
R-squared 0.872 0.855 0.867 0.855
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,399 37,798 201,895 37,798
2000-2010 panel, only firms with at least 10 employees. Standard errors clustered at county level in
parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: share of employees
of establishment in managerial occupations. Independent variable: see Table 3.8. Column 1: Only years
2000, 2004, and 2008. Column 2: control group includes establishments with travel time reduction of
less than 30 minutes. Column 3: control group of column 2 plus establishments in counties without ICE
train station. Column 4: Dθ↓,ijt defined as equal to 1 if travel time to headquarters is reduced by at
least 10 minutes and zero otherwise.
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